Deem v. Eichen ( 2020 )


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  • 19-1630-cv
    Deem v. Eichen, et al.
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed
    on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
    document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
    electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
    must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
    the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 9th day of April, two thousand twenty.
    PRESENT:             AMALYA L. KEARSE,
    JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    MICHAEL H. PARK,
    Circuit Judges,
    MICHAEL ANTHONY DEEM,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                         19-1630-cv
    v.
    LORNA M. DIMELLA-DEEM, LINDA EICHEN, ESQ.,
    HON. HAL B. GREENWALD, F.C.J., AND HON. JOSEPH
    A. EGITTO, A.J.S.C.,
    Defendants-Appellees. *
    *
    The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform to the above.
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    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                    Michael A. Deem, pro se, Yonkers, NY.
    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                                   Anthony P. Colavita and Noah Nunberg,
    L’Abbate, Balkan, Colavita & Contini,
    L.L.P., Garden City, NY.
    Appeal from a May 2, 2019 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of New York (Kenneth M. Karas, Judge).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
    ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and hereby is
    AFFIRMED.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Deem (“Deem”), an attorney proceeding pro se, sued his
    estranged wife, Lorna DiMella-Deem, her family law attorney, Linda Eichen, and two state-court
    judges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First, Second, Ninth, and Fourteenth
    Amendments. He alleged that DiMella-Deem and Eichen conspired with a family court judge to
    deny him due process and extend a temporary order of protection against him that prohibited him
    from contacting his children, practicing his religion with them, or accessing his guns. The District
    Court dismissed the complaint, reasoning, inter alia, that the DiMella-Deem and Eichen were not
    state actors, that the defendant judges were entitled to judicial immunity, and that it should abstain
    under the domestic relations abstention doctrine. See App’x 48. We assume the parties’ familiarity
    with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
    “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
    construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and
    drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 
    282 F.3d 147
    , 152 (2d Cir. 2002).
    The District Court properly dismissed the complaint. In American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, we
    held that “[a] federal court presented with matrimonial issues or issues ‘on the verge’ of being
    matrimonial in nature should abstain from exercising jurisdiction so long as there is no obstacle to
    their full and fair determination in state courts.” 
    905 F.2d 12
    , 14 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Csibi v.
    Fustos, 
    670 F.2d 134
    , 137 (9th Cir. 1982)). Because we saw no such obstacle, we held that the
    District Court should have abstained in part from adjudicating the action.
    Id. at 15.
    We recently re-affirmed the vitality of American Airlines in Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 
    941 F.3d 618
    , 623–25 (2d Cir. 2019). There, Deem—the same plaintiff here—sued DiMella-Deem and others
    under § 1983, alleging that they conspired to maliciously prosecute him and violate his right to
    intimate association with his children by seeking and obtaining a temporary order of protection
    prohibiting him from contacting his children. See 
    Deem, 941 F.3d at 620
    . We concluded that the
    District Court properly abstained under American Airlines because Deem’s claims were, “at a
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    minimum, on the verge of being matrimonial in nature” and that there was “no obstacle to their full
    and fair determination in state courts.”
    Id. at 623
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Deem’s allegations in this case are nearly identical to the allegations we considered in his
    prior appeal. In this case, he alleged that his injuries—inability to practice Catholicism with his
    children, inability to gain access to his guns, inability to see his children, and denial of due process—
    stemmed from the defendants’ actions in obtaining an extension of the temporary order of
    protection from the family court. This is the same order of protection and family court case
    discussed in Deem. Therefore, the issues here are also “on the verge of being matrimonial in nature.”
    See
    id. at 623,
    625. Further, Deem made no allegation that he could not vindicate his rights in state
    court, and does not dispute the District Court’s conclusion on this point. Accordingly, the District
    Court properly dismissed the complaint on American Airlines domestic relations abstention grounds.
    CONCLUSION
    We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Deem on appeal and find them to be
    without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the May 2, 2019 judgment of the District
    Court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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