Dai v. Barr ( 2020 )


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  •      18-3358
    Dai v. Barr
    BIA
    Kolbe, IJ
    A206 581 731
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 23rd day of November, two thousand twenty.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
    8                 Chief Judge,
    9            ROBERT D. SACK,
    10            RICHARD C. WESLEY,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   SHIZHUANG DAI,
    15            Petitioner,
    16
    17                 v.                                  18-3358
    18                                                     NAC
    19   WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
    20   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:               Adedayo O. Idowu, Esq., New York,
    25                                 NY.
    26
    27   FOR RESPONDENT:               Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting
    28                                 Assistant Attorney General; Greg
    1                                    D. Mack, Senior Litigation
    2                                    Counsel; Shahrzad Baghai, Office
    3                                    of Immigration Litigation, United
    4                                    States Department of Justice,
    5                                    Washington, DC.
    6         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    9   is DISMISSED in part, and DENIED in part.
    10         Petitioner Shizhuang Dai, a native and citizen of China,
    11   seeks review of an October 18, 2018, decision of the BIA
    12   affirming an October 17, 2017, decision of an Immigration
    13   Judge    (“IJ”)     denying      Dai’s    application      for    asylum,
    14   withholding    of   removal,     and   relief    under   the   Convention
    15   Against Torture (“CAT”).         In re Shizhuang Dai, No. A206 581
    16   731 (B.I.A. Oct. 18, 2018), aff’g No. A206 581 731 (Immig.
    17   Ct.   N.Y.   City   Oct.   17,   2017).     We    assume   the   parties’
    18   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
    19         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the
    20   BIA, and assume credibility as the BIA did.                See Xue Hong
    21   Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    426 F.3d 520
    , 522 (2d Cir.
    22   2005).    We review the agency’s factual findings under the
    23   substantial evidence standard, treating them as “conclusive
    24   unless   any   reasonable     adjudicator    would   be    compelled   to
    2
    1   conclude to the contrary.”           
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); see
    2   also Corovic v. Mukasey, 
    519 F.3d 90
    , 95 (2d Cir. 2008).                   “We
    3   review de novo questions of law and the application of law to
    4   undisputed fact.”        Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 
    529 F.3d 99
    , 110
    5   (2d Cir. 2008).
    6       I.       Asylum
    7       An       asylum   applicant   must     apply   within     one   year   of
    8   arriving in the United States, or must show either “changed
    9   circumstances         which   materially     affect     the    applicant’s
    10   eligibility for asylum” or “extraordinary circumstances” that
    11   prevented him from applying.         
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(2)(B), (D).
    12   Dai contends that his baptism and continued practice of
    13   Christianity in the United States is a changed circumstance
    14   excusing the one-year deadline.            We dismiss the petition as
    15   to asylum because our review is limited to constitutional
    16   claims and questions of law and Dai does not raise such a
    17   claim.       
    Id.
     §§ 1158(a)(3), 1252(a)(2)(D); Xiao Ji Chen v.
    18   U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    434 F.3d 144
    , 151–54 (2d Cir. 2006).
    19   Where    a     petitioner’s     argument     concerns       the meaning of
    20   “changed circumstances,” i.e., if an action categorically
    21   cannot be a changed circumstance, then we may review the
    22   agency’s conclusions.         See Weinong Lin v. Holder, 
    763 F.3d 3
    1   244, 247–49 (2d Cir. 2014).                       Where, as here, the agency
    2   considered the circumstance, but concluded that the alleged
    3   change did not materially change the applicant’s risk of
    4   persecution,        we    do    not       have   jurisdiction       to    review   the
    5   agency’s factual determination.                   See Hui Lin Huang v. Holder,
    6   
    677 F.3d 130
    , 134 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A determination of what
    7   will occur in the future and the degree of likelihood of the
    8   occurrence     has       been    regularly         regarded     as       fact-finding
    9   subject to only clear error review.”); Xiao Ji Chen, 
    434 F.3d 10
       at    154   (“We    are     .   .     .    without    jurisdiction         to   review
    11   petitioner’s claims to the extent that she asserts that the
    12   IJ abused his discretion when making factual determinations
    13   that    she   had    failed      to       demonstrate      either    ‘changed’      or
    14   ‘extraordinary’ circumstances.”).
    15          II. Withholding of Removal and CAT
    16          Dai did not allege past persecution, so he had the burden
    17   to show that he would “more likely than not” be persecuted on
    18   account of his religion upon his return to China.                           8 C.F.R.
    19   § 1208.16(b)(1)(iii); see also 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(A), (C).
    20   The agency reasonably concluded that the record did not show
    21   such a likelihood because Dai testified that he and his family
    22   had    practiced         Christianity        in    China    for     years       without
    4
    1   suffering persecution.   See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191
    
    2 F.3d 307
    , 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that fear of persecution
    3   was weakened where applicant’s mother and daughters continued
    4   to live in petitioner’s native country unharmed); Lie v.
    5   Ashcroft, 
    396 F.3d 530
    , 537 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that “fear
    6   of future persecution is diminished” when “family members
    7   remain in petitioner’s native country without meeting harm”).
    8       Because the agency reasonably found that Dai failed to
    9   demonstrate that he would more likely than not suffer harm
    10   rising to the level of persecution on account of his religion,
    11   he necessarily failed to establish the likelihood of torture
    12   needed to meet his burden for CAT relief.        See Lecaj v.
    13   Holder, 
    616 F.3d 111
    , 119 (2d Cir. 2010).
    14       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    15   DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.    All pending motions
    16   and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.
    17                               FOR THE COURT:
    18                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    19                               Clerk of Court
    5