Singh v. Barr ( 2020 )

18-267
Singh v. Barr
BIA
Wright, IJ
A205 422 118
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
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IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 3rd day of January. two thousand twenty.
PRESENT:
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
MICHAEL H. PARK,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
PARVINDERJEET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 18-267
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Parvinderjeet Singh, pro se,
Jamaica, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
Attorney General; Paul Fiorino,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Judith
R. O’Sullivan, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of
Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Parvinderjeet Singh, a native and citizen of
India, seeks review of a December 29, 2017, decision of the
BIA affirming an April 20, 2017, decision of an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Parvinderjeet Singh, No. A205
422 118 (B.I.A. Dec. 29, 2017), aff’g No. A205 422 118 (Immig.
Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 20, 2017). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
Under the circumstances, we have considered both the IJ’s
and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”
Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528
(2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well
established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v.
Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
determination on . . . the consistency between the
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applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,
the internal consistency of each such statement, the
consistency of such statements with other evidence of
record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency,
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s
claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,
163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence supports the
agency’s determination that Singh was not credible as to his
claim that members of his girlfriend’s politically connected
family beat him in India because they wanted him to stop
dating his girlfriend.
The agency reasonably relied on Singh’s inconsistent
statements regarding whether his girlfriend’s father was
involved in the beating, who accompanied him to report the
attack to police, and whether he was beaten with guns. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh did not provide
compelling explanations for these inconsistencies. See
Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A
petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation
for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must
demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled
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to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Given its findings of inconsistency, the agency’s adverse
credibility determination is supported by substantial
evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That
determination was dispositive of asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based
on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444
F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we do not
consider the agency’s alternative burden finding. See INS
v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule
courts and agencies are not required to make findings on
issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results
they reach.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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