Hamilton v. United States , 592 F. App'x 43 ( 2015 )

13-3516
Hamilton v. United States of America
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 6th day of February, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
8 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
9 Circuit Judges.
10
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
12 JEFFREY EARL HAMILTON,
13 Petitioner-Appellant,
14
15 -v.- 13-3516
16
17 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
18 Respondent-Appellee.
19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
20
21 FOR APPELLANT: SALLY WASSERMAN, New York, New
22 York.
23
24 FOR APPELLEE: HIRAL D. MEHTA, with Susan
25 Corkery on the brief, Assistant
26 United States Attorneys (for
27 Loretta E. Lynch, United States
28 Attorney for the Eastern
1
1 District of New York), Brooklyn,
2 New York.
3
4 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
5 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Ross, J.).
6
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
8 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
9 AFFIRMED.
10
11 Jeffrey Earl Hamilton appeals from the judgment of the
12 United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
13 York (Ross, J.), denying his motion to vacate, set aside, or
14 correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Hamilton
15 contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for
16 providing bad advice about whether to enter a guilty plea.
17 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
18 facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for
19 review.
20
21 On “an appeal from the denial of a § 2255 motion, we
22 review the district court’s factual findings for clear error
23 and its legal conclusions de novo.” Rosario v. United
24 States, 164 F.3d 729, 735 (2d Cir. 1998).
25
26 “Section 2255 allows a federal prisoner to attack
27 collaterally his sentence on the grounds that it was
28 ‘imposed in violation of the Constitution.’” Morales v.
29 United States, 635 F.3d 39, 42-43 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting 28
30 U.S.C. § 2255(a)). “Because the Sixth Amendment provides
31 criminal defendants with the right to effective assistance
32 of counsel, inadequate representation is a basis for relief
33 under section 2255.” Id. at 43 (internal citation and
34 emphasis omitted).
35
36 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
37 counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s
38 performance was “deficient” as measured by an “objective
39 standard of reasonableness,” and (2) actual prejudice
40 resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88
41 (1984).
42
43 The Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel “extends
44 to the plea-bargaining process.” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.
45 Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012). “To establish Strickland prejudice
46 . . . [i]n the context of pleas[,] a defendant must show the
47 outcome of the plea process would have been different with
2
1 competent advice. Id. When the prejudice alleged is the
2 rejection of a plea offer,
3
4 a defendant must show that but for the ineffective
5 advice of counsel there is a reasonable
6 probability that the plea offer would have been
7 presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant
8 would have accepted the plea and the prosecution
9 would not have withdrawn it in light of
10 intervening circumstances), that the court would
11 have accepted its terms, and that the conviction
12 or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms
13 would have been less severe than under the
14 judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.
15
16 Id. at 1385.
17
18 At a lengthy evidentiary hearing, Hamilton testified
19 that--contrary to prior assertions in his written filings--
20 he was the one who decided to reject several plea offers
21 from the government before trial, over counsel’s strenuous
22 and repeated recommendations that he accept. Hamilton’s
23 trial counsel testified to the same effect. The district
24 court credited that testimony: “it is not reasonably
25 probable that Hamilton would have accepted any of the
26 government’s plea offers,” even if counsel had rendered
27 different advice.
28
29 The district court denied relief on the ground that
30 Hamilton cannot sustain his burden to show prejudice--even
31 assuming that counsel’s performance was constitutionally
32 deficient (an issue we need not and do not reach).
33
34 In finding an absence of prejudice, the district court
35 relied on material contradictions between Hamilton’s habeas
36 petition and his sworn testimony at the evidentiary hearing:
37
38 Ultimately, the court disbelieves petitioner’s
39 testimony that he would have pleaded guilty but
40 for [trial counsel’s] allegedly deficient plea
41 advice. Hamilton’s lack of veracity as to this
42 critical issue--and his willingness to
43 misrepresent the facts to secure habeas relief--is
44 reflected in the significant contradictions
45 between the statements in his petition and at the
46 hearing. Perhaps most strikingly, Hamilton
47 initially insisted that [counsel] had advised him
3
1 to reject the two written plea offers. Only after
2 the government disclosed the tape recordings that
3 clearly indicated otherwise did petitioner admit
4 that [counsel] had, in fact, repeatedly urged him
5 to accept the deals.
6
7 The district court did not clearly err in finding that
8 Hamilton was not credible on the decisive question of why he
9 rejected all of the government’s plea offers. Accordingly,
10 he cannot show prejudice stemming from the decision to
11 reject the government’s pre-trial plea offers.
12
13 Hamilton also claims that his attorney provided
14 deficient representation when Hamilton asked him mid-trial
15 whether Hamilton should consider pleading to the indictment,
16 and his attorney responded that such a course was not
17 advisable. As to this claim, Hamilton has not met his
18 burden to show prejudice because the prospect of an
19 acceptance-of-responsibility reduction at sentencing is far-
20 fetched given the facts of this case. See United States v.
21 Nouri, 711 F.3d 129, 146 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 134 S. Ct.
22 309 (2013).
23
24 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
25 Hamilton’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
26 the district court.
27
28 FOR THE COURT:
29 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
30
4