Pelczar v. Kelly ( 2020 )

18‐3833 (L)
Pelczar v. Kelly
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,
2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS
COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@).
A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT
ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 11th day of February, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
Circuit Judges,
JESSE M. FURMAN,
District Judge.*
_____________________________________
James F. Pelczar,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. 18‐3833 (L),
19‐1691 (Con)
* Judge Jesse M. Furman, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, sitting by designation.
Judge Peter J. Kelly, in his official
capacity as Surrogate of the Queens
County Surrogate’s Court,
Defendant‐Appellee.
_____________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: James F. Pelczar, pro se, New Port
Richey, FL.
FOR APPELLEE: Letitia James, Attorney General of the
State of New York, Barbara D.
Underwood, Solicitor General,
Anisha S. Dasgupta, Deputy Solicitor
General, David Lawrence III,
Assistant Solicitor General, of
counsel, New York, NY.
Appeals from a judgment of dismissal and post‐judgment order of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Donnelly, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment is VACATED and
REMANDED with instructions, and the order is AFFIRMED.
James F. Pelczar, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment
sua sponte dismissing his complaint against Queens County Surrogate’s Court
Judge Peter J. Kelly primarily under the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine, see Rooker v.
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Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), and an order denying Pelczar’s motion for relief from the judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We assume the parties’ familiarity with
the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
I. Dismissal of the Complaint
We review a sua sponte dismissal, including a dismissal under the Rooker‐
Feldman doctrine, de novo. Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009)
(Rooker‐Feldman); J.S. v. T’Kach, 714 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 2013) (sua sponte
dismissal). As we have recently explained, the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine
establishes “the clear principle that federal district courts lack jurisdiction over
suits that are, in substance, appeals from state‐court judgments.” Sung Cho v. City
of New York, 910 F.3d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of
Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005)). Rooker‐Feldman thus applies where the
federal‐court plaintiff: (1) lost in state court, (2) alleges, in district court, injuries
caused by the state‐court judgment, (3) invites the district court to review and
reject the state‐court judgment, and (4) commenced the district court proceedings
after the state‐court judgment was rendered. Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home
Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85).
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Pelczar challenges the district court’s conclusion that the third requirement
was satisfied, arguing that his complaint did not invite the district court to review
and reject the Surrogate Court’s ruling. We disagree. Pelczar sought an
injunction directing the defendant, a Queens County Surrogate’s Court Judge, to
undo a ruling admitting a will to probate and finding that certain property was
part of his father’s estate. He thus asked the district court “to determine whether
the state judgment was wrongfully issued.” Id. at 427.
Nevertheless, because the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine is a matter of subject‐
matter jurisdiction, Sung Cho, 910 F.3d at 644, the district court “lack[ed] the power
to dismiss [the complaint] with prejudice,” Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Assocs., 182
F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand to
the district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
II. Denial of Rule 60(b) Motion
We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Gomez
v. City of New York, 805 F.3d 419, 423 (2d Cir. 2015). We find no abuse of discretion
here. In support of his motion, Pelczar argued that a statement by a lawyer who
was connected to the probate proceeding (and who was a defendant in a separate
action brought by Pelczar) was evidence that the property in question was not part
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of his father’s estate. The attorney in the other action stated in a letter to the court
that “the specific issue of whether [the property was] an asset of the probate estate
was never before the Surrogate’s Court of Queens County[, but] the Surrogate’s
Court did indirectly decide that it was.” Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 7 at 7. However, that
statement has no bearing on whether Pelczar invited the district court in this case
to review the Surrogate’s Court’s judgment, thereby implicating Rooker‐Feldman.†
* * *
We have considered all of Pelczar’s arguments and find them to be without
merit. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND with instructions
to dismiss the complaint without prejudice, and AFFIRM the order.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
† We similarly conclude that the probate documents attached to Pelczar’s pending motion for
judicial notice have no bearing on whether the district court correctly applied the Rooker‐Feldman
doctrine. Accordingly, we deny that motion as moot. See, e.g., United States v. Bleznak, 153 F.3d
16, 21 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1994).
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