United States v. Medina , 459 F. App'x 31 ( 2012 )


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  • 11-252-cr
    United States v. Medina
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
    SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
    BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
    WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
    MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
    NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
    Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York,
    on the 3rd day of February, two thousand twelve,
    Present:    JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
    PIERRE N. LEVAL,
    ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    -v-                                                11-252-cr
    LUIS MEDINA,1
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appearing for Appellee:         Daniel P. Chung, Andrew L. Fish, Assistant United States
    Attorneys (of counsel), for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney
    for the Southern District of New York, N.Y.
    Appearing for Appellant:        Michael Hurwitz, Hurwitz Stampur & Roth, New York, N.Y.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
    (Castel, J.).
    1
    We direct the Clerk of Court to amend the official caption of this case to reflect the
    parties' designations herewith.
    ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
    AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.
    Appellant Luis Medina was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute and to
    possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    and one count of conspiracy to import into the United States one kilogram or more of heroin, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 963
    , after a bench trial on stipulated facts. He was sentenced principally
    to 70 months’ imprisonment. Petitioner now appeals from his January 19, 2011, judgment of
    conviction. On appeal, Medina asserts that there was not probable cause for his arrest and that
    the district court erred in denying him minor or minimal participant credit under the sentencing
    guidelines. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and
    specification of issues for review.
    Appellant argues there was not probable cause for his arrest, and so his post-arrest
    inculpatory statements must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. “Probable cause to arrest
    a person exists if the law enforcement official, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances,
    has sufficient knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information to justify a person of reasonable
    caution in believing that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”
    United States v. Patrick, 
    899 F.2d 169
    , 171 (2d Cir. 1990). Here, police knew a box containing
    drugs was addressed to appellant and that he was to be paid $2,000 to pick it up. Police also
    knew that appellant went to pick up that box accompanied by the person they knew to have
    arranged for the delivery of those drugs. A person of reasonable caution would be justified in
    believing that there was at least “a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity,” Illinois
    v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 244 n.13 (1983), in this situation, and that is all that is necessary.
    As to appellant’s next contention, the Guidelines provide for a two-level downward
    departure if “the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity” and for a four-level
    downward departure if “the defendant was a minimal participant.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A
    defendant is not entitled to a reduction “simply because the defendant played a lesser role than
    his co-conspirators; to be eligible for a reduction, the defendant's conduct must be ‘minor’ or
    ‘minimal’ as compared to the average participant in such a crime.” United States v. Rahman, 
    189 F.3d 88
    , 159 (2d Cir. 1999). Here, the district court found appellant was involved on multiple
    levels with the drug conspiracy, acting as a courier, packaging drugs, and making drug related
    wire transfers. The district court did not err denying the minimal and minor participation credits
    to such a defendant.2
    2
    Although this Court has sometimes reviewed such determinations for clear error and
    other times de novo, see United States v. Burgos, 
    324 F.3d 88
    , 91 n. 2 (2d Cir. 2003), we need
    not decide which standard is appropriate, because in either case we find the district court did not
    err.
    2
    We have examined the remainder of appellant’s arguments and find them to be without
    merit.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    3