Lukasiewicz-Kruk v. Greenpoint YMCA , 404 F. App'x 519 ( 2010 )

09-4722-cv
Lukasiewcz-Kruk v. Tse
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on
the 17th day of November, two thousand ten.
PRESENT:
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
Circuit Judges.
__________________________________________
Monika Lukasiewicz-Kruk,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 09-4722-cv
Greenpoint YMCA, and YMCA of Greater NY,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________________________
FOR APPELLANT: Monika Lukasiewicz-Kruk, pro se, Middle
Village, NY.
FOR APPELLEES: Lori Diane Bauer, Jackson Lewis LLP, New
York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York (Ross, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Monika Lukasiewicz-Kruk, pro se, appeals the
district court’s judgment granting the motion of the Greenpoint
YMCA and the YMCA of Greater New York (collectively, the “YMCA”)
for summary judgment and dismissing her employment discrimination
complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the
issues on appeal.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and ask
whether the district court properly concluded that there were no
genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff &
Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In
determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we
are "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible
factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought." Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d
Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). However, "conclusory
statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a
summary judgment motion." Davis v. State of New York, 316 F.3d
93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).
Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the
record in light of these principles, we affirm the district
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court's judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the
district court in its thorough and well-reasoned decision. The
district court's decision is not undermined by the argument in
Lukasiewicz-Kruk's brief that, in granting the YMCA's summary
judgment motion, the court failed to mention various factual
allegations. A majority of these allegations involve conduct
allegedly engaged in by Loretta Trapani, and, as the district
court concluded, there is no evidence in the record that Trapani
was involved in the adverse employment actions at issue.
Additionally, several allegations relate to Lukasiewicz-Kruk's
qualifications for the Associate Executive Director position.
However, the district court properly concluded that
Lukasiewicz-Kruk's credentials were not “so superior to the
credentials of the person selected for the job that no reasonable
person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen
the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in
question.” See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243
F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Lukasiewicz-Kruk also argues that the district court erred
in declining to apply the continuing violation theory to her
time-barred claims, because "prior acts might be offered as
background in support of acts upon which a timely claim is
based," and because the YMCA's failure to promote her and
decision to terminate her was based on subjective criteria.
However, it is not clear how these contentions establish the
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existence of a continuing violation. Recovery for discrete acts
of discrimination that occur outside of the applicable
limitations period is precluded, even if the acts are related to
acts alleged in timely filed charges. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). Moreover,
Lukasiewicz-Kruk has not established the existence of a
discriminatory policy or mechanism, which is required under the
continuing violation theory. See Quinn v. Green Tree Credit
Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1998).
We have considered Lukasiewicz-Kruk’s other arguments on
appeal and have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the
judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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