Singh v. Garland ( 2022 )

20-1064
Singh v. Garland
BIA
Hom, IJ
A206 079 306
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 31st day of August, two thousand twenty-
5 two.
6
7 PRESENT:
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 DENNY CHIN,
10 JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
11 Circuit Judges.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 GURMEET SINGH,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 20-1064
18 NAC
19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Anas J. Ahmed, Esq., Pannun the
25 Firm, P.C., Jackson Heights, NY.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Madeline Henley, Trial Attorney;
28 Sabatino F. Leo, Assistant
1 Director, Office of Immigration
2 Litigation, United States
3 Department of Justice, for Brian
4 Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
5 General, Washington, DC.
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
9 is DENIED.
10 Petitioner Gurmeet Singh, a native and citizen of India,
11 seeks review of a February 25, 2020 decision of the BIA
12 affirming a June 27, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge
13 (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum, withholding
14 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
15 (“CAT”). In re Gurmeet Singh, No. A 206 079 306 (B.I.A. Feb.
16 25, 2020), aff’g No. A 206 079 306 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June
17 27, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
18 underlying facts and procedural history.
19 We review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the
20 sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
21 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review adverse
22 credibility determinations for substantial evidence, see Hong
23 Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and treat
24 “the administrative findings of fact [as] conclusive unless
2
1 any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
2 the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
3 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
4 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
5 determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s
6 or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the
7 consistency of such statements with other evidence of record
8 . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,
9 without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
10 falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any
11 other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We
12 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from
13 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
14 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
15 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.
16 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial
17 evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh was
18 not credible as to his claim that members of an opposition
19 political party (the “Congress Party”) threatened and
20 assaulted him because of his membership in the Shiromani Akali
21 Dal Amritsar party (the “Mann Party”).
3
1 The agency reasonably relied on four inconsistencies or
2 omissions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). First, Singh
3 was inconsistent about when he received threatening telephone
4 calls from Congress Party members. His written statement
5 said he received two telephone calls in June 2012 and was
6 beaten by Congress Party members just over a year later in
7 July 2013; however, he testified that he received the calls
8 in June 2013, then was beaten a month later. When confronted
9 with the discrepancy at his hearing, he changed his testimony
10 to agree with his application. This inconsistency undermines
11 his claim because it calls into question the timeline that
12 Singh gave for the threats and the attack. See Hong Fei Gao,
13 891 F.3d at 79 (“An applicant’s testimonial discrepancies .
14 . . must be weighed in light of their significance to the
15 total context of his or her claim of persecution.” (internal
16 quotation marks omitted)).
17 Second, the agency relied on Singh’s differing accounts
18 of his beating. Singh testified on direct and confirmed on
19 cross examination that Congress Party members beat him only
20 with their hands, but in his written statement said he was
21 also kicked. During his testimony, he added that he was
4
1 kicked only when confronted with the discrepancy with the
2 written statement.
3 Third, Singh testified that the doctor who treated him
4 after the attack did not use bandages because only his nose
5 was bleeding, but the medical certificate he submitted
6 reflected that he was bandaged as part of his treatment. The
7 IJ was not required to accept his explanation that the doctor
8 may have been “talking about . . . heart bandages” for
9 internal injuries because the explanation added injuries not
10 previously alleged and did not identify what was meant by
11 heart bandages. Cert. Admin. Record at 72–73; see Majidi v.
12 Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must
13 do more than offer a plausible explanation for his
14 inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate
15 that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit
16 his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
17 Fourth, the agency did not err in relying on Singh’s
18 omission from his written statement that he lost
19 consciousness during or after the beating. See Singh v.
20 Garland, 6 F.4th 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Whether . . . such
21 statements are inconsistent depends in part on the importance
5
1 that the omitted fact would have had for the purpose of the
2 earlier telling.”)
3 Taken together, these inconsistencies and omission
4 constitute substantial evidence for the adverse credibility
5 determination because they call into question the timeline of
6 events and the primary allegation of past harm. See 8 U.S.C.
7 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The
8 adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum,
9 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three
10 claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul
11 v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
13 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
14 stays VACATED.
15 FOR THE COURT:
16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
17 Clerk of Court
6