Osen LLC v. United States Central Command ( 2020 )


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  • 19-1577
    Osen LLC v. United States Central Command
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    ______________
    August Term 2019
    (Argued: March 16, 2020 | Decided: August 10, 2020)
    Docket No. 19-1577
    OSEN LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ______________
    Before:
    WESLEY, CARNEY, MENASHI, Circuit Judges.
    Appeal from a judgment of the Southern District of New York (Failla, J.),
    denying in part United States Central Command’s (“CENTCOM”) motion for
    summary judgment.
    Osen LLC (“Osen”) brought this action under the Freedom of Information
    Act (“FOIA”) seeking military investigation records from terrorist attacks that
    occurred in Iraq between 2004 and 2011. Applying the official disclosure doctrine,
    the district court found that CENTCOM could not withhold certain classified
    images contained in those records, because another component of the Department
    of Defense (“DoD”) had previously disclosed that information.
    We disagree. Although similar images from other, unrelated terrorist
    attacks have been produced in the past, no component of DoD has ever disclosed
    images of the attacks for which Osen seeks records in this case. CENTCOM
    therefore did not waive its right to withhold the images that Osen requested under
    the official disclosure doctrine. Further, because we must give substantial weight
    to CENTCOM’s position that disclosure of those classified images will pose a risk
    to national security, we find that CENTCOM properly withheld the images at
    issue under the first exemption from FOIA production.
    Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment in part and REVERSE the decision
    of the district court. We REMAND so that the district court may enter an order
    and judgment consistent with this opinion.
    Judge Menashi concurs in a separate opinion.
    _________________
    MICHAEL J. RADINE (Gary M. Osen, on the brief), Osen LLC,
    Hackensack, NJ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    ANDREW E. KRAUSE, Assistant United States Attorney
    (Christopher Connolly, Assistant United States Attorney, on the
    brief), for Audrey Strauss, Acting United States Attorney for the
    Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Defendant-
    Appellant.
    _________________
    WESLEY, Circuit Judge:
    Osen LLC (“Osen”) has filed a large number of lawsuits on behalf of United
    States servicemembers and their families against Iran and various Iranian and
    Western financial institutions. Osen’s clients were injured or killed in terrorist
    attacks that occurred in Iraq between 2004 and 2011; their lawsuits allege that Iran
    and the defendant financial institutions helped fund, train, and support terrorists
    responsible for those attacks.
    2
    To meet its burden of proving Iran’s responsibility for the terrorist attacks
    at issue, Osen sought military investigation records from Department of Defense
    (“DoD”) entities, including United States Central Command (“CENTCOM”).
    Specifically, Osen sought to confirm the types of explosive weapons used in each
    attack, reasoning that, if the weapons were too sophisticated for Iraqi terrorists to
    have manufactured themselves, this demonstrated the terrorists’ affiliation with
    Iran, and by extension, Iran’s causal role in the servicemembers’ injuries.
    Osen brought this action under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),
    5 U.S.C. § 552, arguing that, in response to its request for these military
    investigation records, CENTCOM improperly withheld, under various FOIA
    exemptions, documents and information to which Osen believed it was entitled.
    Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court for
    the Southern District of New York (Failla, J.) determined in relevant part that
    CENTCOM could not withhold certain classified images because another
    component of DoD had already officially disclosed the information that those
    images conveyed.
    CENTCOM appealed. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the district
    court’s decision.
    3
    BACKGROUND
    Osen is a New Jersey-based law firm that represents hundreds of United
    States servicemembers and the families of United States servicemembers injured
    or killed in terrorist attacks that occurred in Iraq between 2004 and 2011. On behalf
    of these clients Osen has sued the Islamic Republic of Iran and various Iranian and
    Western financial institutions for allegedly funding, training, and supporting the
    terrorists responsible for those devastating attacks.
    To show that the attacks were committed by Iranian-backed terrorists, Osen
    intends to argue that the weapons used in the attacks were more sophisticated and
    destructive than the types of weapons terrorists in Iraq would or could have
    otherwise obtained themselves, thereby suggesting Iran provided the weapons.
    One such weapon is called an Explosively-Formed Penetrator (“EFP”)—an
    explosive device that the terrorists used to penetrate armored vehicles and maim
    the servicemembers inside. Military investigation records contain information
    and details about weapons used in terrorist attacks. Osen therefore submitted a
    FOIA request to CENTCOM, seeking “reporting or investigative documents”
    related to 92 terrorist attacks involving the use of EFPs. J.A. 20–23.
    4
    CENTCOM is “one of nine combatant commands of the United States armed
    forces; it directs and enables military operations and activities with allies and
    partners” within, among other areas, the Middle East. J.A. 118. CENTCOM
    produced six unclassified documents in response to Osen’s FOIA request. Osen
    thereafter submitted 168 additional FOIA requests to CENTCOM related to
    numerous different EFP attacks.
    One type of record that Osen requested from CENTCOM is called an Army
    Regulation (“AR”) 15-6 investigation report, created by the Army after an incident
    in which a servicemember is wounded or killed in action. As relevant here, after
    an EFP attack in Iraq, the military investigates the attack scene, takes pictures of
    the damaged armored vehicle, and records those images along with its findings in
    the AR 15-6 investigation report, thus memorializing the damage from the attack.
    CENTCOM conducted database searches and found 36 responsive AR 15-6
    investigation reports. CENTCOM cannot, however, produce AR 15-6 reports
    “without the approval of a properly designated release authority” from the Army.
    J.A. 124, 152. It therefore referred the 36 responsive reports to United States Army
    Central (“ARCENT”)—the Army unit that conducted those investigations—to
    determine whether to produce the reports to Osen. ARCENT is “an operational-
    5
    level Army force that exercises administrative control of all U.S. Army forces in
    the Middle East.” J.A. 123. ARCENT has its own FOIA staff and procedures, and
    it handles FOIA requests independently from CENTCOM. Osen also submitted
    separate FOIA requests to ARCENT, which were related to its lawsuits against
    Iran but which Osen does not challenge in this action.
    After Osen “receiv[ed] what [it] felt was insufficient production” from
    CENTCOM, J.A. 104, Osen filed a complaint in federal district court to obtain
    additional and lesser-redacted records under FOIA. During the district court
    proceedings, CENTCOM and ARCENT each produced several thousands of pages
    of documents in response to Osen’s first and subsequent FOIA requests, including
    14 of the 36 AR 15-6 investigation reports that CENTCOM referred to ARCENT.
    Unable to resolve Osen’s remaining challenges to still-unproduced
    documents, the parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
    district court found that ARCENT’s FOIA production to Osen of images showing
    EFP strike damage from a terrorist attack related to Osen’s lawsuits operated as a
    waiver with respect to CENTCOM’s right to withhold similar images from all
    other terrorist attacks.   The district court therefore ordered CENTCOM “to
    produce the redacted photographs of EFP strikes” from all the attacks at issue.
    6
    Special App. 32. CENTCOM appealed and claims the order covers “more than 500
    pages of classified photographs from numerous distinct attacks.” Appellant Br.
    13.
    DISCUSSION
    This case requires us to determine whether CENTCOM waived its right to
    withhold classified information from FOIA production under the official
    disclosure doctrine, and if not, whether CENTCOM properly invoked the first
    exemption from production under FOIA to withhold the requested information as
    classified. We review de novo a district court’s decision on summary judgment in
    a FOIA case. See Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 
    592 F.3d 60
    , 69 (2d Cir. 2009).
    “The mandate of [] FOIA calls for broad disclosure of Government records.”
    CIA v. Sims, 
    471 U.S. 159
    , 166 (1985). It generally provides that “each agency, upon
    any request for records . . . shall make the records promptly available to any
    person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
    FOIA does not compel the disclosure of all agency information, however.
    There are nine exemptions to FOIA’s general rule of production, pursuant to
    which agencies can withhold certain categories of documents or information.
    See
    id. § 552(b)(1)–(9). Only
    the first exemption is relevant here. Exemption 1
    7
    excludes from disclosure material that is “(A) specifically authorized under
    criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
    national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant
    to such Executive order.”
    Id. § 552(b)(1). In
    other words, Exemption 1 protects
    information about national security that is classified as secret pursuant to an
    Executive order.
    Pursuant to Executive Order 13,526, information can be classified as secret
    if “its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause identifiable
    or describable damage to the national security . . . and it pertains to” certain
    categories of information including “military plans, weapons systems, or
    operations,” and “vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
    infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national
    security.”   Classified National Security Information, Exec. Order No 13,526
    §§ 1.2(2), 1.4(a), (g), 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 709 (Dec. 29, 2009).
    As relevant to this appeal, Osen challenged CENTCOM’s withholdings
    under Exemption 1 of classified images that show damage caused by EFPs in these
    terrorist attacks—specifically, the “strike points” where an EFP penetrated an
    armored vehicle. J.A. 105. Osen relied on several past DoD disclosures of images
    8
    of EFP damage to argue that CENTCOM waived its right to withhold similar EFP
    damage images from other attacks under the official disclosure doctrine, which we
    discuss at length below. 1
    The district court divided the prior disclosures into two categories: (1) the
    “Prior CENTCOM Disclosures” and (2) ARCENT’s FOIA disclosures in this case
    (to which we refer as “ARCENT’s FOIA Production”). Special App. 15, 19.
    The Prior CENTCOM Disclosures included (1) CENTCOM’s FOIA
    production in a different case of “clear and close up” EFP strike photographs from
    a separate and unrelated terrorist attack; (2) a DoD press conference in which
    agency representatives discussed the dangers of EFPs using an accompanying
    slide deck with images of EFP damage; (3) a CNN video which displayed “a close-
    1 Osen also challenged CENTCOM’s decision to withhold information about EFP size
    under Exemption 1; CENTCOM’s redactions to names that Osen claimed identified
    terrorists under Exemption 6 (i.e., information withheld for privacy reasons, see 5 U.S.C.
    § 552(b)(6)); and the AR 15-6 investigation reports CENTCOM referred to ARCENT that
    ARCENT had not yet produced. The district court found that CENTCOM waived
    Exemption 1 under the official disclosure doctrine with respect to the withheld EFP size
    information. Separately, the district court found that CENTCOM satisfied the
    requirements to redact names under Exemption 6. Finally, the district court did not find
    anything awry with CENTCOM’s referrals to ARCENT of the AR 15-6 investigation
    reports. CENTCOM does not challenge the district court’s order as to EFP size
    information on appeal, nor does Osen challenge the district court’s order as to
    CENTCOM’s name redactions or the ARCENT referrals; these decisions are therefore not
    before us for review.
    9
    up picture of an EFP strike” that DoD released to the media; and (4) CENTCOM’s
    other disclosures in this case, which Osen argues often reveal EFP strike points.
    Id. at 15–16.
    With respect to this category of disclosures, the district court accorded
    substantial weight to the declaration of CENTOM’s Chief of Staff, Major General
    Terry Ferrell, that “[e]ach individual photograph showing the penetration of
    armor by EFPs that has been withheld . . . reveals information about the
    vulnerabilities of American war-fighting equipment.” J.A. 156. The district court
    also accepted CENTCOM’s argument that “each attack presents its own specific,
    individualized factual scenario,” and, accordingly, found that prior disclosure of
    information about one attack does not “categorically waive” the right to withhold
    information under Exemption 1 for other attacks. Special App. 18.
    The district court explained that the Prior CENTCOM Disclosures that
    concerned EFPs generally or general vulnerabilities of armored vehicles were “too
    broad” to constitute official disclosures of individual attacks, and that the Prior
    CENTCOM Disclosures with images of EFP damage from other attacks were “too
    narrow” to constitute official disclosure of the attacks at issue here.
    Id. at 18–19. 10
    Thus, the district court concluded that the Prior CENTCOM Disclosures did not
    compel production of withheld images of EFP damage from other attacks.
    With respect to ARCENT’s FOIA Production, however, the district court
    found that ARCENT “provide[d] specific photographs connected to a specific
    attack, with dates and detailed location information” that was at issue in Osen’s
    lawsuits. 2
    Id. at 21.
    According to the district court, ARCENT’s FOIA Production
    “provide[d] the precise type of information that General Ferrell suggests would
    reveal vulnerabilities through an official disclosure”; the district court therefore
    interpreted ARCENT’s FOIA Production as suggesting that ARCENT “made a
    determination that this type of material does not pose a risk to national security.”
    Id. The district court
    concluded that the images in ARCENT’s FOIA Production
    constituted a subject matter waiver under the official disclosure doctrine and
    “require[d] disclosure of any similar photographs of EFP strikes withheld by
    CENTCOM.”
    Id. 2This
    finding states the obvious. A photograph necessarily memorializes a specific event,
    frozen in time. Given that fact, it is somewhat confusing how the district court concluded
    that the photographs ARCENT produced were any different in this respect from other
    photographs that DoD has produced.
    11
    I.     Official Disclosure Doctrine
    Under the official disclosure doctrine, an agency may not invoke
    Exemption 1 “to prevent public disclosure when the government has officially
    disclosed the specific information being sought.” Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc.
    v. Dep't of Navy, 
    891 F.2d 414
    , 421 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original). The official
    disclosure doctrine prohibits an agency from withholding “even properly
    classified information once the Agency itself has officially disclosed it.” Wilson v.
    CIA, 
    586 F.3d 171
    , 186 (2d Cir. 2009).
    The test we articulated in Wilson is a “strict” one: “Classified information
    that a party seeks to obtain or publish is deemed to have been officially disclosed
    only if it (1) ‘[is] as specific as the information previously released,’ (2) ‘match[es]
    the information previously disclosed,’ and (3) was ‘made public through an official
    and documented disclosure.’”
    Id. (alterations in original)
    (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 
    473 F.3d 370
    , 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (citing Hudson River Sloop 
    Clearwater, 891 F.2d at 421
    ).
    All three prongs of the Wilson test must be met before an agency will be deemed
    to have officially disclosed classified information.
    Neither we nor the D.C. Circuit (from where the official disclosure doctrine
    originates) has delineated what a FOIA plaintiff must establish to satisfy the first
    12
    or second prong of the Wilson test. 3 Rather, much of the caselaw refers to and
    analyzes whether “the specific information” has already been produced by the
    government, as that phrase is used (including in Hudson River Sloop Clearwater) to
    describe a disclosure that triggers the official disclosure doctrine generally, rather
    3 The third prong of the Wilson test is not at issue in this case. CENTCOM does not
    challenge the official nature of any of the disclosures upon which Osen relies in arguing
    that CENTCOM waived its Exemption 1 rights. Accordingly, for purposes of this
    decision, we assume that each of the prior disclosures upon which Osen relies is an
    “official” disclosure under the third prong of the Wilson test.
    CENTCOM also does not challenge the district court’s finding that any waiver by
    ARCENT also applies to CENTCOM. As is relevant to that finding, CENTCOM referred
    to ARCENT the FOIA decision of whether to produce records that contain EFP strike
    point images. Though CENTCOM did not refer the decision on whether to produce every
    document that Osen sought, or even the majority of Osen’s requests, CENTCOM and
    ARCENT nevertheless displayed a telling level of coordination and deference with
    respect to the decision of whether to disclose this type of information to Osen in this case.
    As we discuss further below, there is no difference in the character of EFP strike point
    images across terrorist attacks, regardless of who is the custodian of those images. In
    other words, it is logical in this case that ARCENT’s disclosure could implicate the official
    disclosure doctrine for CENTCOM with respect to EFP strike point images, even though
    each DoD subcomponent has its own FOIA staff and procedures.
    This might not be the case in a factually distinct scenario. As the concurrence suggests,
    disclosure by one component of an Executive department or agency does not
    automatically implicate the official disclosure doctrine for another component of the
    same department or agency. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (defining “agency” as “each authority
    of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review
    by another agency”). Because neither party has briefed this issue, we decline to comment
    further, other than to caution against extrapolating from or taking this point out of
    context, because what constitutes an “agency” under FOIA need not but may be the
    equivalent of the government entity itself, depending on the facts of the case.
    13
    than examining whether information is “as specific as” a prior disclosure, as that
    phrase is used in the Wilson test.
    This case demands a more granular approach. We must parse out the first
    two prongs of the Wilson test to determine whether the official disclosure doctrine
    properly applies to compel the broad finding of waiver that Osen advances and
    that the district court found.
    The phrase “the specific information” logically covers the first two prongs
    of the Wilson test: “the specific information” refers to information that is both “as
    specific as” and “matches” information previously disclosed.         Each serves a
    distinct purpose. If information is as specific as but does not match previously
    disclosed information, it cannot be “the specific information.” The same is true for
    information that matches a prior disclosed subject but is more or less specific than
    information previously disclosed; it also does not constitute “the specific
    information” warranting application of the official disclosure doctrine. Thus, the
    specificity and matching prongs work together to form the crux of the official
    disclosure doctrine: “disclosure of similar information does not suffice; instead,
    the specific information sought by the plaintiff must already be in the public
    domain by official disclosure.” 
    Wolf, 473 F.3d at 378
    (emphasis in original).
    14
    There is no exhaustive list of factors a court must consider under either
    prong. We also acknowledge that at times these prongs blend together, likely
    because it is rare to encounter a scenario in which the result is different under each.
    But delineating between the specificity and matching prongs of the Wilson test in
    this case demonstrates two major flaws in the district court’s analysis. First, there
    is no meaningful difference between the Prior CENTCOM Disclosures and
    ARCENT’s FOIA Production. Second, images of EFP damage from different
    terrorist attacks do not convey the same information such that disclosure of images
    from one attack constitutes a blanket waiver for images of other attacks under the
    official disclosure doctrine.
    A.     Specificity
    Generally, for information to be “as specific as” that which was previously
    disclosed, there cannot be any “substantive differences between the content of the
    [publicly] released government documents and the withheld information.” Am.
    Civ. Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    628 F.3d 612
    , 620–21 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
    (“ACLU v. DOD”). For example, prior disclosure of “general descriptions” does
    not waive Exemption 1 for withheld documents that are more “specific and
    particular” and that “would reveal far more . . . than the previously released
    15
    records.”
    Id. at 621
    (citation omitted). Thus, specificity concerns the quality or
    kind of information about a particular topic that has been produced to the public.
    Images of strike points from one EFP attack are “as specific as” images of
    strike points from another EFP attack. Each set of images conveys the same level
    and type of details across various attacks: that an explosive weapon penetrated an
    armored vehicle and caused damage to the vehicle and its passengers at a certain
    point in time and at a certain location.
    Both the Prior CENTCOM Disclosures and ARCENT’s FOIA Production
    included images of EFP strike points from terrorist attacks. Osen requests the
    same information from CENTCOM with respect to the remaining withheld images
    showing EFP damage of the attacks forming the subject of Osen’s lawsuits. There
    is no principled distinction between ARCENT’s FOIA Production—which the
    district court found constituted a waiver—and the Prior CENTCOM Disclosures—
    which the district court concluded did not—either from the other or from the
    remaining withheld images. Each of the disclosed and withheld images are
    equally specific; they tell the same stories, but about different attacks. 4
    4On appeal, Osen also relies on several other DoD disclosures that the district court did
    not explicitly consider. Those additional disclosures do not change the outcome on
    16
    The only way in which some of the Prior CENTCOM Disclosures are less
    specific than ARCENT’s FOIA Production and the images CENTCOM withheld is
    that they neither contextualize, nor identify, the attack which caused the EFP
    damage displayed in the image. This lack of context is not uniform, however, as
    demonstrated by the DoD press conference slide deck, which identified the
    location and date of the attack that caused the damage seen in the photographs.
    Thus, the specificity prong of our analysis provides no basis to distinguish
    between the prior disclosures that the district court found did not waive
    Exemption 1, and the prior disclosures that the district court found did. Rather,
    all the prior disclosures upon which Osen relies satisfy the specificity prong of the
    Wilson test.
    B.   Matching
    That does not end the inquiry. Next, we must consider Wilson’s matching
    prong, under which “a plaintiff asserting a claim of prior disclosure must bear the
    initial burden of pointing to specific information in the public domain that appears
    appeal.    They are either fairly characterized as general disclosures about the
    vulnerabilities of armored vehicles or the effectiveness of EFPs (which—as the district
    court suggested—would be too broad to trigger the official disclosure doctrine) or they
    are additional images of EFP attack damage, which have the same effect as the images of
    EFP damage that the district court did explicitly consider.
    17
    to duplicate that being withheld.” 
    Wolf, 473 F.3d at 378
    (emphasis added) (quoting
    Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 
    702 F.2d 1125
    , 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). 5
    Although we have questioned whether the matching prong “require[s]
    absolute identity,” 6 we have repeatedly acknowledged that Wilson is a “precise
    and strict test,” under which we have explained that even a “substantial overlap”
    between the requested information and previously disclosed information is not
    5 In explaining the origin of the official disclosure doctrine, a panel of this Court in New
    York Times Co. v. U.S. Department of Justice, 
    756 F.3d 100
    , 120 n.19 (2d Cir. 2014), noted in
    dicta that, although “Wilson remains the law of this Circuit,” “a rigid application of it may
    not be warranted in view of its questionable provenance.” To briefly recount that history,
    our Circuit adopted the official disclosure doctrine from a line of D.C. Circuit cases, the
    first of which relied in part on a district court decision and never articulated a “matching”
    requirement.
    Id. Thus, the New
    York Times panel expressed skepticism with overly
    relying on the matching prong of the Wilson test.
    Osen has only urged us not to apply a more rigid version of the Wilson test than is
    warranted. Ultimately—as we recognized in New York Times—Wilson remains the law in
    this Circuit. Until it is overturned en banc or by the Supreme Court, we will continue to
    apply Wilson. In fact, this case demonstrates how each prong can serve a distinct purpose
    in determining whether an agency has disclosed “the specific” information at issue, thus
    triggering application of the official disclosure doctrine. 
    Wilson, 586 F.3d at 186
    (emphasis
    in original) (quoting Hudson River Sloop 
    Clearwater, 891 F.2d at 421
    ).
    6 By contrast, the D.C. Circuit appears to “insist[] on exactitude” under the matching
    prong, in recognition of “the Government’s vital interest in information relating to
    national security and foreign affairs.” 
    Wolf, 473 F.3d at 378
    (citations omitted); accord
    ACLU v. 
    DOD, 628 F.3d at 621
    (citation omitted). Under this interpretation, the fact that
    a “FOIA requester would have little need for undisclosed information if it had to match
    precisely information previously disclosed,” N.Y. 
    Times, 756 F.3d at 120
    , is a feature, not
    a bug, of the official disclosure doctrine, because it prevents a FOIA requester from
    accessing undisclosed national security information.
    18
    enough to establish waiver. N.Y. Times v. CIA, 
    965 F.3d 109
    , 116, 119 (2d Cir. 2020).
    Rather, there must be enough of an overlap in subject matter between disclosed
    and withheld records to fairly say that the two records “match”—in other words,
    that they present the same information about the same subject.           See Match,
    Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
    /match (defining “match” to include “to put in a set possessing equal or
    harmonizing attributes” and “to cause to correspond”); see also Fitzgibbon v. CIA,
    
    911 F.2d 755
    , 766 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that a “prior disclosure waiver would not
    operate on information pertaining to a time period later than the date of the
    publicly documented information” because “the fact that information resides in
    the public domain does not eliminate the possibility that further disclosures can
    cause harm to intelligence sources, methods and operations” (citations omitted)).
    Matching, by comparison to specificity, is therefore a question of what topics have
    already been produced to the public.
    Wilson’s matching prong is dispositive in this case. 7 Images of damage from
    one EFP attack do not match images of damage from another EFP attack, and for
    7Both parties seem to agree that this case turns on the matching prong. For example,
    CENTCOM summarized its appellate argument as follows: “because each EFP attack
    19
    that reason, none of the prior disclosures upon which Osen relies triggers the
    official disclosure doctrine for additional images from other attacks.
    Take, for example, images of strike points and damage from Attack A and
    Attack B. Attacks A and B happened in different years, at separate locations, and
    involved different models of an armored vehicle. Each set of EFP strike point
    images provides the same kind and type of information about the attack it
    memorialized. But the images from Attack A say nothing about what happened
    during Attack B, and vice versa. In other words, the subject matter, facts, and
    details conveyed by one set of images are unique to that attack and are different
    from the subject matter, facts, and details conveyed by the other set of images—
    the information does not match.
    Each of the prior disclosures at issue contains images of strike points from
    EFP attacks. Each disclosure reveals information about the vulnerabilities with
    which General Ferrell expressed concern in his affidavit—whether it be the date
    and location of the attack, the type of armor penetrated, the fact that an armored
    presents a distinct set of factual circumstances, photographs of damage to American
    military equipment from one EFP attack do not ‘match’ photographs of damage to
    different American military equipment from different EFP attacks.” Appellant’s Br. 2.
    Osen responded in its own brief employing the “matching” terminology as well.
    20
    vehicle was hit by an EFP, or how and where that vehicle was damaged. But each
    disclosure says nothing about the attacks that the other disclosures depict. More
    importantly, the prior disclosures say nothing about the attacks from which
    images of EFP damage have never been disclosed.
    Accordingly, each set of images effects an Exemption 1 waiver as to the same
    information about the specific attack to which they relate (as the district court
    found and as CENTCOM concedes); but none effects a blanket subject-matter
    waiver of Exemption 1 for all images of EFP damage from every terrorist attack
    across the board.    The district court erred in finding that ARCENT’s FOIA
    Production triggered the official disclosure doctrine and operated as a waiver of
    CENTCOM’s Exemption 1 rights to withhold images showing EFP damage from
    terrorist attacks from which similar images have never been disclosed to the
    public.
    The district court’s justifications for its conclusion were that “CENTCOM
    d[id] not address distinctions between what ARCENT has disclosed and the
    information withheld,” Special App. 20, and that ARCENT “[e]vidently . . . made
    a determination that this type of material does not pose a risk to national security,”
    id. at 21.
    But the district court found that CENTCOM’s explanation that each EFP
    21
    strike represents a unique factual scenario was sufficient to justify CENTCOM’s
    withholdings in light of the Prior CENTCOM Disclosures. Because there is no
    meaningful difference between the Prior CENTCOM Disclosures and ARCENT’s
    FOIA Production, there was no need for CENTCOM separately to address the
    ARCENT production. The outcome for each category should have been the same.
    Further, whether information is or is not properly classified plays no
    independent role in the official disclosure doctrine analysis.     The relevant
    considerations are the three prongs of the Wilson test—which together determine
    whether additional disclosure of information will, as the Government contends,
    harm national security. See ACLU v. 
    DOD, 628 F.3d at 625
    (“The ‘officially
    acknowledged’ test recognizes that even if information exists in some form in the
    public domain that does not mean that official disclosure will not cause harm
    cognizable under a FOIA exemption.” (citation omitted)). Even though General
    Ferrell acknowledged that ARCENT is “the [DoD] component best able to
    determine whether to disclose the records,” J.A. 151, ARCENT’s reasons for
    disclosing the records is a separate consideration from whether the information
    that was disclosed waived Exemption 1 under the official disclosure doctrine. The
    22
    concern is whether additional disclosure would provide meaningfully different
    information such that production would cause harm. 8
    In that vein, ARCENT’s FOIA Production does not contradict General
    Ferrell’s declaration that a large disclosure of all such images will pose a unique
    risk to national security that smaller, isolated productions of the same type of
    images do not. ARCENT disclosed a small number of images that pertain to a
    single attack; it did not produce images of EFP damage en masse. What matters as
    it relates to waiver is the lack of any identifiable distinction between ARCENT’s
    FOIA Production and the other disclosed images. And, more importantly, there
    is no basis in the record to support the district court’s dispositive finding that
    ARCENT has deemed this entire category of military records as not posing a risk
    to national security and therefore ordering their production, other than the fact of
    the ARCENT production itself.
    8 Even if “ARCENT ha[d] made a determination that this type of material does not pose
    a risk to national security,” Special App. 21, the specificity and matching prongs of the
    Wilson test require us to look at the specific information that has been disclosed
    previously—not presumed policy judgments underlying those disclosures—to establish
    waiver. See ACLU v. 
    DOD, 628 F.3d at 621
    . The legitimacy of those types of policy
    judgments is considered when determining whether an entity has appropriately claimed
    an exemption. See Discussion § II, infra.
    23
    Thus, the district court erred in holding that ARCENT’s FOIA Production
    waived Exemption 1 as to the other images of EFP damage that CENTCOM
    withheld as classified. As the district court recognized with respect to the Prior
    CENTCOM Disclosures, an official disclosure of EFP strike point images waives
    Exemption 1 only as to the same information about the same attack that those
    images memorialize. That same disclosure does not constitute a subject matter
    waiver for all images of EFP damage across all terrorist attacks.
    II.    FOIA Exemption 1
    Resolution of Osen’s claim of waiver does not bear on the question of
    whether CENTCOM properly invoked Exemption 1 by withholding images of EFP
    damage. Although the district court chose not to answer the exemption question
    once it found waiver, the court nevertheless made all the factual findings in its
    waiver analysis needed to resolve the exemption issue. 9 Cf. Wright v. N.Y. State
    Dep’t of Corr., 
    831 F.3d 64
    , 76 (2d Cir. 2016).
    9 Indeed, in response to the district court’s attention to the merits of the exemption issue,
    both parties have presented substantial argument in their appellate briefs about the
    legitimacy of CENTCOM’s national security justifications for its Exemption 1
    withholdings.
    24
    “[A]n agency may invoke a FOIA exemption if its justification ‘appears
    logical or plausible.’” Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    681 F.3d 61
    , 69 (2d
    Cir. 2012) (“ACLU v. DOJ”) (quoting 
    Wilner, 592 F.3d at 73
    ). “The agency asserting
    the exemption bears the burden of proof, and all doubts as to the applicability of
    the exemption must be resolved in favor of disclosure.” 
    Wilner, 592 F.3d at 69
    .
    “The agency may meet its burden by submitting a detailed affidavit showing that
    the information logically falls within the claimed exemptions.”
    Id. at 68
    (quoting
    Minier v. CIA, 
    88 F.3d 796
    , 800 (9th Cir. 1996)).
    “Summary judgment is appropriate where the agency affidavits ‘describe
    the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate
    that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are
    not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of
    agency bad faith.’” ACLU v. 
    DOJ, 681 F.3d at 69
    (quoting 
    Wilner, 592 F.3d at 73
    ).
    “In the national security context, however, we ‘must accord substantial weight to an
    agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed
    record.’”
    Id. (emphasis in original)
    (quoting 
    Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374
    ).
    25
    General Ferrell stated the following about CENTCOM’s decision to
    withhold images of EFP damage in his declaration supporting CENTCOM’s
    motion for summary judgment:
    The largest category of withheld materials consists of
    photographs, text, and graphics depicting specific details of how
    EFPs/[Improvised Explosive Devices] were able to effectively
    penetrate the armor on American military vehicles. CENTCOM has
    withheld a substantial volume of photographs depicting damage to
    vehicles caused by EFPs. . . . [P]hotographs of damage to vehicles—
    while potentially not as revealing if viewed in isolation—are
    particularly sensitive when taken together with all of the other
    detailed information contained in the documents that have been
    released to [Osen]. The publication of these photographs alongside
    information about the composition of EFPs, the placement of EFPs,
    the number of EFPs contained in a particular attack array, the distance
    from EFPs to the affected vehicles, and the height at which EFPs were
    placed would reveal to American adversaries specific and detailed
    information about the vulnerabilities of American war-fighting
    equipment. This type of detailed information is not publicly available
    in this form or with this level of specificity, and would clearly
    illustrate the effectiveness of particular types of EFPs and
    combinations of critical variables.
    These considerations are sufficient to warrant the classification
    of each photograph relating to each individual attack at issue in
    [Osen’s] FOIA requests. The potential harm is magnified, however,
    when considering the more than 500 pages containing photographs
    that [Osen] seeks to have released. Taken together, this trove of
    valuable information would provide American adversaries with
    enough material to draw conclusions about areas of vulnerability
    across multiple attacks, with clear depictions in official government
    documents to supplement whatever anecdotal information may be
    26
    available to adversaries based on past deployment of EFPs on the
    battlefield. Public disclosure of this information reasonably could be
    expected to cause serious damage to the national security by
    revealing in considerable and precise detail the vulnerabilities and
    capabilities of critical military equipment and infrastructure, and it
    therefore remains properly classified in accordance with Sections
    l.4(a) and l.4(g) of Executive Order 13,526.
    J.A. 131–32 (paragraph numbers omitted).
    Osen argues that, because CENTCOM never disclosed the “other detailed
    information” that General Ferrell contends makes images of EFP damage
    “particularly sensitive,” CENTCOM’s proffered “mosaic argument”—that
    innocuous information becomes sensitive when considered alongside other
    information in the public sphere—falls short. But this fails to consider the other
    justifications for withholding the images that CENTCOM provided through
    General Ferrell.
    First, General Ferrell declared that the risk to national security is increased
    by producing all of the approximately 500 pages of images that CENTCOM is
    currently withholding pursuant to Exemption 1, regardless of whether it
    withholds the “other detailed information.”       Moreover, in his supplemental
    affidavit, General Ferrell explained:
    27
    Each individual photograph showing the penetration of armor by
    EFPs that has been withheld from CENTCOM’s responses to [Osen’s]
    FOIA requests reveals information about the vulnerabilities of
    American war-fighting equipment.         CENTCOM would have
    withheld each of these photographs even if it had been responding to
    separate FOIA requests from individual requestors on an incident-by-
    incident basis.
    J.A. 156.
    As the district court acknowledged, we cannot ignore either of these
    declarations. To the contrary, in the national security context, we must give them
    substantial weight. See ACLU v. 
    DOJ, 681 F.3d at 69
    . We have repeatedly found
    that it is appropriate to “defer[] to executive [declarations] predicting harm to the
    national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial
    review.” Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Dep’t of Def., 
    901 F.3d 125
    , 134 (2d Cir. 2018)
    (second alteration in original) (quoting ACLU v. 
    DOJ, 681 F.3d at 70
    ). “[G]iven
    ‘relative competencies of the executive and judiciary, we believe that it is bad law
    and bad policy to “second-guess the predictive judgments made by the
    government’s intelligence agencies.”’”
    Id. (quoting ACLU v.
    DOJ, 681 F.3d at 70
    -
    71 (quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    331 F.3d 918
    , 927 (D.C.
    Cir. 2003))).
    28
    General Ferrell’s determination that disclosure of even an individual image
    of EFP damage from a single attack can pose a risk to national security by
    evidencing vulnerabilities of military armor is both logical and plausible. See
    ACLU v. 
    DOJ, 681 F.3d at 69
    . So too is his explanation that a disclosure of a
    substantial number of images could pose a significantly greater risk to national
    security than disclosure of just a handful. Accordingly, neither we nor the district
    court are in any position to deem these approximately 500 pages of images
    improperly withheld as classified.
    The record does not suggest any bad faith on the part of DoD. See
    id. Indeed, the district
    court expressly noted that “[g]iven CENTCOM’s accommodations
    during this litigation, as well as its demonstrated willingness to address redactions
    where [Osen] points to inconsistencies, . . . [there is] no reason to doubt
    CENTCOM’s good-faith efforts . . . or its continued willingness to work with
    [Osen] in addressing these disputes.” Special App. 29 n.7.
    Nor does the record contradict the General’s conclusions. General Ferrell’s
    declaration that a larger production of these types of images would endanger U.S.
    armed forces is not inconsistent with the existence of those prior disclosures, as
    Osen merely points to a handful of disclosures of images showing EFP damage
    29
    from different attacks during the relevant time period. The more images of
    different attacks that become available to the public, the more adversaries might
    learn about the Army’s weaponry, a potential development that CENTCOM
    logically posits puts national security at risk. Of course, the more images of
    individual attacks that components of DoD voluntarily release on a piecemeal
    basis, the less compelling this position will become; but as it stands, CENTCOM’s
    reasoning is sound, and entitled to substantial weight in its favor.
    Accordingly,    CENTCOM’s         withholdings   under   Exemption    1   are
    appropriate, unless Exemption 1 has already been waived with respect to specific
    information about the specific attack at issue through prior official disclosure of
    strike point images from that attack.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the judgment in part and
    REVERSE the decision of the district court. We REMAND so that the district
    court may enter an order and judgment consistent with this opinion.
    30
    MENASHI, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I join the opinion of the court in full and write separately to
    address the district court’s conclusion that, under the official
    disclosure doctrine, it is not “appropriate to limit a waiver of
    Exemption 1 to subcomponents of the same agency.” Osen LLC v. U.S.
    Cent. Command, 
    375 F. Supp. 3d 409
    , 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
    I agree with the court that CENTCOM did not challenge this
    holding on appeal. And because the prior disclosures that Osen
    identifies do not match CENTCOM’s withholdings, we need not
    resolve this question to reverse the judgment of the district court. Still,
    the court appropriately cautions that “disclosure by one component
    of an Executive department or agency does not automatically
    implicate the official disclosure doctrine for another component of the
    same department or agency.” Ante at 13 n.3. Indeed, there are strong
    reasons to doubt the district court’s conclusion that one
    subcomponent can waive Exemption 1 for another subcomponent of
    the same agency.
    First, the plain text of Exemption 1 permits an agency to
    withhold information “specifically authorized under … an Executive
    order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign
    policy” that is “in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive
    order,” without regard to whether that information has been the
    subject of prior disclosures. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). We have therefore
    explained that an agency may withhold such information despite
    “widespread public discussion of [the] classified matter,” “statements
    made by a person not authorized to speak for the [a]gency,” or
    “release of information by another agency, or even by Congress.”
    Wilson v. CIA, 
    586 F.3d 171
    , 186 (2d Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
    The district court assumed that “another agency” must mean a
    government authority without a common superior short of the
    President. See 
    Osen, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 422
    . But the Freedom of
    Information Act (FOIA) defines “agency” to mean, among other
    things, “each authority of the Government of the United States,
    whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency.” 5 U.S.C.
    § 551(1) (emphasis added); see
    id. § 552(f). 1
    Courts have applied this
    definition to conclude, for example, that the Centers for Disease
    Control and Prevention (CDC), the Public Health Service (PHS),
    and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
    (NIOSH)—three subcomponents of the Department of Health and
    Human Services (HHS)—and the Federal Bureau of Prisons—a
    subcomponent of the Department of Justice—are each separate
    agencies for purposes of the FOIA and of the Administrative
    Procedure Act, which shares the same definition. Formaldehyde Inst. v.
    HHS, 
    889 F.2d 1118
    , 1121 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Simmat v. U.S. Bureau
    of Prisons, 
    413 F.3d 1225
    , 1239 (10th Cir. 2005).
    Because the FOIA’s provisions for disclosure and withholding
    apply to a subcomponent independent of its relationship with
    another subcomponent of the same or of a different parent agency, see
    5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (8)(A), it would be anomalous to conclude that
    the subcomponent’s authority to withhold records depends on the
    independent decisions of another entity also considered an “agency”
    under the statute. Moreover, because the FOIA defines “agency”
    without regard to “whether or not it is within or subject to review by
    1 “Section 552(f) of [the] FOIA incorporates the definition of ‘agency’
    contained in section 551(1) of the APA by reference,” Grand Cent. P’ship. v.
    Cuomo, 
    166 F.3d 473
    , 484 (2d Cir. 1999), and “expand[s]” that definition “for
    FOIA purposes,” 1 KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
    ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.2, at 5 (6th ed. 2019).
    2
    another agency,” it would conflict with the statutory scheme for
    courts to engraft onto the FOIA a judge-made doctrine that gives this
    consideration dispositive weight.
    Second, imputing waivers between subagencies that address
    FOIA requests independently, each with “its own FOIA staff and
    FOIA procedures,” 
    Osen, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 415
    , would add
    unnecessary administrative burden. “There are currently one
    hundred agencies subject to the FOIA with several hundred offices
    that process FOIA requests.” 2 In the Department of Defense (DoD)
    alone, there are nineteen components that “have their own FOIA
    programs, including a FOIA appellate authority,” and thirteen
    additional components that “have their own FOIA programs” and a
    consolidated appellate authority. 3 Requiring each component of the
    DoD to involve itself in the work of thirty-one other components, on
    pain of potentially being forced to disclose information that has been
    2 Office of Info. Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Frequently Asked Questions:
    Where do I send a FOIA request?, https://www.foia.gov/faq.html (last visited
    July 29, 2020).
    3U.S. Dep’t of Def., Manual 5400.07, DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
    Program 6-7 (Jan. 25, 2017). These components include the Department of
    the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, Defense
    Commissary Agency, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Defense Contract
    Management Agency, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Defense
    Health Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence
    Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Security Service, Defense
    Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Defense Education Activity,
    National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office,
    National Security Agency/Central Security Service, and Office of the
    Inspector General of the Department of Defense.
    Id. 3
    properly classified in the interest of national security, would increase
    administrative costs significantly and without justification. 4
    The FOIA has been criticized for imposing administrative
    burdens. 5 Justice Scalia, when a law professor, called it “the Taj Mahal
    of the Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of
    Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored.” 6 We should not casually compound
    that burden through judge-made doctrines, such as the official
    disclosure doctrine, that fail to take account of the legal framework
    that governs FOIA administration. 7
    4One researcher estimated “[t]he total cost of FOIA implementation, among
    cabinet-level departments from 1975 until 2015,” at $6.3 billion. A.J.
    Wagner, Essential or Extravagant: Considering FOIA Budgets, Costs and Fees,
    34 GOV’T INFO. Q. 388, 393 (2017). “FOIA costs for the year 2015 [alone]
    amounted to $403 million.”
    Id. 5See
    Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 907, 937
    (2006) (“Agency efforts to comply with FOIA are expensive …. Disclosure
    requirements create [additional] costs to government operations and the
    public in a number of ways [including] by forcing disclosures that actually
    harm national security.”).
    6Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION,
    Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 14, 15.
    7 We have previously suggested that the official disclosure doctrine is of
    “questionable provenance.” N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, 
    756 F.3d 100
    , 120 n.19
    (2d Cir. 2014). But the doctrine ultimately seems to be an application of the
    requirement that an agency’s justification for invoking Exemption 1 be
    “logical or plausible.” Wilner v. NSA, 
    592 F.3d 60
    , 75 (2d Cir. 2009). It would
    be neither logical nor plausible for an agency to claim that information has
    been properly classified in the interest of national security when it has
    already publicly released the exact same information. For that reason, cases
    applying the official disclosure doctrine often come down to whether it is
    logical or plausible that release of the withheld information would reveal
    something else. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. CIA, 
    965 F.3d 109
    , 122 (2d Cir. 2020)
    (“It is still ‘logical or plausible’ that disclosing the existence or nonexistence
    of an intelligence interest in such a program would reveal something not
    4
    Third, both the FOIA statute and implementing regulations
    adopted by the DoD contemplate the potential “need for consultation
    … with another agency … or among two or more components of [an]
    agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B)(iii)(III) (emphasis added); see also
    32 C.F.R. § 286.7(d)(1) (“[T]he DoD Component initially processing
    the request should typically consult with all interested DoD
    Components or other Federal agencies prior to making a release
    determination.”). It would undermine this scheme if one DoD
    component’s refusal or failure to consult with another DoD
    component could waive the second component’s ability to withhold
    records under Exemption 1.
    Observers might assume that subagencies within the same
    department must follow common policies or share common interests.
    But “agencies, like nearly all large organizations, are not unitary
    actors. They are fractured internally.” 8 “Beneath the surface of the
    administrative state are constant battles, between and within
    agencies,” and indeed “like the conflict between agencies,
    subagencies can clash.” 9 When subagencies “share overlapping
    duties,” as would likely be the case when subagency records contain
    common information, rivalry is at least as likely as cooperation. 10 So
    already officially acknowledged and thereby harm national security
    interests.”); ACLU v. CIA, 
    710 F.3d 422
    , 429 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The question
    before us, then, is whether it is ‘logical or plausible’ for the CIA to contend
    that it would reveal something not already officially acknowledged to say
    that the Agency ‘at least has an intelligence interest’ in such strikes.”)
    (internal citation omitted).
    8Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120
    YALE L.J. 1032, 1036 (2011).
    9Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105
    CAL. L. REV. 1375, 1378, 1405 (2017).
    10
    Id. at 1405. 5
    rather than impose the courts’ assumptions about agency behavior on
    the FOIA, it would perhaps be more prudent to follow the statutory
    scheme and to identify each government authority with its own FOIA
    office as a separate “agency.”
    There does not seem to be a principled reason grounded in the
    statute for a subagency to be able to waive Exemption 1 for another
    subagency in the same department—when both subagencies address
    FOIA requests independently—but not for a subagency in another
    department that similarly handles FOIA requests independently. See
    
    Wilson, 586 F.3d at 186
    . Under such a scheme, a disclosure by the
    Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), a DoD component, of a record
    that was jointly drafted by the CIA and the DIA would not affect the
    CIA’s ability to withhold the record but would waive the Defense
    Health Agency’s ability to do so, solely because the Defense Health
    Agency happens to be a DoD component. That would be an odd
    result.
    Accordingly, the question of whether a subagency’s disclosure
    waives another subagency’s ability to apply Exemption 1 should be
    carefully considered when it arises in an appropriate case.11
    11This is an open question in our circuit. The D.C. Circuit, meanwhile, has
    said that while it would avoid “forcing one agency to adopt another’s
    official disclosure of information common to both,” Marino v. DEA, 
    685 F.3d 1076
    , 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2012), that “rule does not apply … where the
    disclosures are made by an authorized representative of the agency’s
    parent,” 
    ACLU, 710 F.3d at 429
    n.7. While it might make sense that a
    subagency would be bound by the determination of a superior authority—
    that is, the disclosure decisions of the HHS Secretary would bind the CDC—
    the same logic does not apply where the two agencies are coequal, though
    share a common parent—such as the CDC and the PHS. Cf. N.Y. 
    Times, 965 F.3d at 121
    (indicating that a disclosure by the President, but not by an
    official of the Defense Department, could bind the CIA).
    6