United States v. Roye ( 2021 )


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  • 19-2644-cr
    United States v. Roye
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
    SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
    FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
    WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
    CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
    "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
    ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
    the City of New York, on the 12th day of January, two thousand twenty-one.
    PRESENT:             GUIDO CALABRESI,
    REENA RAGGI,
    DENNY CHIN,
    Circuit Judges.
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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    -v-                                                  19-2644-cr
    JIMEL FRANK, AKA 30, AKA Velly,
    Defendant,
    KARL ROYE, AKA Eagle,
    Defendant-Appellant.
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    FOR APPELLEE:                             JOHN T. PIERPONT, JR., Assistant United
    States Attorney (Marc H. Silverman, Assistant
    United States Attorney, on the brief), for John H.
    Durham, United States Attorney for the
    District of Connecticut, New Haven,
    Connecticut.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:                  MICHELLE A. BARTH, Law Office of Michelle
    Anderson Barth, Burlington, Vermont.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Connecticut (Arterton, J.).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
    DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    On August 4, 2016, a jury convicted defendant-appellant Karl Roye of
    murder in aid of racketeering and conspiracy to commit the same. On August 2, 2019,
    following the resolution of the parties' post-judgment appeals, the district court
    imposed concurrent sentences of 120 months' imprisonment and life imprisonment, and
    an amended judgment was entered on August 12, 2019. Roye appeals, contending that
    the district court (1) violated his Eighth Amendment rights by imposing a mandatory
    life sentence without parole, and (2) committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury
    as to the conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering. We assume the parties'
    familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues
    on appeal.
    2
    On April 6, 2011, Roye and Jimel Frank approached Anthony Parker, a
    rival gang member, sitting alone in a parked car in a driveway. United States v. Frank,
    
    749 F. App'x 5
    , 6-7 (2d Cir. 2018). After a brief confrontation, Roye and Frank shot
    Parker from both sides of the car, killing him. 
    Id. at 7
    . Roye was twenty years old at the
    time of the murder.
    Roye argues that this Court should vacate his mandatory life sentence,
    relying primarily on Miller v. Alabama, 
    567 U.S. 460
    , 465 (2012) (holding that "mandatory
    life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the
    Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments'"). In effect, Roye
    argues that this Court should extend the Eighth Amendment protections provided to
    juveniles under Miller, and reaffirmed in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
    136 S. Ct. 718
     (2016),
    to twenty-year-old offenders, such as Roye himself at the time of the April 6, 2011
    murder. Roye's argument is unavailing. As this Court noted in United States v. Sierra,
    when it comes to the age of an offender, "a line must be drawn, and the Supreme Court
    has repeatedly chosen in the Eighth Amendment context to draw that line at the age of
    18, which is the point where society draws the line for many purposes between
    childhood and adulthood." 
    933 F.3d 95
    , 97 (2d Cir. 2019) (citations and internal
    quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Beltran v. United States, 
    140 S. Ct. 2540
    (2020), and cert. denied sub. nom. Lopez-Cabrera v. United States, 
    140 S. Ct. 2541
     (2020). See
    also Cruz v. United States, 
    826 F. App'x 49
    , 51 (2d Cir. 2020) ("As Sierra observes, the
    3
    Supreme Court has repeatedly drawn a bright line at age eighteen for Eighth
    Amendment limitations on sentencing." (citation omitted)). Consequently, mandatory
    life sentences without parole for individuals who were over eighteen (even though they
    were under twenty-one) when they committed their crimes are constitutional. See
    Sierra, 933 F.3d at 97.
    Roye also argues that the district court committed prejudicial error in
    instructing the jury as to conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering without
    including the underlying Connecticut state law's requirement that an overt act be
    committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
    We review unpreserved objections to jury instructions for plain error,
    which requires for reversal an error that is plain, "affects substantial rights," and
    "seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."
    United States v. Solano, 
    966 F.3d 184
    , 193 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and
    alterations omitted). "An error affects substantial rights when it is prejudicial -- that is,
    when there is a 'reasonable probability' that the error affected the outcome of the trial."
    
    Id.
     We find that here, even if the omission of the "overt-act" element were to constitute
    plain error, it did not affect the outcome of the trial because the jury also convicted Roye
    of murder, the overt act underlying the murder conspiracy charge. Accordingly, we
    find that the omission did not affect Roye's substantial rights and provides no basis for
    reversal here.
    4
    * * *
    We have considered Roye's remaining arguments and conclude they are
    without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
    court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-2644-cr

Filed Date: 1/12/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2021