M.A. v. Rockland County Department of Health ( 2022 )

21-551-cv
M.A. v. Rockland County Department of Health
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2021
No. 21-551
M.A., on behalf of his minor children, H.R. & M., M.C., on behalf of her minor
child, R.J., W.D., on behalf of his minor children, A. & J., N.D., on behalf of her
minor children, L.M. & P., E.E., J., on behalf of their minor children, A. & S., J.J., on
behalf of her minor child R., L.V.G., on behalf of his four minor children, P.J., on
behalf of his minor child A., D. on behalf of their minor children, S. & O., R.J. on
behalf of their minor children S. & O., K.K., on behalf of her minor children M. &
G., L.K. on behalf of his minor child L., M.K., on behalf of his minor child, A.,
V.L., on behalf of their two minor children, V.M., on behalf of their minor child,
I., A.M., on behalf of their minor child, I., T. on behalf of their minor children Y.,
N. & S., M.M., on behalf of their minor children Y., N. & S., K.M.M., on behalf of
their minor children, S., K. & L., W.M., on behalf of their minor children, S., K. &
L., K.M., on behalf of their minor children, R. & A., J.O., on behalf of her minor
child, T., M.P., on behalf of his minor children, TR. & TE., L.P., on behalf of her
minor child, M., M.R., on behalf of her minor children, R. & E., J.R., T.T., on behalf
of his minor child, M., Y.T., on behalf of her minor child, Y., J.E., M.O.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ROCKLAND COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DR. PATRICIA SCHNABEL RUPPERT,
in her official capacity as Commissioner and in her individual capacity,
1
ROCKLAND COUNTY, ED DAY, in his official capacity as County Executive and in
his individual capacity, 1
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
No. 19-cv-2066
(Argued: June 14, 2022; Decided: November 9, 2022)
Before: POOLER, PARK, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, who are the parents of minor children enrolled in the
Green Meadow Waldorf School or the Otto Specht School and are residents of
Rockland County, New York, bring this action against the Rockland County
Department of Health and several Rockland County officials asserting various
claims, including a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
based on orders which excluded children who were not vaccinated against
measles from attending school and an emergency declaration which barred
unvaccinated children, other than those with medical exemptions, from places of
public assembly.
Defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment, and the district
court granted their motion in full. We disagree with the district court’s dismissal
of Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claim because this claim raises numerous factual
disputes—including whether there is evidence of religious animus, to whom the
emergency declaration applied, and what the County’s purpose was in enacting
the declaration—that prevent Defendants from prevailing on summary judgment.
1The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption to
conform to the above.
2
For the reasons explained below, we VACATE in part as to the grant of
summary judgment on the Free Exercise claim, REVERSE the district court’s
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims, and REMAND for trial on the Free Exercise claim
and for consideration of whether partial summary judgment for the Defendants is
warranted on the remaining claims.
Judge Park concurs in a separate opinion.
MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, Sussman &
Associates, Goshen, New York, for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.
LARRAINE FEIDEN, Principal Assistant
County Attorney (Patrick John
Fischer, Principal Assistant County
Attorney, on the brief), for Thomas E.
Humbach, County Attorney, County
of Rockland Department of Law,
New City, New York, for Defendants-
Appellees.
EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellants, who are the parents of minor children enrolled in the
Green Meadow Waldorf School or the Otto Specht School and are residents of
Rockland County, New York, bring this action against the Rockland County
Department of Health and several Rockland County officials asserting various
claims, including a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
3
based on orders which excluded children who were not vaccinated against
measles from attending school and an emergency declaration which barred
unvaccinated children, other than those with medical exemptions, from places of
public assembly.
Defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment, and the district
court granted their motion in full. We disagree with the district court’s dismissal
of Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claim because this claim raises numerous factual
disputes—including whether there is evidence of religious animus, to whom the
emergency declaration applied, and what the County’s purpose was in enacting
the declaration—that prevent Defendants from prevailing on summary judgment.
For the reasons explained below, we VACATE in part as to the grant of
summary judgment on the Free Exercise claim, REVERSE the district court’s
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims, and REMAND for trial on the Free Exercise claim
and for consideration of whether partial summary judgment for the Defendants is
warranted on the remaining claims.
BACKGROUND
Beginning in October 2018, Rockland County experienced a measles
outbreak—the largest outbreak in New York since measles was declared
4
eradicated in 2000. The Rockland County Department of Health (“RC DOH”),
including Defendant-Appellee Patricia Schnabel Ruppert, the Commissioner of
Health of the Rockland County Health District, coordinated with the New York
State Department of Health (“NY DOH”) to identify cases and implement contact
tracing methods. Isolation at home was recommended for those who had been
exposed and lacked immunity. However, cases began to spread.
That same month, RC DOH began to issue temporary orders of exclusion to
schools with one or more measles case, requiring that unvaccinated and partially
vaccinated children stay home. After cases continued to rise, NY DOH and RC
DOH broadened their school exclusion orders on November 1, 2018, to reach
schools without infected students, but with low vaccination rates, if those schools
were in close geographic proximity to the areas with the highest concentration of
confirmed cases. The NY DOH identified two zip codes with the highest
concentrations of confirmed cases, which cover approximately eleven square miles
and primarily contain Hasidic Jewish communities. At first, a low vaccination rate
was considered under 70%, but since less restrictive means did not quell the
outbreak, Ruppert upped the low vaccination rate designation to 80% and then
95%.
5
On December 3, 2018, RC DOH ordered the Green Meadow Waldorf School
and its sister school, the Otto Specht School (collectively, “GMWS”), to exclude all
non-vaccinated students for twenty-one days because it was in one of the
identified zip codes and its vaccination rate was only about one-third of students
(“First Exclusion Order”). Prior to the start of the measles outbreak, all of
Plaintiffs’ children had previously received religious exemptions to vaccination,
including for measles, from GMWS. 2 However, the First Exclusion Order and the
subsequent exclusion orders provided no religious or medical exemptions. By
December 21, 2018, 105 cases had been reported in Rockland County, up from
forty-five in late October, 3 and RC DOH issued another order informing GMWS
that if it reached the threshold of 95% vaccinated, then RC DOH would lift the
current exclusion order (“Second Exclusion Order”). RC DOH sent additional
exclusion orders to other schools with vaccination rates under 95% on January 3,
2019.
2Approximately forty-four percent of GMWS’s elementary school population
had religious exemptions to vaccination. However, GMWS is not a religious-
based school.
3New York State Measles Watch, N.Y. ST. DEP’T HEALTH,
https://nyshc.health.ny.gov/web/nyapd/measles-watch.
6
On January 30, 2019, RC DOH found that GMWS high school had achieved
a 95% vaccination rate for students under eighteen and lifted the high school’s
exclusion order. However, on February 7, 2019, GMWS was informed that as long
as any active case of measles existed in Rockland County, the exclusion orders on
the lower school would not be lifted until the school achieved a 95% vaccination
rate or forty-two days passed without any new cases (“Third Exclusion Order”).
These Exclusion Orders formed the basis for Plaintiffs’ initial complaint in this
action, which was filed in federal court on March 6, 2019, and alleged various
claims against RC DOH and Defendant Ruppert.
In March 2019, NY DOH reported that Rockland County had seen a total of
152 measles cases since the outbreak began in October, which included a rise in
cases from the 116 cases that had been reported in January. On March 26, 2019,
Defendant-Appellee Ed Day, Rockland County Executive, issued a Local State of
Emergency Declaration (the “Emergency Declaration” or the “Declaration”),
barring unvaccinated children under the age of eighteen, except for those with a
medical exemption or documented serological immunity, from places of public
assembly, including schools. The Declaration provided that:
From 12:01 a.m. March 27, 2019 to 11:59 p.m. on April 25, 2019, no
parent or guardian of a minor or infant under the age of 18, shall
7
cause, allow, permit, or suffer a minor or infant under their
supervision, to enter any place of public assembly in Rockland
County, if that minor or infant is not vaccinated against measles for
any reason other than being serologically immune to measles as
documented by a physician, or prevented from receiving a measles
vaccination for a medical reason documented by a physician, or
because the infant is under the age of 6 months.
Joint App’x at JA-1648. At his deposition, Day testified that he issued the
Declaration after Ruppert expressed concern regarding a possible rise in measles
during the upcoming holiday season of Easter and Passover. Ruppert, however,
testified that she “had no direct role” in the development of the Declaration. Joint
App’x at JA-356.
On April 3, 2019, in an Article 78 proceeding before the Supreme Court,
County of Rockland, and while the federal lawsuit was still pending, Plaintiffs
sought a preliminary injunction ordering Rockland County to rescind the
Emergency Declaration and Third Exclusion Order. See Order to Show Cause,
W.D. v. Cnty. of Rockland, No. 31783/2019 (Sup. Ct. Rockland Cnty. Apr. 3, 2019),
ECF No. 2. The court granted the motion on April 5, 2019. W.D. v. Cnty. of
Rockland, 101 N.Y.S.3d 820, 824 (Sup. Ct. 2019). On April 19, 2019, the Second
Department denied Rockland County’s motion for leave to appeal and to stay
enforcement of the Supreme Court’s ruling. Decision & Order on Motion, W.D. v.
8
Cnty. of Rockland, No. 2019-03666 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t Apr. 19, 2019), ECF No.
45.
Later in April, Day and Ruppert lobbied New York legislators to repeal New
York State’s statutory religious exemption to the vaccine requirement for school
children, which requires vaccination against measles. In support of the repeal,
Day stated: “There’s no such thing as a religious exception. The bottom line here
is that in addition to the fear factor, we have, we have babies in ICU’s. We’ve had
a baby born with measles. When are we going to wake up and say, ‘you know
something, let’s do the right thing here . . . .’” Joint App’x at JA-1724, JA-2195. Day
also characterized “anti-vaxxers” as “loud, very vocal, also very ignorant.” Joint
App’x at JA-2186. The New York legislature passed a bill repealing all religious
exemptions for vaccination on June 13, 2019. S. 2994A, 2019-2020 S., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2019). On September 25, 2019, Rockland County declared an end to the
resurgence.
In their amended complaint in federal court, which added Day and the
County as Defendants, as well as claims based on the Emergency Declaration,
Plaintiffs alleged a violation of procedural due process, violation of the First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause, violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
9
Protection Clause, and violation of the right to publicly assemble under the First
Amendment. Plaintiffs claimed that the Exclusion Orders and Emergency
Declaration impermissibly targeted them based on their sincerely held religious
beliefs. Following discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all
claims.
The district court granted Defendants’ motion in full. W.D. v. Rockland
Cnty., 521 F. Supp. 3d 358, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2021). As relevant to Plaintiffs’ Free
Exercise claim, the district court found that the Emergency Declaration prohibiting
unvaccinated children, except those with a medical exemption, from assembly in
certain public places was “subject to rational basis review because it [was] both
facially neutral and generally applicable.” Id. at 397. As to neutrality, the district
court observed that the Declaration applied to all “children between six months
and eighteen years old who were unvaccinated ‘for any reason,’ except those with
documented medical reasons preventing vaccination or those deemed
serologically immune.” Id. at 398. Moreover, the Declaration applied equally to all
types of gatherings and did not distinguish between religious and non-religious
children. Id. at 398–400. The district court found no disputed facts as to
discriminatory intent, despite Day’s comments regarding “anti-vaxxers,” because
10
those comments “d[id] not raise a triable issue of fact as to discriminatory intent
because none of Day’s statements are derogatory, nor do they indicate ‘active
hostility’ towards religion.” Id. at 400–01 (citation omitted).
The district court concluded that the Declaration was generally applicable
because it “impose[d] identical burdens on religious and non-religious conduct”
and observed that the Declaration applied to children other than those with
religious affiliations, including those who were homeschooled or were not
vaccinated for non-religious reasons. Id. at 402–03. Plaintiffs argued that because
the Declaration provided only a medical exemption, it was underinclusive, and
likely targeting religion, given that children who are unvaccinated for medical
reasons are “just as likely” as children unvaccinated for religious reasons “to
become infected and spread the virus” if permitted to gather in public places. Id.
at 403. Rejecting Plaintiffs’ argument, the court explained that “the medical
exemption was created to control the measles outbreak by encouraging
vaccination” of all those who could be vaccinated, “while protecting those who
could not be inoculated for medical reasons.” Id.
Applying rational basis review, the district court found that the Emergency
Declaration was rationally related to Defendants’ interest in controlling measles.
11
Id. at 406–07. Next, in the alternative, the district court evaluated the Declaration
under strict scrutiny, finding that the interest in quelling the measles outbreak was
compelling and that the Declaration was narrowly tailored in light of “Defendants’
previous unsuccessful efforts, the medical data and their limited resources in
March 2019.” Id. at 407–08. Finally, the district court found that Plaintiffs’
procedural due process claim, Equal Protection Clause claim, and freedom of
assembly claim all failed. Id. at 381–96, 409–14. This appeal, which challenges the
Exclusion Orders and Declaration, followed.
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor.” Guan v. City of N.Y.,
37 F.4th 797, 804 (2d Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
For the reasons explained below, we VACATE the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for Defendants as to the Free Exercise claim, REVERSE the
district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims, and REMAND for trial on the Free
12
Exercise claim and consideration of whether partial summary judgment is
warranted on the remaining claims.
DISCUSSION
Because there are factual issues relevant to whether the Emergency
Declaration was neutral and generally applicable, the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claim that the
Emergency Declaration violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. While
a reasonable juror could conclude that Day’s statements evinced religious animus,
rendering the Declaration not neutral, a reasonable juror could also conclude the
opposite. Similarly, there are disputes of fact regarding whether the Declaration,
in practice, primarily affected children of religious objectors or whether there was
a sizable population of children who were unvaccinated for a variety of non-
medical and non-religious reasons. There are also disputes as to whether the
County’s purpose in issuing the Declaration was to stop the spread of measles or
to encourage vaccination. Given these fact-intensive issues, the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Claim was erroneous. 4
4On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s decision in its entirety. Because
we find that the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise claim was
13
The Free Exercise Clause protects “the ability of those who hold religious
beliefs of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through ‘the performance of
(or abstention from) physical acts.’” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct. 2407,
2421 (2022) (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990)). However, “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes
(or proscribes).” Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Where a law is both neutral and generally applicable, rational basis
review applies. See Kane v. de Blasio, 19 F.4th 152, 166 (2d Cir. 2021). On the other
hand, where a law is not neutral or generally applicable, “this Court will find a
First Amendment violation unless the government can satisfy ‘strict scrutiny’ by
demonstrating its course was justified by a compelling state interest and was
narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest.” Kennedy, 142 S. Ct. at 2422 (quoting
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)). We
address neutrality and general applicability in turn.
erroneous, we reverse as to that claim, vacate the district court’s grant of summary
judgment as a whole, and remand for consideration of whether partial summary
judgment is justified on the remaining claims.
14
I. Neutrality
“[I]f the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of
their religious motivation, the law is not neutral.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533. “To
determine the object of a law, we must begin with its text, for the minimum
requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face.” Id. We find
that the Declaration is facially neutral in that it applies to all unvaccinated
children, but for two limited exceptions, in prohibiting them from entering a place
of public assembly. See We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, 281 (2d
Cir. 2021) (finding a rule facially neutral because it applied to “all
‘personnel,’ . . . aside from those who qualify for the narrowly framed medical
exemption”). However, “[o]fficial action that targets religious conduct for
distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement
of facial neutrality.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534.
We therefore consider whether the Declaration “had as [its] object the
suppression of religion” by assessing factors including, “the historical background
of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the
enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative
history, including contemporaneous statements made by members of the
15
decisionmaking body.” Id. at 540; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R.
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018) (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540).
“Government fails to act neutrally when it proceeds in a manner intolerant of
religious beliefs or restricts practices because of their religious nature.” Fulton v.
City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (2021).
Plaintiffs argue that the object of the Declaration was to burden the exercise
of their religious beliefs because Day and Ruppert acted with discriminatory
intent, evinced by Day’s statements made between April and June 2019.
Defendants respond that the statements do not illustrate discriminatory intent
because they were made several weeks after the Declaration was rescinded and in
a different context.
Given the fact-intensive nature of this inquiry, Defendants have not met the
high bar required to prevail at the summary-judgment stage. Contrary to the
district court’s holding, we conclude that a reasonable juror could find that
Defendants acted with religious animus. Notably, Day testified that he issued the
Declaration after Ruppert expressed concern over a rise in measles cases during
the Easter and Passover holidays. Moreover, in connection with his lobbying for
the repeal of a religious exemption to vaccination, Day commented that “[t]here’s
16
no such thing as a religious exception” and characterized “anti-vaxxers” as “very
ignorant.” Joint App’x at JA-1724. 5 Based on these facts, a reasonable juror could
find the Declaration was designed “to target religious objectors to the vaccine
requirement because of their religious beliefs.” We The Patriots, 17 F.4th at 284. As
the Supreme Court has recognized, the government “cannot act in a manner that
passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and
practices.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731.
Assessing the relevance of statements by public officials to the question of
religious animus is often context specific. In We The Patriots, this Court held that
statements made by Governor Kathy Hochul at a press conference, including that
her “‘personal opinion’ [was] that no religious exemption is required” and “that
she was ‘not aware of’ any ‘sanctioned religious exemption from any organized
religion,’” did not evince religious animosity in connection with a vaccine
requirement for healthcare workers that did not provide a religious exemption. 17
F.4th at 283–84. Unlike here, however, Governor Hochul did not actually issue the
vaccination rule, see id. at 274 (the rule “was issued by the State’s Public Health
5At oral argument, Defendants’ counsel reiterated Day’s sentiments, referring to
Plaintiffs’ “so-called religious beliefs.” Arg. 22:21–25.
17
and Health Planning Council, a group of 25 healthcare professionals, including the
Commissioner of Health”), and her statements merely appeared to express “the
State’s litigation position” and “the fact . . . that many religious leaders have stated
that vaccination is consistent with their faiths,” id. at 283-84. Ultimately, given that
it was Day himself who issued the Declaration and indicated that the religious
holidays were a factor in doing so, and that Day later made derogatory comments
about “anti-vaxxers,” which may include religious objectors, the evidence could
support a finding of discriminatory intent.
On the other hand, a juror could find that there is no evidence of religious
animus. Although Day stated that he issued the Declaration after Ruppert
expressed concern regarding measles cases during the religious holidays, a juror
could also credit Ruppert’s testimony that she had no direct role in developing the
Declaration. Additionally, Day’s remaining statements postdated the Declaration
and were made in connection with repealing the religious exemption, not issuing
the Declaration. Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–30 (finding
contemporaneous statements were evidence of religious animus). A reasonable
juror could conclude that while Day’s statements were “insensitive,” see W.D., 521
F. Supp. 3d at 401, he was merely expressing a concern for the community’s health,
18
not a hostility towards religion. At bottom, this presents the sort of close factual
question that should be left to the jury. The district court erred in holding
otherwise.
II. General Applicability
The general applicability requirement prohibits the government from “in a
selective manner impos[ing] burdens only on conduct motivated by religious
belief.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543. “A law . . . lacks general applicability if it
prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the
government’s asserted interests in a similar way.” Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877; see
Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of the U.S. & Can. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene,
763 F.3d 183, 197 (2d Cir. 2014) (“A law is therefore not generally applicable if it is
substantially underinclusive such that it regulates religious conduct while failing
to regulate secular conduct that is at least as harmful to the legitimate government
interests purportedly justifying it.”). “[W]hether two activities are comparable for
purposes of the Free Exercise Clause must be judged against the asserted
government interest that justifies the regulation at issue,” and “[c]omparability is
concerned with the risks various activities pose.” We The Patriots, 17 F.4th at 285
(quoting Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021)).
19
Plaintiffs argue that the Declaration is not generally applicable because the
medical exemption permits those who are unvaccinated for non-religious reasons
to assemble in public places. Plaintiffs characterize unvaccinated children who are
subject to the Declaration as falling into two groups—children with medical
exemptions and the children of religious objectors—with only the latter being
prohibited from public gatherings. Defendants counter that the Declaration
applied to multiple categories of non-religious, unvaccinated children, affecting
them to the same extent as Plaintiffs’ children.
Given the underdeveloped record, Defendants have failed to meet the
burden needed to prevail without trial on this issue. In finding the Declaration
generally applicable, the district court accepted the assertion that the Declaration
prohibited children other than those of religious objectors from public assembly.
See W.D., 521 F. Supp. 3d at 402. However, based on the record before us, we
cannot determine whether the Declaration affected only the two groups identified
by Plaintiffs or affected the other groups posited by the district court, such as
homeschooled students or those who objected to vaccination on philosophical
20
grounds. 6 Much like the question of religious animus, the question of who was
actually affected by the Declaration should be put before the factfinder.
Additionally, there is a dispute regarding what governmental interest the
Declaration was intended to serve, which is relevant to the question of whether
the Declaration was “substantially underinclusive,” and therefore, not generally
applicable. See We The Patriots, 17 F.4th at 284–85. Rockland County’s interest in
issuing the Declaration could be to stop the transmission of measles, which might
lead a factfinder to question why there was a medical exemption, where, as
Plaintiffs point out, medically exempt children “are every bit as likely to carry
undetected measles [as] a child with a religious exemption and are much more
vulnerable to the spread of the disease and serious health effects if they contract
it.” Appellants’ Br. at 56.
On the other hand, as advocated by Defendants, the purpose of the
Declaration could be to encourage vaccination. If this is the purpose, then the
Declaration could be viewed as a reasonable method for doing so. The language
of the Declaration itself, however, does little to resolve this issue, stating both that
6The district court’s citations to bolster this fact—which are to Defendants’
memoranda of law, see W.D., 521 F. Supp. 3d at 402—provide little factual
support.
21
“[i]t has been found that a meaningful portion of the County’s residents are not
vaccinated against the measles, which permits the outbreak to continue,” and that
the Declaration must be issued to “protect the infants, infirm, and ill of this County
who are unable to be vaccinated against the measles or who are
immunocompromised.” Joint App’x at JA-1647. This is another fact-intensive
question that should be explored at trial through the examination of evidence that
supports or undermines the two suggested purposes, including whether there is
any evidence to suggest that the County’s stated purpose is pretextual. See We The
Patriots, 17 F.4th at 285.
In sum, because factual questions about the Emergency Declaration pervade
the issues of neutrality and general applicability, the question of what level of
scrutiny applies cannot be resolved on summary judgment, and Defendants fail to
meet the high burden required to prevail at this stage. Therefore, the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ Free Exercise
claim was in error.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we VACATE in part as to the grant of
summary judgment on the Free Exercise claim, REVERSE the district court’s
22
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims, and REMAND for trial on the Free Exercise claim
and for consideration of whether partial summary judgment for the Defendants is
warranted on the remaining claims.
23
21-551-cv
M.A. v. Rockland Cnty. Dep’t of Health
PARK, Circuit Judge, concurring:
In the spring of 2019, Rockland County quarantined children
who were unvaccinated for measles for religious reasons—
prohibiting them from entering any public place—but not children
who were unvaccinated with medical exemptions. County officials
did not even try to hide their reasons for engaging in this “religious
gerrymander[ing],” which served to isolate, target, and burden
Plaintiffs’ religious practices. 1 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (citation omitted). To them,
Plaintiffs were “anti-vaxxers” who were “loud, very vocal, [and] also
very ignorant.” Special App’x at SA-12. “There’s no such thing as
a religious exemption,” they said, and Plaintiffs—all of whom
received valid exemptions from the State of New York—held beliefs
that “were debunked years ago.” Id. at SA-13. The officials’
justification for the mass quarantine was based on their concerns
about the spread of measles during the “Easter and Passover
1 At first, the County’s temporary orders of exclusion—which
included neither medical nor religious exemptions—targeted only schools
that actually had measles cases. But the First Exclusion Order relied on
supposed “mapping technology” to select schools that had no connection
to the outbreak other than proximity and vaccination rates below 70%.
Special App’x at SA-7. These criteria necessarily targeted nearby schools
with high numbers of religious objectors, especially in the Hasidic
community. Cf. Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 624 (2d Cir.
2020) (Governor segmenting population into “zones” with varying
religious constituencies). And once vaccination rates increased in those
schools, officials simply moved the goalposts, requiring higher percentage
thresholds. After this sort of targeting was no longer possible (because the
County imposed a broad-based, County-wide order via the Emergency
Declaration), the County included a medical exemption, while students
with religious objections were still subject to the mandate.
holidays.” Id. at SA-12. Even at oral argument before this Court,
Defendants’ counsel questioned Plaintiffs’ “so-called religious
beliefs.” Oral Arg. Tr. at 22:10.
I agree with the majority that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment for Defendants and by dismissing
Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs did not move for summary judgment, so
we are not presented today with the question whether they would
have prevailed if they had done so. The majority refrains from
applying Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), finding
close factual issues to be resolved at trial. But in my view, a
straightforward application of Smith to facts not in dispute shows that
the Emergency Declaration was neither neutral nor generally
applicable.
The Emergency Declaration was not neutral because its
“object” was to burden Plaintiffs’ choices “at least in part because of
their religious character.” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 142 S. Ct.
2407, 2422 (2022) (citation omitted). A review of the “historical
background,” “contemporaneous statements made by members of
the decisionmaking body,” and the “specific series of events leading
to the enactment” of the Emergency Declaration reveals its
discriminatory object. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540. County Executive
Day publicly defended the Declaration as an effort to address the risk
of rising measles cases during religious holidays, and he made
numerous disparaging comments about religious objectors as part of
his effort to repeal the religious exemption from the statewide vaccine
mandate. See Maj. Op. at 16–17.
Moreover, the Emergency Declaration was not generally
applicable because, by allowing a medical exemption, it “prohibit[ed]
2
religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that
undermine[d] the government’s asserted interests in a similar way.”
Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1877 (2021); see also Tandon v.
Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (“Comparability is concerned
with the risks various activities pose, not the reasons” for them.).
The County even conceded at oral argument that children who were
medically exempted from the mandate were given free rein
throughout the County, even though they posed identical risks to the
public as children seeking a religious exemption.
The Emergency Declaration was neither neutral nor generally
applicable and should thus be subject to strict scrutiny under Smith.
The district court erred by applying rational-basis review in the first
instance. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
Although the district court applied strict scrutiny in the
alternative, it improperly deferred to the “Defendants’ authority as
elected representatives to use their best judgment.” Special App’x at
SA-62. Courts “may not defer” to the executive on constitutional
questions “simply because he is addressing a matter involving science
or public health.” Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 635 (2d
Cir. 2020); see Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 (noting that strict scrutiny
should not be “watered . . . down but really means what it says”
(cleaned up)).
The majority opinion does not address whether the record
already supports a conclusion that the Emergency Declaration fails
strict scrutiny and Plaintiffs would thus be entitled to summary
judgment. On that understanding, I join the majority in vacating the
grant of summary judgment for Defendants and remanding for trial
on Plaintiffs’ free-exercise claim.
3
I note two additional points. First, during the events at issue
in this case, New York amended its school-vaccination requirements
to eliminate the state’s religious exemption altogether—while still
allowing medically exempt students to enter school classrooms. See
2019 N.Y. Laws ch. 35, § 1 (repealing N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2164(9)).
Indeed, Defendants made their derogatory comments about
Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs while lobbying New York state legislators
to repeal the religious exemption (after enforcement of the Emergency
Declaration had been enjoined 2 ). New York’s school-vaccination
laws are now an extreme outlier. 3 We have not yet had occasion to
review the constitutionality of New York’s new regime. 4
Second, this case highlights the difficulty of applying Smith.
General applicability turns on whether an exception “undermines the
purposes of the law” at issue or “undermines the government’s
asserted interests in a similar way” that a requested religious
exemption would. Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 209 (3d
2 See W.D. v. Cnty. of Rockland, 101 N.Y.S.3d 820 (Sup. Ct. 2019).
3 See States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School
Immunization Requirements, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (May 25, 2022),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-
state-laws.aspx (listing only six states with neither religious nor personal-
belief exemptions, three of which repealed such exceptions within the last
few years).
4 In accordance with Smith, we said that “New York could
constitutionally require that all children be vaccinated in order to attend
public school” and that the state “goes beyond what the Constitution
requires by allowing an exemption for parents with genuine and sincere
religious beliefs.” Phillips v. City of N.Y., 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015).
But we have never said that allowing some unvaccinated students (i.e., those
with medical exemptions) to mingle with their peers in schools, while
excluding religious objectors, would be constitutional.
4
Cir. 2004) (Alito, J.); Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877. But laws can have
various purposes and advance various interests. The Emergency
Declaration, for example, could be viewed as an effort aimed
narrowly at preventing the spread of measles, broadly at promoting
public health, or something in between at both stopping the spread
and “encouraging vaccination of all those for whom it was medically
possible.” Special App’x at SA-52. The more narrowly a law’s
purpose is construed, the more difficult it is for an exception to
undercut it—at a granular enough level, the purpose of any law is
simply to “appl[y] to everything it applies to.” Douglas Laycock &
Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 95 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 16 (2016). Conversely, a law’s purpose
could be framed broadly—for example, “to promote public health”—
so that an exception would rarely undermine it. See Does 1–3 v. Mills,
142 S. Ct. 17, 20 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of
application for injunctive relief) (“[A]n error this Court has long
warned against [is] restating the State’s interests . . . at an artificially
high level of generality.”).
In short, the general-applicability test embraces a purposivist
approach that is vulnerable to manipulation and arbitrariness. And
although the inquiry is highly malleable, the consequences are
entirely inflexible: Pass the test and the law faces only rational-basis
review; fail, and it is subject to strict scrutiny. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct.
at 1876. At least with ordinary analysis under the tiers of scrutiny,
constitutional burdens can be weighed against the government’s
interests as a whole. But with Smith, the inquiry is all-or-nothing—
an exception either undermines a law’s particular, overriding
“purpose,” or it does not. See id.
5
Unlike recent cases arising from governmental responses to the
COVID-19 pandemic, this appeal comes to us free from the exigencies
of emergency motion practice and with the benefit of a summary-
judgment record. The majority’s careful opinion rightly holds based
on the record below that the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Defendants was in error. But courts will continue to
struggle in cases raising similar issues in emergency proceedings
when timeframes are short, records are undeveloped, and the science
is uncertain. Until Smith is overruled, its ill-defined test means that
free-exercise rights risk being perennially trumped by “the next
crisis.” Dr. A v. Hochul, 142 S. Ct. 2569, 2571 (2022) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). For today at least, our Court
has not fallen into that trap, and I join its opinion in full.
6