Yu Lin Weng v. Holder , 398 F. App'x 652 ( 2010 )

09-2760-ag
Weng v. Holder
BIA
Abrams, IJ
A097 152 824
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 22nd day of October, two thousand ten.
PRESENT:
REENA RAGGI,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
_______________________________________
YU LIN WENG,
Petitioner,
v. 09-2760-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_______________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division; Russell
J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation
Counsel; Tim Ramnitz, Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Yu Lin Weng, a native and citizen of the People’s
Republic of China, seeks review of a June 18, 2009 order of
the BIA affirming the September 24, 2007 decision of
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Steven R. Abrams, which denied his
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Yu Lin
Weng, No. A097 152 824 (B.I.A. June 18, 2009), aff’g No.
A097 152 824 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 24, 2007). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA decision. See Xue Hong
Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.
2005). The applicable standards of review are well-
established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Corovic
v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2008).
The BIA did not err in concluding that Weng failed to
demonstrate his eligibility for relief on account of his
alleged resistance to the family planning policy that
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resulted in his wife being subjected to an involuntary
abortion. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494
F.3d 296, 313 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Weng argues that his own resistance to the family
planning policy was manifested by his refusal to disclose
where his wife was hiding from government officials.
Further, he submits that the loss of his job due to this
resistance constituted economic persecution. We detect no
error, however, in the BIA’s conclusion that these
circumstances failed to establish the “severe economic
disadvantage” required for a showing of persecution. See
Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 161 n.21 (2d Cir. 2008)
(citing Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163, 173 (B.I.A.
2007)). Weng was able to find alternative, albeit less
remunerative, work and was not subjected to fines,
confiscation of property, or other economic hardship. See
Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 174 (noting that “a
compulsory change in occupation is least likely [among
various economic harms] to qualify as persecution by
itself,” and that “[t]he availability of other sources of
income has been a key factor in assessing the impact of
economic sanctions”). Weng also failed to present evidence
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concerning any other aspects of his financial situation that
would have compelled a finding of severe economic
disadvantage. See Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
293 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2002); Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. at 174.
As to Weng’s argument that he established a well-
founded fear of persecution based on continuing police
efforts to track him down on account of his altercation with
family planning officials, the BIA reasonably concluded that
Weng’s claim was undermined by the fact that his wife
continues to live in China without further problems or harm.
See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir.
1999).
Thus, to the extent that Weng’s applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief were based on
his resistance to the family planning policy, the agency
properly denied those applications for relief. See Paul v.
Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006); cf. Kyaw Zwar
Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 567 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]orture
requires proof of something more severe than the kind of
treatment that would suffice to prove persecution.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
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DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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