Singh v. Garland ( 2023 )

20-1993
Singh v. Garland
BIA
Wilson, IJ
A206 521 061
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 6th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
8 Chief Judge,
9 BETH ROBINSON,
10 MYRNA PÉREZ,
11 Circuit Judges.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 AMARJIT SINGH,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 20-1993
18 NAC
19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Esq., Law Office
25 of Jaspreet Singh, Jackson
26 Heights, NY.
1 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
2 Attorney General; Zoe J. Heller,
3 Senior Litigation Counsel; Craig
4 W. Kuhn, Trial Attorney, Office of
5 Immigration Litigation, United
6 States Department of Justice,
7 Washington, DC.
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
9 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
10 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
11 is DENIED.
12 Petitioner Amarjit Singh, a native and citizen of India,
13 seeks review of a June 9, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming
14 a May 8, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
15 his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
16 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
17 Amarjit Singh, No. A 206 521 061 (B.I.A. June 9, 2020), aff’g
18 No. A 206 521 061 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 8, 2018). We
19 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
20 procedural history.
21 Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the IJ’s
22 decision as modified by the BIA and consider only the adverse
23 credibility determination on which the BIA relied. See Xue
24 Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d
25 Cir. 2005). We review adverse credibility determinations
2
1 under a substantial evidence standard, see Hong Fei Gao v.
2 Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and treat the
3 agency’s fact-finding as “conclusive unless any reasonable
4 adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,”
5 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
6 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
7 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
8 determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s
9 or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and
10 whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances
11 under which the statements were made), the internal
12 consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of
13 such statements with other evidence of record . . . without
14 regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
15 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other
16 relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer
17 . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the
18 totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
19 fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
20 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008);
21 accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence
3
1 supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.
2 Singh alleged that he was persecuted by members of the
3 Congress Party on account of his work for the Shiromani Akali
4 Dal Mann Party. The agency did not err in relying on
5 inconsistencies between Singh’s border interview, credible
6 fear interview, application, and testimony regarding when he
7 was allegedly beaten by Congress Party members and whether he
8 was arrested during the incidents because the interview
9 records have sufficient indicia of reliability. Both
10 interviews were memorialized in a verbatim question and
11 answer format, the interviewers asked questions designed to
12 elicit an asylum claim, and there was no indication that Singh
13 had difficulty understanding or answering questions. See
14 Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2004);
15 see also Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir.
16 2009); Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 396 (2d Cir.
17 2005).
18 The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between
19 the border interview and later statements. See 8 U.S.C.
20 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh stated at the border interview
21 that he was arrested, but in subsequent statements said he
4
1 was not. And he gave different dates for the two alleged
2 beatings by Congress Party members. The agency reasonably
3 determined that Singh failed to provide a sufficient
4 explanation for the inconsistences. See Majidi v. Gonzales,
5 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more
6 than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent
7 statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a
8 reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his
9 testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). Contrary to Singh’s
10 position, the agency did not err in relying, in part, on the
11 date discrepancy. The agency may “rely on any
12 inconsistency,” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167, and Singh’s
13 statements created direct inconsistencies about the
14 circumstances and dates of the two incidents of physical harm
15 that were the basis of his claim, see Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d
16 at 79 (“[A]n applicant’s testimonial discrepancies . . . must
17 be weighed in light of their significance to the total context
18 of his . . . claim of persecution.” (quotation marks
19 omitted)).
20 In addition to the inconsistencies, the agency reasonably
21 concluded that the lack of reliable corroborating evidence
5
1 further undermined Singh’s credibility. See Biao Yang v.
2 Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s
3 failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on
4 credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general
5 makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has
6 already been called into question.”). Singh’s corroborating
7 evidence was entitled to little weight and undermined his
8 claim because Singh testified that most of the authors of the
9 letters and affidavits did not witness the attacks and a
10 letter documenting Singh’s medical treatment after the second
11 alleged attack was prepared years after the treatment and was
12 not supported by contemporaneous records. See Y.C. v.
13 Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer
14 to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an
15 applicant’s documentary evidence.”).
16 Taken cumulatively, the inconsistencies and lack of
17 reliable corroboration provide substantial evidence for the
18 adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C.
19 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145
20 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[T]his court [has] recognized that even
21 a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing
6
1 that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple
2 inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”);
3 Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166–67; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273.
4 The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of
5 asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all
6 three forms of relief are based on the same discredited
7 factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–
8 57 (2d Cir. 2006).
9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
10 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
11 stays VACATED.
12 FOR THE COURT:
13 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
14 Clerk of Court
7