Alaska Dep't of Revenue, Treasury Div. v. Crédit Agricole Corp. ( 2021 )


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  • 20-1759-cv
    Alaska Dep't of Revenue, Treasury Div. v. Crédit Agricole Corp.
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
    SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
    FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
    WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
    CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
    "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
    ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
    the City of New York, on the 19th day of July, two thousand twenty-one.
    PRESENT:             DENNIS JACOBS,
    DENNY CHIN,
    WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
    Circuit Judges.
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    ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
    TREASURY DIVISION, ALASKA
    PERMANENT FUND CORPORATION, IRON
    WORKERS PENSION PLAN OF WESTERN
    PENNSYLVANIA, ON BEHALF OF
    THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS
    SIMILARLY SITUATED,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    BOSTON RETIREMENT SYSTEM, ON
    BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS
    SIMILARLY SITUATED, IRVING FIREMEN'S
    RELIEF AND RETIREMENT FUND, CITY OF
    ATLANTA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION FUND,
    ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS
    SIMILARLY SITUATED, LOUISIANA
    SHERIFFS' PENSION RELIEF FUND, ON
    BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS
    SIMILARLY SITUATED, SHEET METAL
    WORKERS PENSION PLAN OF NORTHERN
    CALIFORNIA, INTER-LOCAL PENSION
    FUND GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS
    CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
    BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ON
    BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS
    SIMILARLY SITUATED, CITY OF BRISTOL
    PENSION FUND, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF
    AND IN A REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY,
    ON BEHALF OF ALL SIMILARLY SITUATED,
    ASBESTOS WORKERS PHILADELPHIA
    WELFARE AND PENSION FUND, ON
    BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS
    SIMILARLY SITUATED, PAINTERS AND
    ALLIED TRADES DISTRICT COUNCIL NO.
    35 PENSION FUND, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF
    AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
    OKLAHOMA POLICE PENSION AND
    RETIREMENT SYSTEM, ON BEHALF OF
    ITSELF, AND, IN A REPRESENTATIVE
    CAPACITY, ON BEHALF OF ALL THOSE
    SIMILARLY SITUATED, LOUISIANA
    MUNICIPAL POLICE EMPLOYEES
    RETIREMENT SYSTEM, KBC ASSET
    MANAGEMENT NV, CITY OF RIVIERA
    BEACH POLICE OFFICERS' PENSION FUND,
    ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND ALL OTHERS
    SIMILARLY SITUATED, THE POLICE
    RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ST. LOUIS,
    Plaintiffs,
    -v-                       20-1759-cv
    AMANDEEP SINGH MANKU, SHAILEN
    PAU, BHARDEEP SINGH HEER, CREDIT
    SUISSE SECURITIES (EUROPE) LTD., CREDIT
    2
    SUISSE INTERNATIONAL, CREDIT SUISSE
    AG, CRÉDIT AGRICOLE CORPORATE AND
    INVESTMENT BANK, BNP PARIBAS
    SECURITIES CORP., BNP PARIBAS, BANK
    OF AMERICA, N.A., DEUTSCHE BANK AG,
    HIREN GUDKA, HSBC HOLDINGS PLC,
    HSBC BANK USA, N.A., HSBC SECURITIES
    (USA) INC., HSBC BANK PLC, BANK OF
    AMERICA, CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES
    (USA) LLC, CITIGROUP INC., CITIBANK,
    N.A., CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC.,
    CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS LIMITED,
    ROYAL BANK OF CANADA, RBC EUROPE
    LIMITED, RBC CAPITAL MARKETS LLC,
    NOMURA INTERNATIONAL PLC,
    NOMURA SECURITIES INTERNATIONAL,
    INC., GARY MCDONALD, BARCLAYS
    CAPITAL INC., BARCLAYS EXECUTION
    SERVICES LIMITED, BARCLAYS CAPITAL
    SECURITIES LIMITED, BARCLAYS BANK
    PLC, THE TORONTO-DOMINION BANK, TD
    SECURITIES (USA) LLC,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    MERRILL LYNCH INTERNATIONAL, TD
    BANK, N.A., TD SECURITIES LIMITED,
    DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES INC.,
    NOMURA HOLDINGS, INC., JOHN DOE
    DEFENDANTS NOS. 1-100, CRÉDIT
    AGRICOLE S.A., NOMURA HOLDINGS,
    INC., BANK OF AMERICA MERRILL LYNCH
    INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, BANK OF
    AMERICA CORPORATION, MERRILL
    LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH,
    CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG,
    Defendants. *
    *      The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption in this case
    to conform to the caption above.
    3
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    FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS:                                   DANIEL L. BROCKETT (William B. Adams,
    Thomas J. Lepri, Christopher M. Seck, Jeremy
    D. Andersen, on the brief), Quinn Emanuel
    Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, New
    York, and Los Angeles, California, and Susan
    K. Alexander, Andrew S. Love, Joseph D.
    Daley, David W. Mitchell, Brian O. O'Mara,
    Steven M. Jodlowski, Carmen A. Medici,
    Ashley M. Kelly, Samuel H. Rudman, Robbins
    Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP, San Francisco,
    California, San Diego, California, and Melville,
    New York.
    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES                                     KAREN HOFFMAN LENT (Jay B. Kasner, on
    CITIGROUP INC., CITIBANK, N.A.,                              the brief), Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
    CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS                                     Flom LLP, New York, New York.
    INC., AND CITIGROUP GLOBAL
    MARKETS LIMITED:
    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES                                     DAVID G. JANUSZEWSKI (Herbert S. Washer,
    CREDIT SUISSE AG, CREDIT                                     Sheila C. Ramesh, Adam S. Mintz, on the
    SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC,                                 brief), Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, New York
    CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES                                     New York.
    (EUROPE) LIMITED, AND
    CREDIT SUISSE
    INTERNATIONAL:
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE                                       David H. McGill, Nathan M. Richardson,
    AMANDEEP SINGH MANKU:                                        Kobre & Kim LLP, Washington, D.C.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE                                       Richard F. Albert, Christopher B. Harwood,
    SHAILEN PAU:                                                 Nicole L. Buseman, Morvillo Abramowitz
    Grand Iason & Anello P.C., New York, New
    York.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE                                       Derek A. Cohen, William J. Harrington, Eric
    4
    BHARDEEP SINGH HEER:        Lawson, Benjamin Hayes, Goodwin Procter
    LLP, New York, New York, and Washington,
    D.C.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE      Lisa J. Fried, Benjamin A. Fleming, Benjamin F.
    CRÉDIT AGRICOLE CORPORATE   Holt, Hogan Lovells US LLP, New York, New
    AND INVESTMENT BANK:        York and Washington, D.C.
    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES    Carmine D. Boccuzzi Jr., Timothy Thomas
    BNP PARIBAS, AND BNP        Leech, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP,
    PARIBAS SECURITIES CORP.:   New York, New York.
    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES    Alexander J. Willscher, Matthew J. Porpora,
    ROYAL BANK OF CANADA, RBC   Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, New York, New
    EUROPE LIMITED, AND RBC     York.
    CAPITAL MARKETS LLC:
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE      John D. Buretta, Cravath, Swaine & Moore
    NOMURA INTERNATIONAL        LLP, New York, New York.
    PLC:
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE      Aidan Synnott, Rachel J. Corrigan, Paul,
    NOMURA SECURITIES           Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New
    INTERNATIONAL, INC.:        York, New York.
    FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE      James R. Sigel, Bradley S. Lui, Michael F. Qian,
    GARY MCDONALD:              Adam Hunt, Morrison & Foerster LLP, San
    Francisco, California, Washington, D.C., and
    New York, New York.
    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES    Barry G. Sher, Anthony Antonelli, Paul
    BARCLAYS BANK PLC,          Hastings LLP, New York, New York.
    BARCLAYS CAPITAL INC.,
    BARCLAYS EXECUTION
    SERVICES LIMITED, AND
    BARCLAYS CAPITAL
    SECURITIES LIMITED:
    FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES    Paul S. Mishkin, Robert G. King, Benjamin
    THE TORONTO-DOMINION        D. Wasserman, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP,
    5
    BANK, AND TD SECURITIES                    New York, New York.
    (USA) LLC:
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
    New York (Ramos, J.).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
    DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Plaintiffs-appellants Alaska Department of Revenue, Treasury Division;
    the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation; and the Iron Workers Pension Plan of
    Western Pennsylvania ("plaintiffs") are U.S. investors who traded in U.S.
    dollar-denominated ("USD") supranational, sovereign, and agency bonds ("SSA bonds")
    with defendants-appellees ("defendants"), who are entities that deal in USD SSA bonds
    and purportedly dominate the secondary market and certain individuals previously
    employed by some of the dealer entities.
    Plaintiffs, who brought suit under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
    15 U.S.C. § 1
    , appeal from a partial final judgment dismissing their federal antitrust claims
    against one set of defendants (the "Domestic Dealer Defendants") 1 for failure to state a
    claim and against two other sets of defendants -- the "Foreign Dealer Defendants" 2 and
    1       The nine Domestic Dealer Defendants are: Barclays Capital Inc.; BNP Paribas Securities
    Corp.; Citigroup Inc.; Citibank, N.A.; Citigroup Global Markets Inc.; Credit Suisse Securities
    (USA) LLC; Nomura Securities International, Inc.; RBC Capital Markets LLC; and TD Securities
    (USA) LLC.
    2       The thirteen Foreign Dealer Defendants are: Barclays Bank PLC; Barclays Capital
    Securities Limited; Barclays Execution Services Limited (formerly known as Barclays Services
    6
    the "Individual Defendants" 3 (together, the "Foreign Defendants") -- for lack of personal
    jurisdiction and improper venue. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that: (1) they have
    plausibly alleged an antitrust claim based on defendants' continuous and ongoing
    conspiracy to collude with each other in the secondary market for USD SSA bonds to
    plaintiffs' detriment; (2) personal jurisdiction and venue are proper as to all defendants
    under either the Clayton Act or New York's Long-Arm Statute; and (3) the district court
    abused its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery. We assume the parties'
    familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues
    on appeal.
    I.     Background 4
    A.     The USD SSA Bond Market
    SSA bonds are debt securities issued by governmental and quasi-
    governmental entities to fund a range of economic and public-policy mandates. Entities
    issuing SSA bonds include: (1) supranational organizations, which are multilateral
    institutions with shareholders from multiple countries, (2) sovereign and sub-sovereign
    Limited); BNP Paribas; Citigroup Global Markets Limited; Crédit Agricole Corporate &
    Investment Bank; Credit Suisse AG; Credit Suisse International; Credit Suisse Securities
    (Europe) Limited; Nomura International plc; RBC Europe Limited; Royal Bank of Canada; and
    The Toronto-Dominion Bank.
    3      The four Individual Defendants are Amandeep Singh Manku, Bhardeep Singh Heer,
    Gary McDonald, and Shailen Pau.
    4      The following facts are drawn from plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), and
    are assumed to be true. See Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 
    781 F.3d 25
    , 26 (2d Cir. 2015).
    7
    borrowers, which are national, state or provincial governments that issue debt in
    foreign currencies, and (3) agency borrowers, which are typically entities operated by or
    working on behalf of governments. There are approximately $1 trillion of SSA bonds
    outstanding globally. Investors generally regard SSA bonds as secure investments
    "because they often enjoy special legal status, and their credit-worthiness is often
    pegged to sovereign, regional, or international entities." J. App'x at 35. SSA bonds can
    also be dollar-denominated to target the U.S. bond market.
    After they are issued, SSA bonds can be resold and traded by dealers and
    investors in the secondary market. Investors trade SSA bonds in an over-the-counter
    market, transacting individually and privately with dealers as opposed to using an
    open exchange that matches buyers and sellers anonymously. An investor typically
    contacts one or more dealers by telephone, electronic chat messages, or an electronic
    trading platform to request a quote. The dealer relays the quote to the investor, who
    can then place an order.
    Due to the short expiration periods of quotes and the time-consuming
    nature of contacting dealers, investors generally do not shop around with more than a
    few dealers at a time. Regardless of medium -- telephone, electronic chat messages, or
    electronic trading platforms -- investors have "no access to real time market data to
    validate whether dealers' quotes were competitive." 
    Id. at 88
    . Furthermore, there is "no
    post-trade price transparency" and "limited ability to purchase secondary market
    8
    trading information" for SSA bonds. 
    Id. at 89
    . To learn the price of an SSA bond,
    investors must reach out to a dealer and request a quote, thus revealing their identity
    and the specific instrument and volume they seek to trade.
    B.     The Alleged Antitrust Conspiracy
    Plaintiffs seek to represent a class comprised of all persons or entities who,
    from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2015 (the "Class Period"), "directly entered into
    [USD] SSA bond transactions with Defendants, or their respective subsidiaries or
    affiliates, in the United States . . . or otherwise involving U.S. trade or commerce." 
    Id. at 232-33
    .
    The crux of plaintiffs' claims is that all defendants collaborated and shared
    information such "that they effectively ceased" operating separately in the USD SSA
    bond market "and instead functioned as a single, unitary 'super-desk.'" 
    Id. at 41
    .
    Plaintiffs allege that, for every single SSA bond transaction during the Class Period,
    defendants -- several banks operating as dealers in the USD SSA bond market (the
    "Dealer Defendants") and certain of their former employees responsible for the banks'
    USD SSA trading business (including the Individual Defendants) 5 -- conspired not to
    5       The Individual Defendants are British citizens or residents who were employed by
    several of the Dealer Defendants as USD SSA bond traders and communicated with each other
    via chat messages about their transactions. They allegedly shared confidential customer
    information and pricing and volume of USD SSA bond transactions, and at times they sold and
    bought bonds on each other's behalf. The Individual Defendants were also alleged to be part of
    the same social circle.
    9
    compete against each other in the secondary market for USD SSA bonds, and instead
    cooperated to achieve prices and terms more favorable to them and worse for their
    customers.
    Specifically, plaintiffs accuse defendants of colluding to artificially lower
    the price at which defendants purchased SSA bonds from consumers (the "bid") and
    artificially inflate the price at which defendants sold SSA bonds to consumers (the
    "ask"), thus artificially widening the bid-ask spread -- and their profits -- via
    anticompetitive methods. Citing electronic chatroom records between employees
    trading SSA bonds on behalf of the Dealer Defendants, plaintiffs allege that when an
    investor contacted one or more dealers to purchase a bond, defendants would
    communicate with each other via chat rooms and phone calls to achieve more favorable
    prices and terms for themselves, such as by artificially lowering dealer demand for
    investors' sales of USD SSA bonds to dealers and artificially inflating demand for
    dealers' sales of USD SSA bonds to investors. Plaintiffs also supplement their
    allegations with statistical analyses, claiming to identify artificially wide price margins
    for SSA bonds -- and thus artificially high profit margins for dealers of the bonds --
    across the entire market for USD SSA bonds during the Class Period.
    C.     Procedural History
    The initial complaint was filed on May 18, 2016. Following several years
    of litigation, plaintiffs filed the SAC on November 13, 2018. On September 30, 2019, the
    10
    district court granted the Foreign Dealer Defendants' and Individual Defendants'
    motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and also ruled that venue was
    improper with respect to a subset of five Foreign Defendants who had moved to
    dismiss on that basis. 6 On March 18, 2020, the district court granted the Domestic
    Dealer Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On May 8, 2020, the
    district court entered a partial final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). This
    appeal followed.
    II.    Discussion
    A.     Standard of Review
    "We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
    12(b)(6) de novo." Dane v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 
    974 F.3d 183
    , 188 (2d Cir. 2020). "We
    review de novo the district court's decision to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)" for lack of
    personal jurisdiction. MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 
    702 F.3d 725
    , 727 (2d Cir. 2012). "[W]e
    will apply the same [de novo] standard of review in Rule 12(b)(3) dismissals for
    improper venue as we do in Rule 12(b)(2) dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction[.]"
    Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 
    417 F.3d 353
    , 355 (2d Cir. 2005). "We review a district court's
    denial of jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion[.]" Broidy Cap. Mgmt. LLC v.
    Benomar, 
    944 F.3d 436
    , 446 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    6       The five Foreign Dealer Defendants that raised a venue defense are: Barclays Capital
    Securities Limited, Barclays Execution Services Limited, Credit Suisse International, Credit
    Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd., and Nomura International plc.
    11
    B.      Applicable Law
    "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
    factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    ,
    570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
    allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
    misconduct alleged." 
    Id.
     While plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to show "more
    than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," 
    id.
     (citation omitted),
    plausibility "simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
    will reveal evidence of illegality," Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 
    604 F.3d 110
    , 120 (2d Cir.
    2010) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted), "even if it strikes a
    savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable," Citizens United v.
    Schneiderman, 
    882 F.3d 374
    , 380 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 570
    ). As
    relevant here, "[n]o heightened pleading requirements apply in antitrust cases." Todd v.
    Exxon Corp., 
    275 F.3d 191
    , 198 (2d Cir. 2001). But "a bare bones statement of conspiracy
    or of injury under the antitrust laws without any supporting facts permits dismissal."
    Heart Disease Rsch. Found. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
    463 F.2d 98
    , 100 (2d Cir. 1972).
    Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in
    the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce." 
    15 U.S.C. § 1
    . To plead a plausible conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a
    12
    plaintiff must allege "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement
    was made" to restrain trade. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 556
    .
    In so doing, a plaintiff may "assert direct evidence that the defendants
    entered into an agreement in violation of the antitrust laws," Mayor & City Council of
    Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 
    709 F.3d 129
    , 136 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing the rare antitrust
    "smoking gun" evidence), or, in the alternative, "present circumstantial facts supporting
    the inference that a conspiracy existed," 
    id.
     Under the latter method, allegations that
    defendants engaged in parallel conduct can establish a plausible conspiracy when they
    are accompanied by certain "plus factors," which "may include: a common motive to
    conspire, evidence that shows that the parallel acts were against the apparent
    individual economic self-interest of the alleged conspirators, and evidence of a high
    level of interfirm communications." 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted). But a
    complaint may not state "in entirely general terms without any specification of any
    particular activities by any particular defendant." In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 
    502 F.3d 47
    , 50 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    For courts reviewing antitrust cases, "the character and effect of a
    conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but
    only by looking at it as a whole." United States v. Apple, Inc., 
    791 F.3d 290
    , 319 (2d Cir.
    2015) (alteration omitted) (quoting Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 
    370 U.S. 690
    , 699 (1962)).
    13
    C.     Application
    Here, we conclude that plaintiffs have cast a net so wide that the claimed
    antitrust conspiracy is implausible as alleged.
    As plaintiffs themselves note, the secondary market for USD SSA bonds
    operates through bilateral over-the-counter transactions, with quickly expiring quotes
    acquired after extended communications with dealers. Because of its decentralized,
    opaque, and frenetic nature, the secondary market for USD SSA Bonds may indeed be
    vulnerable to manipulation by individual traders colluding on specific trades.
    But the flip side of this same coin is that the conspiracy alleged by
    plaintiffs -- a "super-desk" involving more than twenty entities in different countries as
    well as individual traders, conspiring "[e]very day, nearly all day," J. App'x at 169,
    tainting every one of their trades for some seven years -- is simply not plausible.
    Significantly, in casting this extremely wide net, plaintiffs have explicitly refused to
    plead, in the alternative, a narrower antitrust conspiracy involving only the Individual
    Defendants. Accordingly, we evaluate plaintiffs' claims as they are alleged: an antitrust
    conspiracy involving all defendants and affecting all trades with the defendants.
    In so doing, we conclude that the SAC does not allege sufficient factual
    detail to establish the plausibility of the claimed conspiracy. The SAC fails to explain
    how the conspirators were able to wield such control over the secondary market as to
    impact every trade with every defendant and yield a viable claim for every plaintiff.
    14
    The SAC also fails to link each of the defendants individually to specific acts of
    anticompetitive conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, while we agree with
    the district court that the SAC adequately alleges anticompetitive conduct on the part of
    the Individual Defendants, In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litig., 
    420 F. Supp. 3d 219
    , 237-38
    (S.D.N.Y. 2019), we conclude that the broad conspiracy alleged by plaintiffs is simply
    not plausible. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims
    under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
    Because we affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims as to all defendants on
    plaintiffs' failure to plead a plausible conspiracy, we need not reach the issues of
    personal jurisdiction, venue, and jurisdictional discovery.
    * * *
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the partial final judgment of the
    district court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    15