Rosendale v. Mahoney and The Millbrook Central School District , 369 F. App'x 313 ( 2010 )

08-2988-cv
Rosendale v. Mahoney and The Millbrook Central School District
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 18 th day of March, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 GERARD E. LYNCH,
9 Circuit Judge,
10 JANE A. RESTANI, *
11 Judge.
12
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
14 DONALD P. ROSENDALE,
15
16 Plaintiff-Appellee,
17
18 -v.- 08-2988-cv
19
20 W. MICHAEL MAHONEY, individually and
21 as superintendent of the Millbrook,
22 N.Y. School District, and THE
23 MILLBROOK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
24
25 Defendants-Appellants.
26 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
*
The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge of the
United States Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
1 APPEARING FOR APPELLANTS: Mark C. Rushfield, Shaw,
2 Perelson, May & Lambert, LLP,
3 Poughkeepsie, NY.
4
5 APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: Donald P. Rosendale, pro se,
6 Amenia, NY.
7
8
9 Appeal from an interlocutory order of the United States
10 District Court for the Southern District of New York
11 (Brieant, J.).
12
13 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
14 AND DECREED that the order of the district court be REVERSED
15 and REMANDED.
16
17 Defendant-appellant W. Michael Mahoney appeals from an
18 interlocutory order of the United States District Court for
19 the Southern District of New York (Brieant, J.) denying his
20 motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified
21 immunity. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
22 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
23 presented for review.
24
25 We have jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order
26 doctrine because Mahoney “contends that on stipulated facts,
27 or on the facts that the plaintiff alleges are true, or on
28 the facts favorable to the plaintiff that the trial judge
29 concluded the jury might find, the immunity defense is
30 established as a matter of law because those facts show . .
31 . that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that
32 his action did not violate clearly established law.” Salim
33 v. Proulx, 93 F.3d 86, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1996). We lack
34 jurisdiction to “entertain an interlocutory appeal”
35 contending that the district court “committed an error of
36 law in ruling that [Rosendale’s] evidence was sufficent to
37 create a jury issue on the facts relevant to [Mahoney’s]
38 immunity defense.” Id. at 91. We therefore do not decide
39 whether there are genuine issues of material fact as to
40 whether the letters and alleged oral assurances give rise to
41 a contractual relationship between Rosendale and defendant-
42 appellant Millbrook Central School District (the “School
43 District”), which, in turn, might give rise to a protected
44 property interest requiring notice and a hearing prior to
45 Rosendale’s removal from the call list for substitute
2
1 teachers. **
2
3 However, assuming arguendo that such evidence gives
4 rise to a genuine issue of material fact regarding a
5 protected property interest, we nevertheless conclude that
6 Mahoney’s actions in removing Rosendale’s name from the call
7 list of substitute teachers was objectively reasonable.
8 Reasonable superintendents could disagree as to whether such
9 removal required notice and a pre-removal hearing based on
10 the then-current state of the law. See Salim, 93 F.3d at 91
11 (“The objective reasonableness test is met if officers of
12 reasonable competence could disagree on the legality of the
**
The Supreme Court has recognized that property
interests “are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits.” Bd. of Regents of State
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Magistrate Judge
Smith recognized this principle and the district court
adopted her Report and Recommendation as its decision.
However, neither the Report and Recommendation nor the
district court order addresses decisions of the New York
State Commissioner of Education holding that form letters
such as those received by Rosendale do “not constitute a
binding employment contract.” In the Matter of Bonnie L.
Barkley, Decision No. 14,912, 2003 NY Educ. Dept. LEXIS 177,
at *6 (N.Y. Educ. Dep’t July 28, 2003); see also In the
Matter of Barbara Martin, Decision No. 11,484, 25 Educ.
Dep’t Rep. 21, 22 (N.Y. Educ. Dep’t July 12, 1985) (“The
letter of Superintendent Thomas to petitioner dated August
29, 1984 notifying petitioner of her appointment as a
regular substitute teacher and setting forth her salary for
the 1984-85 school year did not create a definite term of
employment . . . .”).
On remand, the district court should evaluate whether,
as a matter of law, such decisions indicate that Rosendale’s
letters cannot give rise to a protected property interest.
On remand, the district court should further evaluate
whether a genuine issue of material fact truly exists with
respect to the alleged oral assurances in light of
Rosendale’s deposition testimony about the substance and
timing of those assurances and the affidavits and deposition
testimony of other individuals.
3
1 defendant’s actions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of
3 summary judgment to Mahoney (in his personal capacity) on
4 the ground of qualified immunity. See Almonte v. City of
5 Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A]n official
6 is entitled to qualified immunity . . . if the official’s
7 actions were not objectively unreasonable in light of
8 clearly established law.”).
9
10 We decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
11 Rosendale’s procedural due process claim against Mahoney in
12 his official capacity and against the School District.
13 “Where we have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of
14 one ruling, we have the discretion to exercise pendent
15 appellate jurisdiction over other district court rulings
16 that are inextricably intertwined or necessary to ensure
17 meaningful review of the first. We recognize, however, that
18 pendent appellate jurisdiction should be exercised
19 sparingly, if ever.” See Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134,
20 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations
21 omitted). Our objective reasonableness ruling does not
22 require us to decide (i) whether Rosendale’s letters and
23 alleged oral assurances give rise to a contractual
24 relationship which, in turn, gives rise to a protected
25 property interest requiring notice and a hearing prior to
26 Rosendale’s removal from the call list for substitute
27 teachers; (ii) whether any such right to procedural due
28 process was clearly established; or (iii) whether Mahoney
29 acted independently, with the authority of the School
30 District or the State, or with the apparent authority of the
31 School District or the State. Accordingly, the objective
32 reasonableness analysis does not warrant the exercise of
33 appellate pendent jurisdiction over the remaining claim in
34 this action.
35
36 Finding no merit in Mahoney’s remaining arguments, we
37 REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for
38 further proceedings consistent with this order.
39
40
41 FOR THE COURT:
42 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
43
44
45
4