Long Dong v. Garland ( 2021 )

19-1244
Long Dong v. Garland
BIA
A077 415 473
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 8th day of July, two thousand twenty-one.
PRESENT:
JON O. NEWMAN,
DENNIS JACOBS,
PIERRE N. LEVAL,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
JIAN LONG DONG,
Petitioner,
v. 19-1244
NAC
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.*
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Theodore N. Cox, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
Attorney General; Bernard A.
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set
forth above.
Joseph, Senior Litigation Counsel;
Anthony O. Pottinger, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Jian Long Dong, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an April 11, 2019,
BIA decision denying his motion to reopen his removal
proceedings. In re Jian Long Dong, No. A077 415 473 (B.I.A.
Apr. 11, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history.
The applicable standards of review are well established.
See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir.
2008). Petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings
to present evidence of his claimed fear of persecution based
on the births of his two children in the United States
purportedly in violation of China’s population control
program.
It is undisputed that Petitioner’s motion to reopen was
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untimely because he filed it more than one year after he was
ordered removed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(2). The time limitation does not apply if the
motion is to reopen proceedings to apply for asylum “based on
changed country conditions arising in the country of
nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,
if such evidence is material and was not available and would
not have been discovered or presented at the previous
proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
We find no error in the BIA’s determination that
Petitioner failed to demonstrate materially changed country
conditions related to the enforcement of the family planning
policy. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 159-66, 169-73. As
the BIA found, Petitioner’s evidence reflected that the
Chinese government had loosened the family planning policy to
permit two children per couple beginning January 1, 2016, and
that the use of incentives and economic punishments to coerce
compliance with the policy continued as it had for years.
Accordingly, because Petitioner did not establish a
material adverse change in conditions in China, the BIA did
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not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as
untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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