Romero-Flores v. Barr ( 2020 )


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  •      17-2263
    Romero-Flores v. Barr
    BIA
    Christensen, IJ
    A206 688 042/043
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 13th day of January, two thousand twenty.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            JON O. NEWMAN,
    8            JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
    9                 Circuit Judges.1
    10   _____________________________________
    11
    12   GLENDA XIOMARA ROMERO-FLORES,
    13   DIEGO SAUL SANTOS-ROMERO,
    14            Petitioners,
    15
    16                     v.                                        17-2263
    17                                                               NAC
    18   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    19   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONERS:                   Peter E. Torres, New York, NY.
    24
    25   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
    26                                      Attorney General, Civil Division;
    27                                      Claire L. Workman, Senior
    28                                      Litigation Counsel; Maarja T.
    29                                      Luhtaru, Trial Attorney, Office of
    1The panel originally included Circuit Judge Christopher F. Droney, who fully
    retired from the court on December 31, 2019. This case is decided by the
    remaining two judges, consistent with section E(b) of the Internal Operating
    Procedures of the Second Circuit.
    1                                Immigration Litigation, United
    2                                States Department of Justice,
    3                                Washington, DC.
    4           UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    5    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    6    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    7    is DENIED.
    8           Petitioners Glenda Xiomara Romero-Flores and her son
    9    Diego Saul Santos-Romero, natives and citizens of Honduras,
    10   seek review of a June 30, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming
    11   a January 9, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
    12   denying Romero-Flores’s application for asylum, withholding
    13   of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    14   (“CAT”).      In re Glenda Xiomara Romero-Flores, Diego Saul
    15   Santos-Romero, Nos. A 206 688 042/043 (B.I.A. June 30, 2017),
    16   aff’g Nos. A 206 688 042/043 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 9,
    17   2017).        We   assume    the    parties’   familiarity        with    the
    18   underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    19          Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered
    20   both    the   IJ’s   and    the   BIA’s   opinions   “for   the    sake   of
    21   completeness.”       Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    448 F.3d 22
      524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).           The applicable standards of review
    23   are well established.         See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Y.C. v.
    24   Holder, 
    741 F.3d 325
    , 332 (2d Cir. 2013).
    2
    1         Because Romero-Flores expressly waives her CAT claim, we
    2   address only asylum and withholding of removal.                         To establish
    3   eligibility      for     asylum    and       withholding         of   removal,   “the
    4   applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality,
    5   membership in a particular social group, or political opinion
    6   was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting
    7   the     applicant.”               8 U.S.C.          § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i);           
    id. 8 §
    1231(b)(3)(A); see also Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec.
    9   341, 348 (BIA 2010).             Asylum or withholding of removal “may
    10   be    granted        where    there     is       more    than     one   motive    for
    11   mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for the
    12   mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.”                          Acharya
    13   v.    Holder,    
    761 F.3d 289
    ,    297       (2d    Cir.    2014)   (internal
    14   quotation marks omitted).               An applicant “must provide some
    15   evidence        of      [a      persecutor’s             motives],      direct     or
    16   circumstantial.”             INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 483
    17   (1992); see also Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494
    
    18 F.3d 281
    , 291 (2d Cir. 2007).
    19         Romero-Flores has waived her claim that she was harmed
    20   on account of her political opinion or membership in a social
    21   group based on her gender; she presses only her family-based
    22   social group claim.            See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 23
      540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005).
    3
    1          Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination
    2    that Romero-Flores failed to demonstrate that the harm she
    3    suffered or fears would be on account of her membership in a
    4    family-based       social    group.          Romero-Flores’s     testimony
    5    regarding a connection between the robbery of her store in
    6    2014, and her father, who had previously owned the store and
    7    had been robbed and killed by gang members in 1989, was
    8    speculative given the length of time between those events and
    9    the fact that the only connection she could make is that the
    10   gang members may have known that the store was robbed in the
    11   past and thus thought it would be a good target.                    However,
    12   she also testified that the people who robbed her were not
    13   the people who killed her father, and she did not have any
    14   reason to think that they were connected to her father’s
    15   killers.    Her attempt to identify a nexus between her harm
    16   and   a   social    group   of   her       family   members   was   further
    17   undermined by her concession that, other than her father, no
    18   family members had been threatened by gang members.                      See
    19   Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 
    191 F.3d 307
    , 313 (2d Cir. 1999)
    20   (finding claimed fear of future persecution weakened when
    21   similarly    situated       family     members      remain    unharmed    in
    22   petitioner’s native country).               Finally, Romero-Flores also
    23   acknowledged that the men who robbed her would not have been
    4
    1    interested in her if she did not have money.                   This record
    2    provides substantial evidence for the agency’s conclusion
    3    that Romero-Flores was targeted because she was thought to
    4    have    money.   This    harm   as       a    result   of   “general   crime
    5    conditions” does not constitute persecution on account of a
    6    protected ground.       
    Id. at 314;
    see Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey,
    7    
    509 F.3d 70
    , 74 (2d Cir. 2007) (“harm motivated purely by
    8    wealth is not persecution”).                 This nexus determination is
    9    dispositive of both asylum and withholding of removal.                   See
    10   8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A)
    11          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    12   DENIED.    As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    13   that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
    14   and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    15   is DISMISSED as moot.      Any pending request for oral argument
    16   in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    17   Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    18   34.1(b).
    19                                   FOR THE COURT:
    20                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    21                                   Clerk of Court
    22
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-2263

Filed Date: 1/13/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2020