Corines v. Charter One Bank , 365 F. App'x 237 ( 2010 )

07-5622-cv
Corines v. Charter One Bank, et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUM M ARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUM M ARY ORDER FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERM ITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
W HEN CITING A SUM M ARY ORDER IN A DOCUM ENT FILED W ITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
M UST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (W ITH THE
NOTATION “SUM M ARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUM M ARY ORDER M UST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on
the 5th day of February, two thousand ten.
PRESENT:
RALPH K. WINTER,
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
Circuit Judges.
__________________________________________
Peter J. Corines,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 07-5622-cv
Charter One Bank, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: Peter J. Corines, pro se, Eastchester, NY.
FOR APPELLEES: Steven A. Stadtmauer, Harris Beach PLLC, New
York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York (Brieant, J.)
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.
Appellant Peter J. Corines, pro se, appeals a judgment of
the district court granting the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, dismissing his claims for malicious prosecution, false
arrest, and abuse of process. We assume the parties’ familiarity
with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,
and the issues on appeal.
As a preliminary matter, while Corines characterizes the
instant action as brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
alleges violations of his rights under Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, he did not advance these claims in his complaint or
in any fashion in the proceedings below. Accordingly, we decline
to consider these claims. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
120-21 (1976) (recognizing the well-established general rule that
a court of appeals will not consider an issue raised for the
first time on appeal); see also Virgilio v. City of New York, 407
F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2005).
We review orders granting summary judgment de novo and focus
on whether the district court properly concluded that there was
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff &
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Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). “In
determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we
are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible
inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is
sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)
(internal quotations omitted).
Corines argues that the district court erred by granting the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because: (1) he was not
bound by the terms of the mutual release because the Defendants
did not fulfil their obligation to release the lien on his yacht;
and (2) by signing the mutual release, he did not intend to
relinquish any claims against the Defendants that were based on
acts they committed of which he was then unaware. Both of these
arguments are unavailing. First, the record indicates that,
although there may have been some clerical error in the document
that memorialized the release of lien executed by Charter One,
there was no evidence to support Corines’s assertion that the
bank refused to release the mortgage. Moreover, despite the
district court’s urging, Corines made no effort to correct this
error, which, regardless, had no effect on his obligations under
the mutual release.
Second, we have held that, where a contract provision is
unambiguous, a court must interpret the contract to “effectuate
its plain language.” Seabury Const. Corp. v. Jeffery Chain
Corp., 289 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 2002). Moreover, where parties
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of comparable bargaining power enter into a release with ready
access to counsel, “the intent of the parties is indicated by the
language employed [in the release],” and, “[w]hen the words of
the release are of general effect the release is to be construed
most strongly against the releasor, and the burden is on the
releasor to establish that the release should be limited.”
Middle East Banking Co. v. State Street Bank Int’l, 821 F.2d 897,
907 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
Here, by its express terms, the mutual release provided that
Corines agreed to release the Defendants from “all obligations,
liability, damages, actions, causes of action, right to file
actions, agreements, promises, claims and demands whatsoever in
law, admiralty or equity, whether known [or] unknown.” (emphasis
added). Accordingly, although Corines argues that he did not
intend to relinquish claims against the Defendants that were
based on facts which he was not aware of at the time the release
was executed, the clear and unambiguous language of the release
demonstrates that the parties—both of whom were counseled at the
time—intended that those exact type of claims be encompassed
within the release terms. Accordingly, the district court
properly concluded that Corines lacked standing to bring the
instant action.
We have considered Corines’s remaining claims of error and
determined them to be without merit. Accordingly, there is no
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basis on which to challenge the judgment of the district court.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is hereby AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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