Rodney G. Patterson v. State of Indiana , 110 N.E.3d 429 ( 2018 )

FILED
Sep 14 2018, 9:57 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jack Quirk Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ian McLean
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Rodney G. Patterson, September 14, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-959
v. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kimberly S.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Dowling, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
18C02-1709-F1-16
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-959 | September 14, 2018 Page 1 of 9
Case Summary
[1] Rodney G. Patterson (“Patterson”) was brought to trial on several counts. At
trial, Patterson pursued an insanity defense, but the jury found him guilty but
mentally ill as to the most serious count of Attempted Murder, a Level 1
felony,1 and guilty of the remaining counts tried to it. Patterson now appeals.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
[3] Patterson presents two issues, which we restate as follows:
I. Whether his insanity defense should have prevailed; and
II. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error in
instructing the jury on the insanity defense.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] On the afternoon of September 1, 2017, Patterson spoke with his apartment
manager, Tony Ong (“Ong”), who lived a couple of doors down in Muncie.
Ong asked Patterson when he would be paying rent that day, and Patterson said
that he would see what he could do. Patterson returned to his apartment.
1
Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1(a).
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[5] Around 9:00 p.m., Jan Borror (“Borror”), who lived nearby, saw Patterson
wearing a closed-faced motorcycle helmet and trench coat, standing still “like a
statue” against an exterior wall. Tr. Vol. II at 205. Borror called Ong to tell
him about Patterson’s behavior. Ong was not very concerned. About thirty
minutes later, Ong was inside his apartment when he saw Patterson wearing a
motorcycle helmet, peeking in through the storm door. Ong nodded and waved
at Patterson, who jerked away. Ong got up, opened the door, and greeted
Patterson. Patterson did not respond and turned away. Patterson then turned
back and shot Ong in the chest. At that point, Patterson rushed toward the
apartment while Ong struggled to get inside. Ong managed to lock the door.
[6] Around this time, a neighbor heard the gunshot and saw Patterson walking
away from Ong’s apartment. The neighbor yelled out to Patterson, asking
about the noise. Patterson looked at the neighbor, then kept walking down the
sidewalk and entered his apartment. Both Ong and the neighbor called 9-1-1.
Responding officers then formed a perimeter around the building with guns
drawn. A police negotiator yelled through a bullhorn speaker, attempting—to
no avail—to get Patterson to come out of his apartment. At some point, a
gunshot sounded nearby, and law enforcement decided to enter the apartment.
Meanwhile, Ong was transported to the hospital and successfully treated.
[7] At the apartment building, a Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) team
assembled in a line behind Sergeant Joe Kresja (“Sergeant Kresja”), who was
carrying a ballistic shield. The SWAT team approached the apartment, opened
the door with a battering ram, and placed a distraction device inside. After the
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device detonated, the apartment door was pushed closed from inside. Sergeant
Kresja pushed back on the door, entered the apartment, and saw Patterson by
the doorframe. When the SWAT team entered, Patterson was wearing a
motorcycle helmet with the visor closed, and his hands were stuffed inside his
jacket pockets. Sergeant Kresja ordered Patterson to get down, but Patterson
did not comply. A struggle ensued, with three officers attempting to handcuff
Patterson, who was pushing his hands into his jacket pockets. During the
struggle, officers removed a 9mm Taurus firearm from a holster on Patterson’s
hip. Officers eventually subdued and handcuffed Patterson, who had a 9mm
Hi-Point firearm in his left jacket pocket, and two knives attached to his belt.
[8] A search of the apartment produced two identification cards: one issued to
Rodney Patterson and another to Kenan Abraman, an alias. The search also
produced a receipt showing a transaction the afternoon of the shooting. The
receipt, together with firearm transaction records, indicated that Patterson had
purchased the Taurus and the Hi-Point earlier that day, under the name Kenan
Abraman. In the same transaction, Patterson had purchased ammunition. He
also gave untruthful answers in completing a form to obtain the firearms, failing
to disclose a prior felony conviction and previous mental health commitments.
[9] The State charged Patterson with (1) Attempted Murder, a Level 1 felony; (2)
Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, a Level 4 felony;2
2
I.C. § 35-47-4-5(c).
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(3) Criminal Recklessness, as a Level 5 felony;3 and Resisting Law
Enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor.4 Patterson filed a Suggestion of
Insanity, and the trial court ordered that Patterson be evaluated by Dr. Frank
Krause (“Dr. Krause”) and Dr. Craig Buckles (“Dr. Buckles”). After the court
held a competency hearing and determined Patterson was competent to stand
trial, a jury trial commenced on February 20, 2018. At trial, there was evidence
that Patterson suffered from mental health issues: “schizoaffective disorder,
bipolar type[;] antisocial personality disorder[;] and some chemical dependence
issues.” Tr. Vol. IV at 58. There was also conflicting evidence concerning
Patterson’s sanity at the time of the offenses: Dr. Krause opined that Patterson
had been insane while Dr. Buckles opined that Patterson had been sane.
[10] The jury was instructed on the insanity defense as well as the consequences of
finding Patterson “not responsible by reason of insanity” or, alternatively,
“guilty but mentally ill.” App. Vol. III at 121. The jury ultimately rejected
Patterson’s insanity defense, finding him guilty but mentally ill with respect to
Attempted Murder, and guilty of Criminal Recklessness and Resisting Law
Enforcement. The jury further found that Patterson had possessed a firearm.
[11] The trial court vacated the count related to possessing a firearm, as “the State
could not proceed to phase two of the trial on that charge.” Tr. Vol. IV at 205.
3
I.C. § 35-42-2-2(a), -2(b)(2).
4
I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).
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The court also vacated the Criminal Recklessness count because of double
jeopardy concerns. On the remaining counts, the trial court imposed a forty-
year sentence for Attempted Murder and a concurrent one-year sentence for
Resisting Law Enforcement, to be executed in the Indiana Department of
Correction. The trial court recommended that Patterson be placed in a
correctional facility with a specialized unit offering mental health treatment.
[12] Patterson now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Insanity Defense
[13] “A person may be convicted of an offense only if his guilt is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” I.C. § 35-41-4-1(a). However, “the burden of proof is on
the defendant to establish the defense of insanity . . . by a preponderance of the
evidence.” I.C. § 35-41-4-1(b). Thus, “[a] defendant claiming the insanity
defense should have prevailed at trial faces a heavy burden because he or she ‘is
in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment.’” Galloway v. State,
938 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146,
1149 (Ind. 2004)). When reviewing such a claim, “we will reverse only when
the evidence is without conflict” and leads to a single conclusion: “that the
defendant was insane when the crime was committed.” Thompson, 804 N.E.2d
at 1149. In conducting our review, we “will not reweigh evidence, reassess
witness credibility, or disturb reasonable inferences made by the trier of fact.”
Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1074 (Ind. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).
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We will instead “consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment
and the reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Satterfield v.
State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 348 (Ind. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).
[14] Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-6 sets forth the defense of insanity:
(a) A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited
conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable
to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the
offense.
(b) As used in this section, “mental disease or defect” means a
severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and
demonstrably impairs a person’s perception, but the term does
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful
or antisocial conduct.
[15] In challenging the rejection of his defense, Patterson asserts that “[t]he State has
the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant’s Br. at 14.
However, the Indiana Supreme Court has rejected this proposition. See
Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149 (explaining that “[t]he State must prove the
offense, including mens rea, beyond a reasonable doubt but need not disprove
insanity”). Patterson also focuses on favorable evidence that would support a
determination of insanity. Yet, the evidence on this issue is not without
conflict. Rather, the evidence included—inter alia—testimony from Dr. Buckles
who opined that although Patterson suffered from mental illness he “should
have been able to understand that it was wrong for him to shoot another
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person.” Tr. Vol. IV at 64. In light of conflicting evidence, we cannot say that
the jury’s rejection of the insanity defense was contrary to law.
Jury Instructions
[16] Patterson did not object to the jury instructions. Thus, he may now obtain
relief only by demonstrating fundamental error, see Pattison v. State, 54 N.E.3d
361, 365 (Ind. 2016), which occurs “when the error constitutes a blatant
violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and
the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process,” Lewis v.
State, 34 N.E.3d 240, 246 (Ind. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).
[17] Patterson briefly argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by
using the phrase “not responsible by reason of insanity” in the jury instructions.
See App. Vol. III at 115, 121. According to Patterson, the language “not
responsible” poses a “substantial potential for harm” in that it “suggests that the
Defendant will suffer no consequences if found ‘not responsible’ and this is a
denial of due process because it creates . . . improper conclusions” concerning
“the Defendant’s future.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. Patterson asserts that the
phrase should instead be “not guilty by reason of insanity.” Id.[18] Yet, the trial court expressly instructed the jury on the consequences of finding
Patterson not responsible by reason of insanity:
If the Defendant is found not responsible by reason of insanity at
the time of the crime, the prosecuting attorney will file a petition
for mental health commitment with the court. The court will
hold a mental health commitment hearing at the earliest
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opportunity. The Defendant will be detained in custody until the
completion of the hearing. If the court finds that the Defendant
is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled, then the
court may order the Defendant to be either placed in an
outpatient treatment program of not more than ninety (90) days,
or committed to an appropriate mental health facility until a
court determines commitment is no longer needed.
App. Vol. III at 121. Thus, there was no substantial risk that the jury would, as
Patterson suggests, believe that he would “suffer no consequences if found ‘not
responsible.’” Appellant’s Br. at 16. We are therefore not persuaded that
Patterson was deprived of due process because of the challenged instruction.
[19] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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