Fuentes-Hernandez v. Holder , 411 F. App'x 438 ( 2011 )


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  •     10-128-ag
    Fuentes-Hernandez v. Holder
    BIA
    DeFonzo, IJ
    A99 515 609
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    New York, on the 1st day of March, two thousand eleven.
    PRESENT:
    ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
    PETER W. HALL,
    GERARD E. LYNCH,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    ELMER ALEXANDER FUENTES-HERNANDEZ,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                 10-128-ag
    NAC
    ERIC H. HOLDER JR., UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:                 Andrew P. Johnson, New York, NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT:                 Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    General; Douglas E. Ginsburg,
    Assistant Director; Franklin M.
    Johnson, Jr., Trial Attorney, Office
    of Immigration Litigation, Civil
    Division, United States Department
    of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
    hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for
    review is DENIED.
    Petitioner Elmer Alexander Fuentes-Hernandez, a native
    and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of a December 22,
    2009, decision of the BIA affirming the August 14, 2008,
    decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Paul A. DeFonzo denying
    Fuentes-Hernandez’s applications for asylum and withholding
    of removal. In re Elmer Alexander Fuentes-Hernandez, No.
    A099 515 609 (B.I.A. Dec. 22, 2009), aff’g No. A099 515 609
    (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City, Aug. 14, 2008). We assume the
    parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
    procedural history of the case.
    When, as in this case, the BIA agrees with the IJ and
    merely supplements the IJ’s decision, we review the decision
    of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v.
    Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The standards
    of review are well-established. See, e.g., Salimatou Bah v.
    Mukasey, 
    529 F.3d 99
    , 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
    The agency did not err in denying Fuentes-Hernandez’s
    application for asylum and withholding of removal because he
    failed to establish a nexus between the harm he fears and
    one of the protected grounds enumerated in the Immigration
    and Nationality Act (“INA”). See 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1101
    (a)(42);
    1158(b); 1231(b)(3). For applications governed by the
    amendments to the INA made by the REAL ID Act of 2005, “the
    applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality,
    membership in a particular social group, or political
    opinion was or will be at least one central reason for
    persecuting the applicant.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(i);
    see also Matter of C-T-L-, 
    25 I. & N. Dec. 341
    , 343 (BIA
    2010); Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 
    24 I. & N. Dec. 208
    , 212
    (BIA 2007). In order to demonstrate persecution on account
    of a protected ground, the “applicant must [] show, through
    direct or circumstantial evidence, that the persecutor’s
    motive to persecute arises from the applicant’s political
    belief [or another protected ground].” Yueqing Zhang v.
    Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 540
    , 545 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing INS v.
    Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 483 (1992)); see also In re
    S-P-, 
    21 I. & N. Dec. 486
    , 494-95 (BIA 1996).
    2
    Contrary to Fuentes-Hernandez argument, the agency did
    not err in determining that his claimed social group –
    individuals who resisted gang recruitment in El Salvador –
    does not constitute a “particular social group” for purposes
    of the INA because of its lack of particularity and social
    visibility. See Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 
    509 F.3d 70
    , 73 (2d
    Cir. 2007)(per curiam); Matter of S-E-G-, 
    24 I. & N. Dec. 579
    , 582-88 (BIA 2008). The BIA has held that neither
    Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to, have rejected
    or resisted recruitment efforts by the Mara Salvatrucha
    (“MS-13”) gang nor the family members of such Salvadoran
    youth constitute a “particular social group.” Matter of
    S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. at 582-88. The BIA explained that
    applicants who feared “retaliation by the MS-13 for their
    resistance to recruitment efforts” failed to establish “that
    the MS-13 gang in El Salvador imputed, or would impute on
    them, an anti-gang political opinion.” 
    Id. at 589
    . The BIA
    thus relied on its factual determination that the applicants
    had not shown “that the MS-13 gang members who pursued
    [them] had any motives other than increasing the size and
    influence of their gang.” 
    Id.
     While the BIA’s decision in
    Matter of S-E-G- is not binding on us, its analysis is
    instructive. See Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 
    542 F.3d 738
    ,
    745-46 (9th Cir. 2008) (analyzing the BIA’s decision in
    Matter of S-E-G-).
    In this case, although Fuentes-Hernandez claims in his
    brief to have suffered persecution because of his membership
    in a family considered to be “traitors” by his alleged
    persecutors, the record does not compel the conclusion that
    he was targeted for that reason or otherwise targeted for
    recruitment because he possessed a belief or characteristic
    the gang sought to overcome. See Matter of Acosta, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 211
    , 222 (BIA 1985), overruled, in part, on other
    grounds, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
    480 U.S. 421
     (1987).
    Fuentes-Hernandez fails to demonstrate that the motive
    behind the recruitment efforts was for anything “other than
    increasing the size and influence of [the] gang.” Matter of
    S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 589. Indeed, his application
    repeatedly asserted that he was pressured to either join the
    gang or pay money to the gang, including during the one
    incident in which the gang members told him that he came
    from a family of “traitors” and that they knew his uncle was
    in the military.
    3
    Because the agency reasonably found that Fuentes-
    Hernandez was not targeted for any reason other than to
    increase the size of the gang or because of his refusal to
    join, his claim did not bear the requisite nexus to a
    protected ground. The agency did not err in denying his
    applications for asylum and withholding of removal. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); see also Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Homeland Security, 
    494 F.3d 281
    , 289 (2d Cir. 2007).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
    removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
    oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    Circuit Local Rule 34(b).
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    4