Aftab v. Barr ( 2020 )

18-27
Aftab v. Barr
BIA
A095 860 015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 3rd day of January, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
MICHAEL H. PARK,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
SYED FARHAN AFTAB,
Petitioner,
v. 18-27
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Richard W. Chen, Esq., New York,
NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
Attorney General; Anthony P.
Nicastro, Assistant Director; D.
Nicholas Harling, Trial Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of
Justice, Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DISMISSED.
Petitioner Syed Farhan Aftab, a native and citizen of
Pakistan, seeks review of a December 6, 2017, decision of the
BIA denying his motion for reconsideration and reopening. In
re Aftab, No. A095 860 015 (B.I.A. Dec. 6, 2017). We assume
the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
procedural history in this case.
Our jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of
cancellation of removal for failure to satisfy the hardship
requirement or as a matter of discretion, including the denial
of a motion to reconsider a decision denying that relief or
to reopen to present more evidence in support of that relief,
is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D); Barco-Sandoval v.
Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 38–40 (2d Cir. 2008); Sepulveda v.
Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2005) (providing that the
jurisdictional bar for discretionary denials of relief
applies equally to denials of motions to reopen or
reconsider).
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An alien, like Aftab, who entered without inspection,
may have his removal cancelled if he “(A) has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not
less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such
application; (B) has been a person of good moral character
during such period; (C) has not been convicted of [certain]
offense[s] . . . ; and (D) establishes that removal would
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his]
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). “Obtaining . . .
cancellation of removal is a two-step process. First, an
alien must prove eligibility by showing that he meets the
statutory eligibility requirements. Second, . . . the
Attorney General in his discretion decides whether to grant
or deny relief.” Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60, 62 (2d
Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
The BIA declined to reconsider or reopen both because
Aftab did not show error in, or present new evidence in
support of, the hardship determination, and because he did
not establish that cancellation would be warranted as a matter
of discretion. These determinations regarding hardship and
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discretion are independently dispositive grounds for the
denial of cancellation. See id. Aftab has waived any
challenge to the BIA’s decision not to reconsider or reopen
as to its discretionary denial of cancellation by including
only a single sentence of argument on this point in his brief.
See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir.
2005) (holding that a party’s “single conclusory sentence” in
his brief on appeal regarding a claim of error was tantamount
to a waiver of that claim); Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d
114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in
the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be
addressed on appeal.”). We do not reach the hardship
determination because the discretionary finding is
dispositive. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DISMISSED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED
and stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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