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17-2263 Romero-Flores v. Barr BIA Christensen, IJ A206 688 042/043 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 13th day of January, two thousand twenty. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JON O. NEWMAN, 8 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 9 Circuit Judges.1 10 _____________________________________ 11 12 GLENDA XIOMARA ROMERO-FLORES, 13 DIEGO SAUL SANTOS-ROMERO, 14 Petitioners, 15 16 v. 17-2263 17 NAC 18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONERS: Peter E. Torres, New York, NY. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 26 Attorney General, Civil Division; 27 Claire L. Workman, Senior 28 Litigation Counsel; Maarja T. 29 Luhtaru, Trial Attorney, Office of 1The panel originally included Circuit Judge Christopher F. Droney, who fully retired from the court on December 31, 2019. This case is decided by the remaining two judges, consistent with section E(b) of the Internal Operating Procedures of the Second Circuit. 1 Immigration Litigation, United 2 States Department of Justice, 3 Washington, DC. 4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 7 is DENIED. 8 Petitioners Glenda Xiomara Romero-Flores and her son 9 Diego Saul Santos-Romero, natives and citizens of Honduras, 10 seek review of a June 30, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming 11 a January 9, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 12 denying Romero-Flores’s application for asylum, withholding 13 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 14 (“CAT”). In re Glenda Xiomara Romero-Flores, Diego Saul 15 Santos-Romero, Nos. A 206 688 042/043 (B.I.A. June 30, 2017), 16 aff’g Nos. A 206 688 042/043 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 9, 17 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 18 underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 19 Under the circumstances of this case, we have considered 20 both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of 21 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
448 F.3d 22524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review 23 are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Y.C. v. 24 Holder,
741 F.3d 325, 332 (2d Cir. 2013). 2 1 Because Romero-Flores expressly waives her CAT claim, we 2 address only asylum and withholding of removal. To establish 3 eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, “the 4 applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, 5 membership in a particular social group, or political opinion 6 was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting 7 the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i);
id. 8 §1231(b)(3)(A); see also Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 9 341, 348 (BIA 2010). Asylum or withholding of removal “may 10 be granted where there is more than one motive for 11 mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for the 12 mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.” Acharya 13 v. Holder,
761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal 14 quotation marks omitted). An applicant “must provide some 15 evidence of [a persecutor’s motives], direct or 16 circumstantial.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478, 483 17 (1992); see also Manzur v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 494
18 F.3d 281, 291 (2d Cir. 2007). 19 Romero-Flores has waived her claim that she was harmed 20 on account of her political opinion or membership in a social 21 group based on her gender; she presses only her family-based 22 social group claim. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales,
426 F.3d 23540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005). 3 1 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination 2 that Romero-Flores failed to demonstrate that the harm she 3 suffered or fears would be on account of her membership in a 4 family-based social group. Romero-Flores’s testimony 5 regarding a connection between the robbery of her store in 6 2014, and her father, who had previously owned the store and 7 had been robbed and killed by gang members in 1989, was 8 speculative given the length of time between those events and 9 the fact that the only connection she could make is that the 10 gang members may have known that the store was robbed in the 11 past and thus thought it would be a good target. However, 12 she also testified that the people who robbed her were not 13 the people who killed her father, and she did not have any 14 reason to think that they were connected to her father’s 15 killers. Her attempt to identify a nexus between her harm 16 and a social group of her family members was further 17 undermined by her concession that, other than her father, no 18 family members had been threatened by gang members. See 19 Melgar de Torres v. Reno,
191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) 20 (finding claimed fear of future persecution weakened when 21 similarly situated family members remain unharmed in 22 petitioner’s native country). Finally, Romero-Flores also 23 acknowledged that the men who robbed her would not have been 4 1 interested in her if she did not have money. This record 2 provides substantial evidence for the agency’s conclusion 3 that Romero-Flores was targeted because she was thought to 4 have money. This harm as a result of “general crime 5 conditions” does not constitute persecution on account of a 6 protected ground.
Id. at 314;see Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 7
509 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2007) (“harm motivated purely by 8 wealth is not persecution”). This nexus determination is 9 dispositive of both asylum and withholding of removal. See 10 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A) 11 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 12 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 13 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 14 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 15 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 16 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 17 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 18 34.1(b). 19 FOR THE COURT: 20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 21 Clerk of Court 22 5
Document Info
Docket Number: 17-2263
Filed Date: 1/13/2020
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2020