Nguedi v. Caulfield ( 2020 )

18‐3199‐cv
Nguedi v. Caulfield
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 6th day of May, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT:
GUIDO CALABRESI,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
GERARD NGUEDI,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. 18‐3199
BRIAN CAULFIELD,
Defendant‐Cross‐Claimant‐Appellee,
CITY OF NEW YORK, WILLIAM JOSEPH
BRATTON, POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE,
#1 ‐ 9, CHRISTOPHER CARLUCCI,
RAYMOND PHILLIPS, PETER
SCOURTOS,
Defendants‐Cross‐Defendants‐Appellees.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: Gerard Nguedi, pro se,
Woodbridge, VA.
FOR DEFENDANT‐CROSS‐ Karen M. Lager, Marks,
CLAIMANT‐APPELLEE: O’Neill, O’Brien,
Doherty & Kelly, P.C.,
Elmsford, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS‐CROSS‐ Tahirih M. Sadrieh,
DEFENDANTS‐APPELLEES: Assistant Corporation
Counsel, Scott Shorr, of
counsel, for James E.
Johnson, Corporation
Counsel of the City of
New York, New York,
NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Abrams, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Appellant Gerard Nguedi, proceeding pro se, alleges that nine police officers
came to his apartment after his sister called to request a wellness check, forced
their way into his apartment, beat him without provocation, sedated him, and took
him to Bellevue hospital, in violation of Nguedi’s civil rights. On appeal, Nguedi
challenges the district court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of the City
of New York (the “City”), former New York Police Department (“NYPD”)
Commissioner William Bratton, and Nguedi’s building superintendent Brian
Caulfield on Nguedi’s civil rights claims, and its dismissal of Nguedi’s claims
against three individual police officers for failure to effect service. We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,
and the issues on appeal.
I. Summary Judgment
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, “resolv[ing] all
ambiguities and draw[ing] all inferences against the moving party.” Garcia v.
3
Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is
proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non‐
movant, ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344
(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
To establish liability against the City for the acts of its employees, a plaintiff
must show that the violation of his constitutional rights was caused by an official
custom, policy, or practice. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978). While Nguedi points to his own treatment as evidence of a custom, a
single case is insufficient to establish the existence of such a practice. See Mitchell
v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2016); Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397,
402 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that there was no Monell claim where “the only relevant
evidence presented by appellees was the manner in which they themselves were
arrested”). Further, although Nguedi argues on appeal that the district court
disregarded “similar operations the NYPD had done in the past,” he adduced no
evidence regarding such operations, nor did he raise this argument before the
district court. Nguedi’s Br. at 30.
4
Nguedi’s claims against the individual defendants also lack merit. Because
Nguedi failed to present any facts of Commissioner Bratton’s “personal
involvement . . . in alleged constitutional deprivations,” which “is a prerequisite
to an award of damages under § 1983,” his claim against the Commissioner fails.
Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 874 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“The bare fact that [a defendant] occupies a high position in the New York prison
hierarchy is insufficient to sustain [a] claim.”). In order to maintain claims against
Caulfield – Nguedi’s apartment building manager and a private citizen – Nguedi
was required to establish that Caulfield conspired with state actors. See
Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002). But Nguedi points
to no evidence, apart from conclusory allegations, to support the existence of a
conspiracy or otherwise suggest that Caulfield engaged in a joint action with the
police officers to violate Nguedi’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, the district
court did not err in dismissing the claims against Caulfield.
II. Failure to Serve
We review a dismissal for failure to serve under Federal Rule of Civil
5
Procedure 4(m) for abuse of discretion. Gerena v. Korb, 617 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir.
2010). Here, Nguedi’s sole argument concerning the dismissal of the three named
officers for lack of service is that he was waiting to serve them until the City
identified all nine officers that Nguedi originally alleged participated in the illegal
arrest. This contention is meritless. To be sure, Nguedi previously requested
that the City provide him with the identities of the nine officers pursuant to
Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). But after the City represented
that it could only identify three officers who matched the descriptions provided
by Nguedi, the magistrate judge ruled that the City had complied with its
obligations under Valentin and need not conduct a further search. Because
Nguedi did not appeal that ruling to the district court, he has waived his right to
object to it now. See Caidor v. Onondaga County, 517 F.3d 601, 604–05 (2d Cir. 2008).
Given the magistrate judge’s order that the City was not required to make further
efforts to identify the additional officers, we find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s dismissal of Nguedi’s claims for failure to serve the three identified
ones.
* * *
6
We have considered all of Nguedi’s remaining arguments and find them to
be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
7