Chen v. Barr ( 2020 )


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  •      18-3412
    Chen v. Barr
    BIA
    Poczter, IJ
    A 206 895 272
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 21st day of October, two thousand twenty.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            DENNIS JACOBS,
    8            DENNY CHIN,
    9            JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   ZHIQIANG CHEN, AKA ZHI CHEN,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                  v.                                  18-3412
    17                                                      NAC
    18   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    19   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                John Chang, Esq., New York, NY.
    24
    25   FOR RESPONDENT:                Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting
    26                                  Assistant Attorney General;
    27                                  Brianne Whelen Cohen, Senior
    28                                  Litigation Counsel; Ashley Martin,
    1                                   Trial Attorney, Office of
    2                                   Immigration Litigation, United
    3                                   States Department of Justice,
    4                                   Washington, DC.
    5         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    6   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    7   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    8   is DENIED.
    9         Petitioner Zhiqiang Chen, a native and citizen of the
    10   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 5,
    11   2018 decision of the BIA affirming a November 17, 2017
    12   decision   of    an   Immigration   Judge     (“IJ”)   denying   Chen’s
    13   application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    14   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).           In re Zhiqiang
    15   Chen, No. A      206 895 272 (B.I.A. Nov. 5, 2018), aff’g No. A
    16   206 895 272 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 17, 2017).           We assume
    17   the   parties’    familiarity    with   the    underlying   facts   and
    18   procedural history in this case.
    19         Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    20   the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the
    21   findings the BIA declined to rely on.           See Xue Hong Yang v.
    22   U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir. 2005).
    23   Because Chen has not challenged the agency’s alternative
    2
    1   denial of his future persecution claim based on his practice
    2   of   Christianity    in   the   United   States,   only    the   adverse
    3   credibility determination as stated by the BIA is before us.
    4   See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 540
    , 541 n.1 (2d Cir.
    5   2005) (finding CAT claim abandoned where it was not argued in
    6   petitioner’s brief).      The applicable standards of review are
    7   well established.     See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao
    8   v. Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 67
    , 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse
    9   credibility    determination       for       substantial    evidence).
    10   “Considering   the   totality     of   the   circumstances,      and   all
    11   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
    12   determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s
    13   . . . written and oral statements . . . , the internal
    14   consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of
    15   such statements with other evidence of record . . . without
    16   regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
    17   goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other
    18   relevant factor.”     8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).          “We defer
    19   . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the
    20   totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
    21   fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
    3
    1   Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008);
    2   accord Hong Fei 
    Gao, 891 F.3d at 76
    .              We conclude that the
    3   agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by
    4   substantial evidence.
    5         Multiple inconsistencies provide substantial support for
    6   the   agency’s      adverse   credibility     determination.       Chen’s
    7   testimony was inconsistent with his mother’s statement about
    8   how many people came to their house to demolish their property
    9   in June 2014, who called the police after this incident, the
    10   name of the friend who introduced Chen to Christianity in
    11   August 2014, and when the police raided Chen’s church.                 Taken
    12   together,     these       inconsistencies     constitute     substantial
    13   evidence     for    the   agency’s   conclusion    that   Chen   was    not
    14   credible.     See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin,
    
    15 534 F.3d at 167
    (permitting consideration of discrepancies
    16   between the petitioner’s testimony and letters from third
    17   parties).     The IJ was not compelled to accept Chen’s shifting
    18   explanations       for    these   discrepancies.       See    Majidi      v.
    19   Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must
    20   do    more   than     offer   a   plausible     explanation      for    his
    21   inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate
    4
    1   that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit
    2   his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    3       The agency also properly relied on Chen’s omission from
    4   his asylum application of a second beating by the village
    5   officials    who   destroyed   his      property.    In   his   asylum
    6   application, Chen identified only one beating by the village
    7   officials who allegedly destroyed his property.           But he later
    8   testified that the same men beat him a second time two days
    9   later, prompting his mother to call the police again.              His
    10   explanation that he thought mentioning only one beating was
    11   “enough”    in   his   statement   is    not   persuasive,   Certified
    12   Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 116, particularly given the
    13   detailed written statement he attached to his application,
    14   see 
    Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80
    .        We find no error in the agency’s
    15   reliance on this omission because it was a physical assault
    16   that was central to both his past harm and the motivation for
    17   his practice of Christianity.          See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585
    
    18 F.3d 715
    , 726 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the agency may
    19   “draw an adverse inference about petitioner’s credibility
    20   based, inter alia, on h[is] failure to mention” important
    21   details or events in prior statements); see also Hong Fei
    5
    1   
    Gao, 891 F.3d at 78
    (“[T]he probative value of a witness’s
    2   prior silence on particular facts depends on whether those
    3   facts are ones the witness would reasonably have been expected
    4   to disclose.”).
    5       Having    questioned     Chen’s     credibility,    the     agency
    6   reasonably   relied   on    his   failure    to   rehabilitate     his
    7   testimony with reliable corroborating evidence.               See Biao
    8   Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An
    9   applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may
    10   bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in
    11   general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
    12   that has already been called into question.”).           The agency
    13   did not err in declining to afford significant weight to
    14   letters from Chen’s friend and mother because his mother was
    15   an interested witness and her letter was inconsistent with
    16   Chen’s statements, and both authors were not available for
    17   cross-examination.     See Y.C. v. Holder, 
    741 F.3d 324
    , 332,
    18   334 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that weight of evidence is within
    19   agency   discretion   and   deferring   to   agency’s   decision    to
    20   afford little weight to spouse’s letter because it was unsworn
    21   and from an interested witness); see also In re H-L-H- & Z-
    6
    1   Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010) (finding that
    2   unsworn      letters    from    alien’s        friends         and    family       were
    3   insufficient     to     provide    substantial           support       for    alien’s
    4   claims    because      they    were     from    interested           witnesses     not
    5   subject to cross-examination), overruled on other grounds by
    6   Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 
    677 F.3d 130
    (2d Cir. 2012).
    7         Chen    devotes    most     of    his     brief     to    arguing       that    a
    8   September     2014     arrest     warrant       from     the     Chinese       police
    9   corroborates that he was in fact arrested in September 2014
    10   after the police raided his church and thus rehabilitates his
    11   testimony.        However,        the        warrant,     which        the     agency
    12   considered,      does     not     resolve          the     other       substantial
    13   discrepancies     between       Chen’s       testimony     and        his    mother’s
    14   letter – including, but not limited to, the date of Chen’s
    15   arrest - and the agency has broad discretion in the weight it
    16   affords to documents.          See 
    Y.C., 741 F.3d at 332
    .
    17         Accordingly, given the inconsistencies between Chen’s
    18   and   his    mother’s    statements          and   the    omission          from   his
    19   application,      the     adverse       credibility            determination         is
    20   supported by substantial evidence.                 See Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d 21
      at 165–66; see also Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
    7
    1   
    446 F.3d 289
    , 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that even a single
    2   inconsistency is sufficient to support an adverse credibility
    3   determination if it is material and relates to “an example of
    4   the very persecution from which” the applicant seeks relief).
    5   The   adverse    credibility   determination   is   dispositive   of
    6   asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all
    7   forms of relief were based on the same discredited factual
    8   predicate.      See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156–57 (2d
    9   Cir. 2006).
    10         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    11   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    12   stays VACATED.
    13                                   FOR THE COURT:
    14                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    15                                   Clerk of Court
    8