Fuseini v. Barr ( 2020 )


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  •      18-2854
    Fuseini v. Barr
    BIA
    Zagzoug, IJ
    A208 120 768
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 17th day of November, two thousand twenty.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    8                 Chief Judge,
    9            PIERRE N. LEVAL,
    10            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   BUHARI FUSEINI,
    15            Petitioner,
    16
    17                     v.                                  18-2854
    18                                                         NAC
    19   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    20   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                   Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY.
    25
    26   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant
    27                                     Attorney General; Andrew N.
    28                                     O’Malley, Senior Litigation
    29                                     Counsel; Kimberly A. Burdge, Trial
    30                                     Attorney, Office of Immigration
    1                                  Litigation, United States
    2                                  Department of Justice, Washington,
    3                                  DC.
    4
    5          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
    6   AND DECREED that this petition for review of a decision of
    7   the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is DENIED.
    8          Petitioner Buhari Fuseini, a native and citizen of Ghana,
    9   seeks review of a September 10, 2018, decision of the BIA
    10   affirming an August 29, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge
    11   (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of
    12   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
    13   (“CAT”). In re Buhari Fuseini, No. A208 120 768 (B.I.A. Sept.
    14   10, 2018), aff’g No. A208 120 768 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug.
    15   29, 2017).      We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    16   underlying facts and procedural history.
    17          Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    18   both    the   IJ’s    and   BIA’s   decisions   “for   the   sake   of
    19   completeness.”       Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    448 F.3d 20
      524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).       The applicable standards of review
    21   are well established.       See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei
    22   Gao v. Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 67
    , 76–77 (2d Cir. 2018).
    23          “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
    24   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
    25   determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
    2
    1   the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the
    2   applicant’s   .   .   .   account,       the   consistency   between   the
    3   applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,
    4   the internal consistency of each such statement, . . . and
    5   any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without
    6   regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
    7   goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other
    8   relevant factor.”     8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).           “We defer
    9   . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the
    10   totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
    11   fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
    12   Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008);
    13   accord Hong Fei 
    Gao, 891 F.3d at 76
    .               Substantial evidence
    14   supports the agency’s determination that Fuseini was not
    15   credible as to his claim that his father and members of his
    16   community in Ghana beat him because he is bisexual.
    17       The agency reasonably relied on Fuseini’s inconsistent
    18   testimony about how he came to possess the copy of his birth
    19   certificate that he submitted in support of his application,
    20   which bore a March 2016 certification that it was a true copy.
    21   Fuseini initially testified that he had this copy when he
    22   came to the United States in February 2015.              When asked how
    23   he could have possessed a document dated March 2016 in
    3
    1   February 2015, he changed his story and stated that a friend
    2   in Ghana mailed it to him.      He claimed to still have the
    3   envelope in which it was mailed but did not have it with him.
    4   He had no other evidence from Ghana to corroborate his
    5   identity, claiming that he lost his passport in Colombia and
    6   that he never obtained a national identity card in Ghana,
    7   even though one was required.
    8         This internal inconsistency in Fuseini’s testimony about
    9   the birth certificate constitutes substantial support for the
    10   adverse credibility determination because whether Fuseini is
    11   a citizen of Ghana is material to his asylum claim.      See Xian
    12   Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    446 F.3d 289
    , 295 (2d Cir.
    13   2006) (holding that a material inconsistency concerning the
    14   basis of an applicant’s asylum claim is substantial evidence
    15   of adverse credibility); Dhoumo v. BIA, 
    416 F.3d 172
    , 174 (2d
    16   Cir. 2005) (concluding that an applicant’s “nationality, or
    17   lack of nationality, is a threshold question in determining
    18   his eligibility for asylum”); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480
    
    19 F.3d 160
    , 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single false document or
    20   a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable to
    21   the   petitioner)   infect   the    balance   of   the   alien’s
    22   uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”).
    23         The IJ also reasonably relied on Fuseini’s demeanor,
    4
    1   noting that he lacked forthrightness in responding to simple
    2   questions and that his testimony was vague and vacillating.
    3   We grant “particular deference” to a demeanor finding because
    4   “the IJ’s ability to observe the witness’s demeanor places
    5   her in the best position to evaluate . . . credibility.”          Jin
    6   Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 104
    , 113 (2d Cir.
    7   2005). The IJ specified that Fuseini vacillated about whether
    8   he had friends in the United States, he gave “vague accounts
    9   of the difficulties” of securing a new passport, and he did
    10   not explain how he traveled through several countries without
    11   his passport after he lost it in Colombia.            The record
    12   supports these findings.
    13        For example, Fuseini initially testified that he had no
    14   friends     in the United States,     but he later changed his
    15   testimony, stating that he asked his friends about what
    16   documents he would need to obtain a new passport.                 When
    17   confronted with this inconsistent testimony, he stated that
    18   “[t]hey’re not necessarily my friends, but we always talk,
    19   just because we’re all from the same country.”            The IJ was
    20   not required to accept this explanation.            See Majidi v
    21   Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must
    22   do   more    than   offer   a   plausible   explanation     for   his
    23   inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate
    5
    1   that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit
    2   his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).                Fuseini
    3   also gave vague answers about how he was able to travel
    4   through several countries without a passport and why he had
    5   not obtained a new passport.
    6        Having   questioned    Fuseini’s    credibility,         the    agency
    7   reasonably    determined   that   he    did   not    rehabilitate       his
    8   credibility    with   reliable    corroborating       evidence.         “An
    9   applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may
    10   bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in
    11   general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
    12   that has already been called into question.”             Biao Yang v.
    13   Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir. 2007).             Without citing
    14   to any legal support, Fuseini argues that he is not required
    15   to   corroborate   his   sexual   orientation       because    it    “is   a
    16   complicated personal feeling or characteristic that cannot be
    17   proved or disproved by physical evidence or other people’s
    18   words.”   Although in certain circumstances the agency may not
    19   deny relief based on an “otherwise credible” applicant’s
    20   failure to provide corroborating evidence, it properly relied
    21   on the lack of corroboration here because, as explained above,
    22   Fuseini was not “otherwise credible.”          Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S.
    23   Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis
    6
    1   omitted).    Further, Fuseini had the burden to establish that
    2   his “membership in a particular social group . . . was or
    3   will be at least one central reason for” his persecution.      8
    4   U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (placing the burden of proof on the
    5   asylum applicant).
    6       In sum, the inconsistencies, demeanor finding, and lack
    7   of corroboration described above provide substantial evidence
    8   for the agency’s adverse credibility determination.          See
    9   8 U.S.C.     § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).    That   determination    is
    10   dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief
    11   here because all three claims are based on the same factual
    12   predicate.    See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d
    13   Cir. 2006).
    14       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    15   DENIED.    All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    16   stays VACATED.
    17                                 FOR THE COURT:
    18                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    19                                 Clerk of Court
    7