Jiang v. Garland ( 2022 )


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  •      20-977
    Jiang v. Garland
    BIA
    Loprest, IJ
    A205 436 949
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    3   States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    4   on the 30th day of August, two thousand twenty-two.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
    8            EUNICE C. LEE,
    9            MYRNA PÉREZ,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   LING JIANG,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                      v.                                       20-977
    17                                                               NAC
    18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                    Vlad Kuzmin, Kuzmin & Assocs.,
    24                                      P.C., New York, NY.
    25
    26   FOR RESPONDENT:                    John V. Coghlan, Deputy Assistant
    27                                      Attorney General; Jessica A.
    28                                      Dawgert, Senior Litigation
    29                                      Counsel; Jacob A. Bashyrov, Trial
    30                                      Attorney, Office of Immigration
    1                                   Litigation, United States
    2                                   Department of Justice, Washington,
    
    3 D.C. 4
            UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    5   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    6   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    7   is GRANTED.*
    8         Petitioner Ling Jiang, a native and citizen of                   the
    9    People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 5, 2020,
    10   decision of the BIA affirming an April 25, 2018, decision of
    11   an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Jiang’s application for
    12   asylum,    withholding     of   removal,    and    relief     under   the
    13   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).           In re Ling Jiang, No.
    14   A205-436-949 (B.I.A. Mar. 5, 2020), aff’g No. A 205-436-949
    15   (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 25, 2018).         We assume the parties’
    16   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
    17        Under   the   circumstances,      we   have   reviewed    the    IJ’s
    * Judge Sullivan would deny the petition for review in light of the
    “particular deference” owed to the credibility findings made by an
    Immigration Judge, who “has the unique advantage among all officials
    involved in the process of having heard directly from the applicant.”
    Li v. INS, 
    453 F.3d 129
    , 135–36 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
    omitted); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005)
    (noting the “particular weight” we afford to “the IJ’s assessment of [a]
    petitioner’s demeanor,” and “underscor[ing] the general significance of
    such assessments to credibility findings” (emphasis added)).           He
    therefore respectfully dissents.
    2
    1   decision   as      modified   by   the   BIA,   i.e.,    minus   the   IJ’s
    2   timeliness finding that the BIA did not reach.               See Xue Hong
    3   Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir.
    4   2005).       The    applicable     standards    of      review   are   well
    5   established.       See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v.
    6   Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 67
    , 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse
    7   credibility        determination     under      substantial       evidence
    8   standard).
    9       “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
    10   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
    11   determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
    12   the applicant or witness, . . . the consistency between the
    13   applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,
    14   the internal consistency of each such statement . . . without
    15   regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
    16   goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other
    17   relevant factor.”       
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).            Although
    18   “[w]e defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless,
    19   . . . it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make
    20   such an adverse credibility ruling,” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,
    21   
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008), we remand when, as here,
    3
    1   there are errors in the findings underlying the adverse
    2   credibility determination and we are not “confident that the
    3   agency would reach the same result upon a reconsideration
    4   cleansed of errors,” Gurung v. Barr, 
    929 F.3d 56
    , 62 (2d Cir.
    5   2019) (quotation marks omitted).
    6         The IJ found that Jiang was not credible as to his claim
    7   that he was detained and beaten for practicing Christianity
    8   in China.        The IJ found that Jiang gave the impression that
    9    his   testimony         was     memorized    because       (1)     he   became
    10   unresponsive       on     cross-examination        when    asked     questions
    11   similar     to    those    he    had   answered     concisely      on   direct
    12   examination, and (2) he lacked candor by failing to testify
    13   to details provided in his written application.                    Although we
    14   defer to an IJ’s assessment of demeanor, see                        Majidi v.
    15   Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005), these findings
    16   are not supported by the record.
    17         The   IJ    found    Jiang    unresponsive      when    he    could    not
    18   remember the name on the false passport a smuggler gave him
    19   to travel to the United States, but he testified consistently
    20   on direct and cross that he could not remember the full name.
    21   His   inability      to    remember     a   fact    does     not    amount   to
    4
    1   unresponsiveness.        The IJ further cited Jiang’s testimony
    2   regarding his stay at a hotel with his smuggler, but that
    3   testimony was confusing, not unresponsive, and thus did not
    4   support    the    IJ’s   conclusion       that    Jiang’s   testimony   was
    5   memorized.        The    IJ   also    found      that   Jiang’s   testimony
    6   regarding his beating and the food he ate in detention lacked
    7   detail when compared to his application and thus showed a
    8   lack of candor, but Jiang responded candidly to the questions
    9   his attorney asked and neither the IJ nor the Government’s
    10   attorney asked him any questions about those aspects of his
    11   claim, much less asked for more details.                 See Jin Shui Qiu
    12   v. Ashcroft, 
    329 F.3d 140
    , 152 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]f
    13   the [DHS] or IJ has nagging doubts about an applicant’s
    14   credibility due to the spareness of h[is] testimony . . . it
    15   would seem prudent for the [DHS] or IJ to pose questions aimed
    16   at   eliciting      inconsistent          or     inherently    implausible
    17   statements.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Shi Liang
    18   Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    494 F.3d 296
     (2d Cir. 2007).
    19   Accordingly, the agency’s demeanor findings are not supported
    20   by the record, and we do not defer to them.
    21        The   only     other     basis   for      the   adverse   credibility
    5
    1   determination that the BIA affirmed was the IJ’s finding that
    2   Jiang made inconsistent statements regarding how long he was
    3    detained.    See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    480 F.3d 4
     104, 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e may consider only those issues
    5    that formed the basis for that decision.”).      That finding was
    6    erroneous because Jiang’s statements were not inconsistent:
    7    he stated in his application that he was detained for “over
    8    half a month,” and he testified that he was detained for “more
    9   than 10 days.” See Gurung, 929 F.3d at 61 (“Credibility should
    10   not be questioned based on trivial differences in word choices
    11   alone.”).
    12       We   remand   because   the   agency’s   adverse   credibility
    13   determination is not supported by any error-free findings.
    14   Id. at 62.    The agency’s remaining findings do not render
    15   remand futile: if, on remand, the agency concludes that Jiang
    16   stated a credible claim of past persecution, then he will be
    17   entitled to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution.
    18   See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1) (presumption of well-founded
    19   fear of persecution arising from past persecution is rebutted
    20   by fundamental change in circumstances or ability to safely
    21   relocate in country of nationality).
    6
    1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    2   GRANTED, the BIA’s decision is VACATED, and the case is
    3   REMANDED for further proceedings.   All pending motions and
    4   applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.
    5                              FOR THE COURT:
    6                              Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    7                              Clerk of Court
    7