The New York State Police Investigators Association v. the State of New ( 2022 )


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  • 18-3066
    The New York State Police Investigators Association v. The State of New York
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
    SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
    FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
    CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
    EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
    “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
    ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
    City of New York, on the 27th day of July, two thousand twenty-two.
    PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN,
    GERARD E. LYNCH,
    Circuit Judges.*
    ————————————————————————
    NEW YORK STATE POLICE
    INVESTIGATORS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL
    4 IUPA, AFL-CIO BY ITS PRESIDENT
    JEFFREY KAYSER, JOSEPH BARRETT,
    INDIVIDUALLY, TIMOTHY MULVEY,
    ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL
    OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, JAMES
    O'CONNOR, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF
    AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY
    SITUATED, LAWRENCE SHEWARK, ON
    BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS
    *
    Judge Peter W. Hall, originally a member of the panel in this case, died on March 11, 2021.
    The two remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement, authorized the issuance of
    this Summary Order. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 46
    (d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone,
    
    140 F.3d 457
    , 458-59 (2d Cir. 1998).
    SIMILARLY SITUATED, PATRICIA
    HYNES, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND
    ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
    JEFFREY KAYSER,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                           No. 18-3066-cv
    KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, IN HER
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF
    THE STATE OF NEW YORK, PATRICIA A.
    HITE, INDIVIDUALLY, REBECCA A.
    CORSO, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
    ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW
    YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL
    SERVICE, CAROLINE W. AHL, IN HER
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
    COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK
    STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
    LANI V. JONES, IN HER OFFICIAL
    CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
    NEW YORK STATE CIVIL SERVICE
    COMMISSION, ROBERT L. MEGNA,
    INDIVIDUALLY, ROBERT F. MUJICA, JR.,
    IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
    DIRECTOR OF THE NEW YORK STATE
    DIVISION OF THE BUDGET, THOMAS P.
    DINAPOLI, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
    AS COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF
    NEW YORK,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    STATE OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK
    STATE DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL
    SERVICE, NEW YORK STATE CIVIL
    SERVICE COMMISSION, NEW YORK
    STATE AND LOCAL RETIREMENT
    2
    SYSTEM, NEW YORK STATE POLICE
    AND FIRE RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
    Defendants.
    ————————————————————————
    FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS:              MARK T. WALSH, Gleason, Dunn, Walsh
    & O’Shea, Albany, NY.
    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:               FREDERICK A. BRODIE, Assistant
    Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood,
    Solicitor General, Andrea Oser, Deputy
    Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia
    James, Attorney General, State of New
    York, Albany, NY.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of
    New York (Mae A. D’Agostino, Judge).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
    AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants the New York State Police Investigators Association,
    Local 4, IUPA, AFL-CIO (“NYSPIA”) and current and former members of that
    union (collectively, “the NYSPIA Plaintiffs”) appeal the judgment of the United
    States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Mae A. D’Agostino,
    J.) granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees, various State officials
    (collectively, “the State”) on all claims in this contractual and constitutional
    3
    dispute growing out of the State’s 2011 decision to alter its rates of contribution to
    retired former employees’ health insurance plans. We assume the parties’
    familiarity with the facts, the procedural history of the case, and the
    specifications of issues on appeal, which we set forth only as necessary to explain
    our decision.
    We reserved decision in this case pending disposition of Donohue v. Hochul,
    No. 18-3193-cv, which was designated both in the district court and in this Court
    as the lead case of eleven related cases alleging breach of contract and
    constitutional contract-impairment claims based on the alteration of State health
    insurance contribution rates for retirees. Following this Court’s final disposition
    of Donohue, we directed the parties in this and the other related cases “to file
    letter-briefs stating their views on how their case should be resolved in light of
    Donohue v. Cuomo (‘Donohue II’), 
    980 F.3d 53
     (2d Cir. 2020), Donohue v. Cuomo
    (‘Donohue III’), 
    38 N.Y.3d 1
     (2022), and Donohue v. Hochul, [
    32 F.4th 200
     (2d Cir.
    2022)] (‘Donohue IV’),” addressing in particular “the extent to which anything in
    the collective bargaining agreements at issue in the case, or any other
    circumstances specific to the case, distinguish the case from Donohue.” ECF No.
    115 at 2.
    The NYSPIA Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and contractual impairment
    4
    claims, like those in Donohue, necessarily fail absent provisions guaranteeing a
    lifetime vested right to continuous contribution rates from the State for retirees.
    See Donohue IV, 32 F.4th at 206. In their supplemental letter-brief, the NYSPIA
    Plaintiffs make two arguments for the existence of such a right, or at least
    ambiguity concerning it, with no parallel discussed in Donohue.
    First, the NYSPIA Plaintiffs cite a provision stating that “[t]he State shall
    continue to provide all the forms and extent of coverage as defined by the
    contracts in force on [the date of the CBA] with the State’s health and dental
    insurance carriers unless specifically modified or replaced pursuant to this
    Agreement.” J. App’x at 1743. While not identical, that provision is similar to one
    at issue in Donohue, which provided that “[e]mployees covered by the State
    Health Insurance Plan have the right to retain health insurance after retirement
    upon completion of ten years of service.” Donohue II, 980 F.3d at 72 (alteration in
    original). In Donohue II, before we had the benefit of the New York Court of
    Appeals’s guidance, we noted that if “a ‘right to retain coverage after retirement’
    is properly understood as a vested right . . . it is ‘plausible’ that the scope of a
    vested right to coverage would encompass a right to fixed costs such as co-pays
    or, perhaps, contribution rates.” Id. at 73, quoting Kolbe v. Tibbetts, 
    22 N.Y.3d 344
    ,
    5
    355 (2013). The same logic would seem to apply to a provision concerning “the
    forms and extent of coverage.” J. App’x at 1743. But the New York Court of
    Appeals made clear in Donohue III that such language cannot “establish a vested
    right to lifetime fixed premium contributions” that extends past the duration of
    the CBA, 38 N.Y.3d at 19, and we accordingly held in Donohue IV, applying New
    York law, that it cannot support an inference of ambiguity, 32 F.4th at 208. In
    other words, the provision that the NYSPIA Plaintiffs cite is silent on a
    continuing right to a particular level of contribution payments, and thus, like the
    plaintiffs in Donohue, the NYSPIA Plaintiffs “ask us to infer” the existence of a
    lifetime vested right for retirees, or at least “ambiguity[,] from what the CBAs do
    not say rather than anything they do say,” which, as a matter of New York law, we
    may not do, Donohue IV, 32 F.4th at 208; see Donohue III, 38 N.Y.3d at 17-18.
    Second, the NYSPIA Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish their case from
    Donohue on the ground that the State conceded in two district court filings that an
    older CBA intended to last from 1999 to 2003, setting the State’s contribution
    rates for active employees to 90% for individual coverage and 75% for dependent
    coverage, “remained in effect” at the time that the State modified the contribution
    rates for retirees. Appellants’ Supp. Letter-Br. at 9, quoting J. App’x at 204. That
    6
    argument is not persuasive. While the State acknowledged in its statement of
    material facts below that, “[a]s of the filing of the Amended Complaint, on
    February 28, 2014, the 1999-2003 CBA remained in effect,” J. App’x at 204, that
    acknowledgment is immaterial because that CBA did not expressly set
    contribution rates for retirees and, for the reasons explained above and in
    Donohue IV, 32 F.4th at 206-11, we cannot infer the existence of such rates from
    the CBA’s silence.
    The other representations to the district court that the NYSPIA Plaintiffs
    cite are not the concessions that the supplemental letter-brief makes them out to
    be. The NYSPIA Plaintiffs argue that by failing, in its response to the NYSPIA
    Plaintiffs’ statement of material facts, to dispute the assertion that “the State . . .
    presented a formal collective bargaining proposal to NYSPIA which sought to
    modify the existing agreement as it pertained to the retiree health insurance
    premium contribution 90%/10% and 75%/25%,” J. App’x at 2488, the State
    conceded that “there was an ‘existing agreement as it pertained to the retiree health
    insurance premium contribution” rates. Appellants’ Supp. Letter-Br. at 9, quoting
    J. App’x at 2488 (emphasis in original). But admitting the existence of a proposal
    “to modify the existing agreement as it pertained to the retiree health insurance
    7
    premium contribution” rates, J. App’x at 2488, is not the same thing as admitting
    that that agreement, objectively and by its express terms, had anything to say
    about the rates for the State’s contribution to retired former employees’ health
    insurance plans. The NYSPIA Plaintiffs further argue that by acknowledging in
    its summary judgment brief below that the CBAs “guaranteed that the plaintiffs
    would receive the health insurance coverage that was in effect at the time of their
    retirement,” Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Support of S.J., New York State Police
    Investigators Ass’n v. New York, Dkt. No. 88-1, No. 11-cv-1527 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 3,
    2017), and in its reply brief “that retirees have a vested right to continued health
    insurance benefits,” Defs.’ Reply Mem. of Law in Support of S.J., New York State
    Police Investigators Ass’n v. New York, Dkt. No. 98, 11-cv-1527 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 26,
    2018), the State conceded that at the time of the rate modification, it was obligated
    to continue providing coverage to NYSPIA retirees at the same contribution rate
    set forth at the time of their retirement. However, the claimed concession does
    not follow from the quoted passages. As explained above and in Donohue II, 980
    F.3d at 73, a reference to the same “coverage” or “benefits” does not necessarily
    include contribution rates. Conceding an obligation to continue providing
    “coverage” or “benefits” therefore does not imply a concession that that
    8
    obligation includes a particular contribution rate.
    We therefore hold that the district court correctly granted summary
    judgment to the State on the NYSPIA Plaintiffs’ claims for the same reasons
    explained in Donohue IV, 32 F.4th at 206-11.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-3066

Filed Date: 7/27/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/27/2022