Singh v. Rosen ( 2021 )

18-2879
Singh v. Rosen
BIA
Nelson, IJ
A205 585 720
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 21st day of January, two thousand twenty-one.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
8 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 KARAMVIR SINGH,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 18-2879
17 NAC
18 JEFFREY A. ROSEN, ACTING UNITED
19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.*
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Richmond Hill, NY.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant
26 Attorney General; Jessica E.
27 Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel;
28
* Pursuant to Fed R. App. R. 43(c)(2), Jeffrey A. Rosen is automatically substituted for former
Attorney General William P. Barr.
1
2
3 Juria L. Jones, Trial Attorney,
4 Office of Immigration Litigation,
5 United States Department of
6 Justice, Washington, DC.
7
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
9 AND DECREED that this petition for review of a decision of
10 the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is DENIED.
11 Petitioner Karamvir Singh, a native and citizen of India,
12 seeks review of a September 4, 2018, decision of the BIA
13 affirming an October 3, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge
14 (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of
15 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
16 (“CAT”). In re Karamvir Singh, No. A205 585 720 (B.I.A. Sep.
17 4, 2018), aff’g No. A205 585 720 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct.
18 3, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
19 underlying facts and procedural history.
20 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
21 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the
22 IJ’s credibility and internal relocation determinations
23 because the BIA did not rely on those grounds in affirming
24 the IJ’s decision. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of
25 Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Lin Zhong
26 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir. 2007)
27 (“[W]hen the BIA issues an opinion . . . and that opinion
2
1 constitutes the final agency determination, we may consider
2 only those issues that formed the basis for that decision.”).
3 The applicable standards of review are well established. See
4 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 114
5 (2d Cir. 2010).
6 Singh claimed that Muslims who belonged to the Congress
7 Party threatened and attacked him after he refused to sell
8 them land on which they wanted to build a mosque. As to
9 asylum and withholding of removal, the agency denied relief
10 because Singh did not establish a nexus between the attacks
11 and a protected ground of religion or political opinion.
12 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination.
13 For asylum and withholding of removal, an “applicant must
14 establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a
15 particular social group, or political opinion was or will be
16 at least one central reason for” the claimed persecution. 8
17 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum); see also 8 U.S.C.
18 § 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N.
19 Dec. 341, 348 (BIA 2010) (holding that the “one central
20 reason” standard also applies to withholding of removal).
21 Relief “may be granted where there is more than one motive
22 for mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for
23 the mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.”
3
1 Acharya v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal
2 quotation marks omitted). Under this “one central reason”
3 standard, “the protected ground cannot play a minor role in
4 the alien’s past mistreatment or fears of future
5 mistreatment. That is, it cannot be incidental, tangential,
6 superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.” In
7 re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2007).
8 Singh testified that he was attacked by members of the
9 Congress Party because he refused to sell his land to them.
10 He denied belonging to or supporting any political party in
11 India. He said that his attackers wanted to buy his land
12 because it “was right beside the highway,” and he heard from
13 other villagers that his attackers “wanted to put the mosque
14 there.” He testified that he was Hindu and his attackers
15 wanted to build a mosque, but he did not state that his
16 attackers knew his religion or that his religion was a reason
17 he was targeted. Based on this testimony, the agency
18 reasonably concluded that the motive for the attack was a
19 land dispute, and Singh did not provide evidence that his
20 political beliefs or religion were “at least one central
21 reason for the [attacks].” Acharya, 761 F.3d at 297; see
22 also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (holding
23 that an applicant “must provide some evidence of [a
4
1 persecutor’s motives], direct or circumstantial”); Yueqing
2 Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The
3 applicant must also show, through direct or circumstantial
4 evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises
5 from the applicant’s political belief.”).
6 Singh’s argument that “no questions were asked” at the
7 merits hearing about his religion or how his attackers urged
8 him to convert to Islam is unavailing. If he is faulting his
9 prior attorney for not asking such questions, the argument is
10 unexhausted and not subject to review because he did not raise
11 an ineffective assistance claim before the agency. See Lin
12 Zhong, 480 F.3d at 122–23 (holding that our review is
13 generally limited to issues raised before the agency);
14 Arango-Aradondo v. INS, 13 F.3d 610, 614–15 (2d Cir. 1994)
15 (holding that the BIA must review an ineffective assistance
16 claim in the first instance either on appeal or through a
17 motion to reopen). If Singh is instead faulting the IJ or
18 the Government for not asking such questions, the argument is
19 meritless because Singh had the burden to establish his
20 eligibility for relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
21 Finally, with respect to the denial of CAT relief, Singh
22 did not challenge the IJ’s findings and conclusions in his
23 brief to the BIA. Accordingly, he has forfeited a claim of
5
1 error in the denial of CAT relief.
2 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
3 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
4 stays VACATED.
5 FOR THE COURT:
6 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
7 Clerk of Court
8
6