Kalala v. Barr ( 2020 )


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  •      18-791
    Kalala v. Barr
    BIA
    Hom, IJ
    A205 826 228
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 17th day of March, two thousand twenty.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    8            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, Jr.,
    9            STEVEN J. MENASHI,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   NAOMI KALALA,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                    v.                                  18-791
    17                                                        NAC
    18   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    19   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                  Thomas V. Massucci, New York, NY.
    24
    25   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
    26                                    General; John S. Hogan, Assistant
    27                                    Director; Lindsay Corliss, Trial
    28                                    Attorney; Office of Immigration
    1                              Litigation, United States
    2                              Department of Justice, Washington,
    3                              DC.
    4        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    5    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    6    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    7    is DENIED.
    8        Petitioner Naomi Kalala, a native and citizen of the
    9    Democratic Republic of the Congo, seeks review of a February
    10   26, 2018 decision of the BIA affirming an April 20, 2017
    11   decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Kalala’s
    12   application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    13   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).     In re Naomi
    14   Kalala, No. A 205 826 228 (B.I.A. Feb. 26, 2018), aff’g No. A
    15   205 826 228 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C.Apr. 20, 2017).    We assume the
    16   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
    17   history.
    18       Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the
    19   IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.”   See
    20   Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration & Customs
    21   Enf’t, 
    448 F.3d 524
    , 528 (2d Cir. 2006).        The applicable
    22   standards of review are well established.        See 8 U.S.C.
    23   § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 67
    , 76
    24   (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination
    2
    1   under a substantial evidence standard).   The governing REAL
    2   ID Act credibility standard provides as follows:
    3       Considering the totality of the circumstances, and
    4       all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a
    5       credibility determination on . . . the consistency
    6       between the applicant’s or witness’s written and
    7       oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of
    8       each such statement, the consistency of such
    9       statements with other evidence of record . . . , and
    10       any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,
    11       without   regard  to   whether   an  inconsistency,
    12       inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the
    13       applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.
    14
    15   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).    We “defer . . . to an IJ’s
    16   credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
    17   circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
    18   could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”    Xiu Xia Lin
    19   v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei
    20   
    Gao, 891 F.3d at 76
    .     Substantial evidence supports the
    21   agency’s adverse credibility determination.
    22       The agency was entitled to rely on the asylum interview
    23   record in assessing Kalala’s credibility.     The agency may
    24   rely on the record of an asylum interview if the record
    25   contains a “meaningful, clear, and reliable summary of the
    26   statements made by [the applicant] at the interview.”   Diallo
    27   v. Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 624
    , 632 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation and
    28   internal quotation marks omitted).   Asylum interviews do not
    29   require the same special scrutiny as airport or credible fear
    3
    1    interviews because they “take place after the alien has
    2    arrived in the United States, has taken the time to submit a
    3    formal asylum application, and has had the opportunity to
    4    gather his or her thoughts, to prepare for the interview, and
    5    to obtain counsel.”          
    Id. In this
    case, the record contains
    6    the   asylum   officer’s       notes    reflecting        the   questions   and
    7    Kalala’s answers, and a typed assessment of Kalala’s claim.
    8    Kalala argues that the non-responsive and conflicting answers
    9    in the asylum interview record are evidence that the record
    10   was not reliable.        But a factfinder could conclude that the
    11   conflicting answers were the result of Kalala’s fabrication,
    12   not her lack of English fluency.             When competing inferences
    13   can be drawn from the evidence, we defer to the IJ.                         See
    14   Siewe v. Gonzales, 
    480 F.3d 160
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2007).
    15         The   agency     also     did    not   err     in     relying   on    the
    16   inconsistency        among    Kalala’s     asylum    application,      asylum
    17   interview,     and    testimony       regarding     whether     she   had   two
    18   children.      Kalala listed her nieces as her children on her
    19   asylum application and testified that she did so because she
    20   was taking care of them and they were staying with her.                     The
    21   IJ was not required to accept this explanation, particularly
    22   as Kalala testified that she was not taking care of them at
    23   the time she filed her asylum application.                      See Majidi v.
    4
    1    Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must
    2    do    more   than   offer    a   plausible    explanation   for   his
    3    inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate
    4    that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit
    5    his   testimony.”   (internal     quotation   marks   and   citations
    6    omitted)).
    7          The record supports the agency’s reliance on additional
    8    inconsistencies.     Kalala’s testimony and statements at the
    9    asylum interview were inconsistent regarding the location of
    10   the   children.     The     asylum   interview   record   and   asylum
    11   application were inconsistent regarding where she was raped.
    12   And her testimony and documentary evidence were inconsistent
    13   regarding whether she had a miscarriage following the rape.
    14         The agency also did not err in determining that Kalala’s
    15   use of a false passport to obtain a U.S. visa in South Africa
    16   undermined her credibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)
    17   (explaining that IJ may rely on falsehoods in any statement
    18   “without regard to whether . . . [it] goes to the heart of
    19   the applicant’s claim”).         Making false statements to flee
    20   persecution is consistent with the pursuit of asylum, and it
    21   is “unreasonable” to “penalize an applicant for lying to
    22   escape a country where he or she faces persecution.”               Rui
    23   Ying Lin v. Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 127
    , 134 (2d Cir. 2006).           But
    5
    1    here the agency reasonably determined that Kalala was not
    2    directly fleeing persecution at the time that she used the
    3    false passport.   See Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 
    633 F.3d 64
    , 72
    4    (2d Cir. 2011) (“[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that
    5    does not include every sort of treatment our society regards
    6    as offensive.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    7        Finally, two physician affidavits provided by Kalala do
    8    not compel the conclusion that Kalala was credible.   See Xiu
    9    Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    (“We defer . . . to an IJ’s
    10   credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no
    11   reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
    12   ruling.”); see also Hong Fei 
    Gao, 891 F.3d at 79
    (“review of
    13   an agency’s adverse credibility determination is conducted on
    14   the record as a whole” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    15   While a physician’s evaluation provided evidence that Kalala
    16   was harmed, it did not corroborate that she was harmed on
    17   account of her husband’s political activities.     Similarly,
    18   an affidavit signed by a psychiatrist would not necessarily
    19   compel a reasonable factfinder to find Kalala credible.   See
    20   Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    ; cf. Hong Fei 
    Gao, 891 F.3d at 21
      81 (determining that omissions were entitled to little weight
    22   in part because “when considering the record as a whole, there
    23   was corroborating evidence of petitioners’ claims” of past
    6
    1    persecution by authorities (internal quotation marks and
    2    citation omitted)).
    3        Given     the    inconsistencies     among     Kalala’s   testimony,
    4    application, asylum interview record, and medical documents,
    5    substantial     evidence     supports        the   adverse    credibility
    6    determination.       See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
    7    
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    .         Because all of Kalala’s claims were
    8    based on the same factual predicate, the adverse credibility
    9    determination       is   dispositive    of    asylum,   withholding   of
    10   removal, and CAT relief.       See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    ,
    11   156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    12       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    13   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    14   stays VACATED.
    15                                    FOR THE COURT:
    16                                    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    17                                    Clerk of Court
    7