Ismail v. Barr ( 2020 )


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  •      18-983
    Ismail v. Barr
    BIA
    Straus, IJ
    A206 514 530
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 16th day of January, two thousand twenty.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
    8            MICHAEL H. PARK,
    9                 Circuit Judges.1
    10   _____________________________________
    11
    12   ABDUL F. ISMAIL
    13            Petitioner,
    14
    15                    v.                                         18-983
    16                                                               NAC
    17   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    18   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    19            Respondent.
    20   _____________________________________
    21
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                  Megan E. Kludt, Northampton, MA.
    24
    25
    1 Judge Christopher F. Droney, who was originally assigned to the panel,
    retired from the Court, effective January 1, 2020, prior to the resolution of
    this case. The remaining two members of the panel, who are in agreement,
    have determined the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United
    States v. Desimone, 
    140 F.3d 457
    , 458–59 (2d Cir. 1998).
    1    FOR RESPONDENT:               Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
    2                                  General; Jeffery R. Leist, Senior
    3                                  Litigation Counsel; Yedidya Cohen,
    4                                  Trial Attorney, Office of
    5                                  Immigration Litigation, United
    6                                  States Department of Justice,
    7                                  Washington, DC.
    8        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    9    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    11   is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.
    12       Petitioner Abdul F. Ismail, a native and citizen of
    13   Ghana, seeks review of a March 29, 2018, decision of the BIA
    14   affirming an October 4, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge
    15   (“IJ”) denying Ismail’s application for asylum, withholding
    16   of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    17   (“CAT”) and denying his motion to continue his proceedings to
    18   await   a   decision   from   U.S.       Citizenship   and   Immigration
    19   Services (“USCIS”).     In re Abdul F. Ismail, No. A 206 514 530
    20   (B.I.A. Mar. 29, 2019), aff’g No. A 206 514 530 (Immig. Ct.
    21   Hartford Oct. 4, 2017).       We assume the parties’ familiarity
    22   with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    23
    24
    2
    1    Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT
    2        Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    3    both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions.        See Yun-Zui Guan v.
    4    Gonzales, 
    432 F.3d 391
    , 394 (2d Cir. 2005).    The applicable
    5    standards of review are well established.        See 8 U.S.C.
    6    § 1252(b)(4); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 67
    , 76 (2d
    7    Cir. 2018); Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 
    575 F.3d 193
    , 196 (2d Cir.
    8    2009).   Ismail claimed that he was targeted in Ghana because
    9    he was perceived as gay and that he would be targeted again
    10   if he returned.
    11       The agency did not err in finding that Ismail failed to
    12   meet his burden of proof.
    13       The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to
    14       sustain    the     applicant’s    burden     without
    15       corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies
    16       the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is
    17       credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific
    18       facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant
    19       is a refugee. In determining whether the applicant
    20       has met the applicant’s burden, the trier of fact
    21       may weigh the credible testimony along with other
    22       evidence of record. Where the trier of fact
    23       determines that the applicant should provide
    24       evidence that corroborates otherwise credible
    25       testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the
    26       applicant does not have the evidence and cannot
    27       reasonably obtain the evidence.
    28
    29   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Chuilu Liu, 
    575 F.3d 3
    1    at 196–98.     The IJ need not specify the points of testimony
    2    that require corroboration prior to the IJ’s disposition of
    3    the claim because “the alien bears the ultimate burden of
    4    introducing such evidence without prompting from the IJ.”
    5    Chuilu 
    Liu, 575 F.3d at 198
    .           “No court shall reverse a
    6    determination made by a trier of fact with respect to the
    7    availability of corroborating evidence . . . unless the court
    8    finds . . . that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to
    9    conclude that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”
    10   8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).
    11       The   IJ   reasonably   required    corroboration    given    that
    12   Ismail admitted he lied under oath to immigration officials
    13   both during his visa interview in 2011 and to border officials
    14   when he came to the United States in 2013.              See 8 U.S.C.
    15   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)    (IJ   may   rely   on   falsehoods   in    any
    16   statement “without regard to whether . . . [it] goes to the
    17   heart of the applicant’s claim”); 
    id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)
    18   (requiring IJ to weigh testimony and corroborating evidence).
    19   Ismail attempted to obtain a visa in 2011 by falsely claiming
    20   that he was enrolled in college in Ghana and was part of a
    21   student-exchange program.      And when he entered the United
    4
    1    States in 2013, he told border officials that he came to the
    2    United States by boat when, in fact, he flew from Ghana to
    3    Mexico City.    The agency was not required to accept Ismail’s
    4    explanation that he was scared of having to return to Ghana,
    5    because he did not explain why he believed he would be sent
    6    back if he told the truth regarding his travel.         See Majidi
    7    v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner
    8    must do more than offer a plausible explanation for . . .
    9    inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate
    10   that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit
    11   his testimony.” (internal quotations omitted)).       While making
    12   false statements to flee persecution is consistent with the
    13   pursuit of asylum, see Rui Ying Lin v. Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 14
      127, 134 (2d Cir. 2006), the agency did not err in relying on
    15   these   false   statements   because   Ismail   was   not   fleeing
    16   persecution when he lied to obtain a visa years before the
    17   events giving rise to his asylum claim and he lied to border
    18   officials after he arrived in the United States.
    19       Because Ismail’s credibility was in question, the agency
    20   properly looked to his corroborating evidence to determine
    21   whether he could meet his burden of proof.            See 8 U.S.C.
    5
    1    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).   Primarily, Ismail produced only copies
    2    of documents and stated that his friend who was applying for
    3    asylum in New York had the originals, including the original
    4    of Ismail’s mother’s affidavit and her death certificate that
    5    allegedly proved she died a few years after the 2013 attack
    6    as a result of her injuries.   The IJ did not err in requiring
    7    originals.   See Immigration Court Practice Manual, Chapt.
    8    3.3(d)(iii) (providing that alien must file photocopies, but
    9    must make original documents available at hearings).   Nor did
    10   the IJ err in finding that Ismail should have presented
    11   testimony or a statement his friend who had been at the heart
    12   of the events in Ghana.     Although Ismail stated that his
    13   friend’s lawyer had advised him not to appear as a witness,
    14   Ismail did not explain why he had not obtained the originals
    15   of the documents or a written statement.        See 8 U.S.C.
    16   § 1252(b)(4) (stating that a court may not reverse a finding
    17   that evidence is available unless a factfinder would be
    18   compelled to find it unavailable).
    19       Nor did the IJ err in declining to give weight to the
    20   photocopies of documents in the record.   See Y.C. v. Holder,
    21   
    741 F.3d 324
    , 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the
    6
    1    agency’s   evaluation   of   the       weight     to   be   afforded   an
    2    applicant’s documentary evidence.”).            The IJ reasonably found
    3    that Ismail’s mother’s death certificate was suspect because
    4    it listed the cause of death as “severe hand injury and broken
    5    legs due to attack” but Ismail’s mother died four years after
    6    the attack.    The IJ was not required to credit Ismail’s
    7    explanation that his mother died from an infection due to the
    8    injuries she sustained because there is nothing in the record
    9    to confirm that statement, and other medical documents dated
    10   2013 reflect that she had a leg fracture and a broken arm,
    11   but “got treated and became fit.”                Although “the agency
    12   cannot base an adverse credibility determination solely on a
    13   speculative   finding   that   the       applicant      has    submitted
    14   inauthentic documents in support of his application” if the
    15   testimony is “otherwise credible, consistent and compelling,”
    16   Niang v. Mukasey, 
    511 F.3d 138
    , 141 (2d Cir. 2007), the IJ
    17   did not err in declining to credit Ismail’s evidence given
    18   the credibility problems and lack of original documents.
    19   Because Ismail did not demonstrate credibility or otherwise
    20   meet his burden of proof for asylum, he necessarily did not
    21   meet his burden for withholding of removal and CAT relief
    7
    1    because all three forms of relief were based on the same
    2    factual predicate.   See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-
    3    57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    4    Motion for a Continuance
    5        Ismail challenges the agency’s denial of his motion to
    6    continue proceedings to await ruling on adjustment of
    7    status by USCIS.   After the conclusion of Ismail’s removal
    8    proceedings, USCIS denied Ismail’s application.
    9    Accordingly, we agree with the government that any
    10   challenge to the denial of a continuance is moot.    See
    11   Qureshi v. Gonzales, 
    442 F.3d 985
    , 987-90 (7th Cir. 2006)
    12   (“A remand now would effectuate no change in the case
    13   [because the] basis for a continuance no longer exists.”);
    14   see also Church of Scientology of California v. United
    15   States, 
    506 U.S. 9
    , 12 (1992) (“[I]f an event occurs while
    16   a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for
    17   the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a
    18   prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed.” (internal
    19   quotation marks omitted)).
    20       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    21   DENIED as to asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief,
    8
    1   and DISMISSED as moot as to the denial of a continuance.        All
    2   pending    motions   and   applications   are   DENIED   and   stays
    3   VACATED.
    4                                  FOR THE COURT:
    5                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    6                                  Clerk of Court
    9