Debon-Ramos v. Barr ( 2020 )


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  •      18-1505
    Debon-Ramos v. Barr
    BIA
    Straus, IJ
    A208 900 281
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 4th day of November, two thousand twenty.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    8                 Chief Judge,
    9            DENNY CHIN,
    10            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   DORA LINDA DEBON-RAMOS,
    15            Petitioner,
    16
    17                    v.                                  18-1505
    18                                                        NAC
    19   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    20   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                  Robert C. Ross, West Haven, CT.
    25
    26   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
    27                                    Attorney General; Linda S.
    28                                    Wernery, Assistant Director;
    29                                    Janice K. Redfern, Senior
    1                                    Litigation Counsel, Office of
    2                                    Immigration Litigation, United
    3                                    States Department of Justice,
    4                                    Washington, DC.
    5
    6          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    9   is DENIED.
    10          Petitioner Dora Linda Debon-Ramos, a native and citizen
    11   of Honduras, seeks review of an April 18, 2018, decision of
    12   the BIA affirming a July 10, 2017, decision of an Immigration
    13   Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum, withholding
    14   of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    15   (“CAT”).      In re Dora Linda Debon-Ramos, No. A208 900 281
    16   (B.I.A. Apr. 18, 2018), aff’g No. A208 900 281 (Immig. Ct.
    17   Hartford July 10, 2017).         We assume the parties’ familiarity
    18   with the underlying facts and procedural history.
    19          Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    20   both    the   IJ’s   and   the   BIA’s   opinions   “for    the   sake   of
    21   completeness.”       Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    448 F.3d 22
      524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).         The applicable standards of review
    23   are well established.        See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Paloka
    24   v. Holder, 
    762 F.3d 191
    , 195 (2d Cir. 2014).               Because Debon-
    25   Ramos expressly abandons her CAT claim, the only issue before
    2
    1   us   is   whether   the   agency       properly   denied   asylum   and
    2   withholding of removal based on its finding that she was not
    3   a member of her proposed particular social group of Honduran
    4   women unable to leave domestic relationships.              See Yueqing
    5   Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 540
    , 541 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005)
    6   (noting that claims not raised in petitioner’s brief are
    7   abandoned).
    8        To demonstrate eligibility for asylum and withholding of
    9   removal, “the applicant must establish that race, religion,
    10   nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
    11   political opinion was or will be at least one central reason
    12   for persecuting the applicant.”         8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i);
    13   see also
    id. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Matter
    of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N.
    14   Dec. 341, 348 (B.I.A. 2010).             To constitute a particular
    15   social group, a group must be: “(1) composed of members who
    16   share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
    17   particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society
    18   in question.”   Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237
    19   (B.I.A. 2014); see also 
    Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195
    –97.
    20        In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA held that a proposed group
    21   of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
    22   relationship” satisfied the requirements for a particular
    3
    1   social group.        26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388, 392–95 (B.I.A. 2014).
    2   In    June   2018,    the    Attorney       General   overruled    Matter   of
    3   A-R-C-G-, holding that it departed from established legal
    4   principles because it defined a social group based primarily
    5   on the harm that group members experienced and because it did
    6   not    comply    with        the     BIA’s     social     distinction       and
    7   particularity requirements.            Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec.
    8   316, 335–36 (A.G. 2018).
    9         In Debon-Ramos’s case, the agency applied Matter of A-R-
    10   C-G- because its decisions predated Matter of A-B-.                     We need
    11   not remand for the agency to apply, in the first instance,
    12   the legal standards articulated in Matter of A-B- because,
    13   even under more favorable pre-A-B- standards, substantial
    14   evidence supports the agency’s finding that Debon-Ramos was
    15   not a member of her proposed social group since she was able
    16   to leave her relationship with her former partner.
    17         Specifically,         Debon-Ramos      testified    that    her   brother
    18   successfully     evicted       her   former     partner    from    her   home.
    19   Although her former partner subsequently approached her at
    20   the fruit stand outside her house on two occasions, she had
    21   no further contact with him in the month between the last of
    22   those encounters and her departure from Honduras.                   After she
    4
    1   left Honduras, he never returned to her house, where her
    2   children still live.           Based on this testimony, the agency
    3   reasonably concluded that Debon-Ramos had been able to leave
    4   the relationship and, thus, was not a member of her proposed
    5   social group.         See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Rocha v.
    6   Sessions, 720 F. App’x 643, 645 (2d Cir. 2018) (upholding
    7   agency’s determination that petitioner was able to escape her
    8   stepfather’s      abuse,       noting       that         the   stepfather         was
    9   subsequently evicted from the house, so “even if [she] were
    10   to return to Brazil and move back in with her mother, her
    11   stepfather would not be there to abuse her”); cf. Matter of
    12   A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389 (woman was unable to leave
    13   her husband because whenever she left, he followed and secured
    14   her    return   with    either     threats         or    promises       of   changed
    15   behavior).
    16          Debon-Ramos     also    argues       that    the     BIA   erred      by   not
    17   considering     the     possibility         of     future      persecution        and
    18   maintains that she showed that relocation within Honduras was
    19   not reasonable.        However, the agency’s conclusion that she
    20   was not a member of her proposed social group also forecloses
    21   a     claim   based    on     future    persecution.              See    8   U.S.C.
    22   §§ 1101(a)(42),        1158(b)(1)(B)(i),                1231(b)(3)(A).            And
    5
    1   because she did not establish persecution on account of
    2   membership in her proposed social group, we need not reach
    3   the issue of relocation.   See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B)
    4   (providing that an applicant found to be a refugee based on
    5   past persecution on account of membership in a particular
    6   social group may still be denied asylum if relocation is
    7   reasonable).
    8       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    9   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    10   stays VACATED.
    11                               FOR THE COURT:
    12                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    13                               Clerk of Court
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-1505

Filed Date: 11/4/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/4/2020