Jordan v. New York State Dep't of Labor ( 2020 )

19-2943-cv
Jordan v. New York State Dep't of Labor
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
"SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 30th day of June, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER,
GUIDO CALABRESI,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
JANESSA JORDAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 19-2943-cv
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR,
Defendant-Appellee.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Janessa Jordan, pro se, New York, New
York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (McMahon, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-appellant Janessa Jordan, pro se, sued the New York State
Department of Labor ("NYSDOL") alleging that an NYSDOL employee unlawfully
adjusted her unemployment benefits claim which apparently resulted in her having to
repay the agency $9,315. Her complaint did not specify a cause of action or statute
under which she was suing, and this information was unclear from her complaint. The
district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint as frivolous because NYSDOL was
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and it denied leave to amend the
complaint as futile. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
I. Forfeiture
We liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest. Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d
Cir. 2006). Pro se appellants, however, must still comply with Fed. R. App. P. 28(a),
which "requires appellants in their briefs to provide the court with a clear statement of
the issues on appeal." Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1998). Accordingly,
we "normally will not[ ] decide issues that a party fails to raise in his or her appellate
-2-
brief." Id.; see also Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Issues not
sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be
addressed on appeal."). Jordan forfeited a challenge to the district court's rulings that
NYSDOL was immune from suit and that amending her complaint would be futile by
failing to address these determinations in her brief.
II. Sua Sponte Dismissal
Were we to reach the merits of the district court's decision, we would
conclude it did not err. District courts have the inherent power to sua sponte dismiss a
complaint as frivolous, even where, as here, the plaintiff has paid the filing fee.
Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000). Although
we have not determined whether a district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint as
frivolous is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion, the district court's determination
here "easily passes muster under the more rigorous de novo review." Id. at 364 n.2.
A complaint is frivolous when "(1) the factual contentions are clearly
baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory."
Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir 1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted). One example of a claim "based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory" is a claim against a "defendant[ that is] immune from suit." Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
-3-
The district court correctly held that NYSDOL is immune from suit under
the Eleventh Amendment, which precludes suits against states and state agencies unless
the state expressly waives its immunity or Congress abrogates that immunity. CSX
Transp., Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Real Prop. Servs., 306 F.3d 87, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2002); see
also Leitner v. Westchester Cmty. Coll., 779 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2015) ("The Eleventh
Amendment generally bars suits in federal court by private individuals against non-
consenting states."); Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that
Eleventh Amendment immunity "extends to state agencies and to state officers who act
on behalf of the state."). Congress has not abrogated New York's immunity against
suit in this circumstance (particularly where Jordan has not sued under any
ascertainable statute), nor has New York waived its immunity from suit. Accordingly,
the district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing Jordan's complaint as frivolous as
the NYSDOL is immune from suit. See CSX Transp., Inc., 306 F.3d at 94-95. The
district court also did not err in denying Jordan leave to amend her complaint. Pro se
plaintiffs are generally afforded an opportunity to amend, unless amendment would be
futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011). Here, amendment
would have been futile because the NYSDOL is immune from suit.
* * *
-4-
We have considered Jordan's remaining arguments and conclude they are
without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
-5-