United States v. Langston ( 2018 )

17-2553-cr
United States v. Langston
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a
summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is
governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s
Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with
this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic
database (with the notation “Summary Order”). A party citing a summary
order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 26th day of April, two thousand eighteen.
Present:
PETER W. HALL,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY
Circuit Judges,
TIMOTHY C. STANCEU,
Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Int’l Trade.*
United States of America,
Appellee,
v. 17-2553-cr
Nathaniel C. Langston,
Defendant-Appellant.
For Appellee: Douglas M. Pravda, Penelope J. Brady, Assistant
United States Attorneys, for Richard P. Donoghue,
United States Attorney, Eastern District of New
York, Brooklyn, NY.
* Timothy C. Stanceu, Chief Judge of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting
by designation.
For Defendant-Appellant: Robert M. Radick, Jane E. Bobet, Morvillo
Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., New York,
NY.
Appeal from a decision and judgment entered August 8, 2017, in the Eastern
District of New York (Kuntz, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment is VACATED and the case is
REMANDED for a new hearing on the charged violations of supervised release. In
addition, for the reasons stated below, on remand the case will be assigned to a
different judge.
Nathaniel Langston appeals from the judgment and order of the district court
finding that he committed four violations of his supervised release and imposing a
sentence based on those violations. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts, the procedural history, the arguments presented on appeal, and
the district court’s rulings.
To quote from the Government’s brief: “On the facts of this case, the
government agrees that the judgment should be vacated and the case remanded for
a new hearing at which Langston can receive the effective assistance of counsel.”
Appellee’s Brief at 10. This is in part the same relief that Langston is seeking, and
we agree. The district court’s notice to the parties regarding the August 8, 2017,
hearing did not adequately inform Langston that he (and his counsel) needed to be
prepared to present his defense at the hearing. Accordingly, the judgment will be
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vacated, and the case remanded to the district court for a new hearing on those
alleged violations.
With respect to Langston’s argument that this Court should order his case
reassigned to a different judge, although the Government asserts that is
unnecessary and unwarranted, we think it advisable to do so here. In considering
whether to order reassignment, we look to:
(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon
remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind
previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous[,]
. . . (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance
of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and
duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance
of fairness.
United States v. DeMott, 513 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (alterations in
original) (citation omitted). Regarding the first factor, the government, in opposing
reassignment, argues that there is an insufficient basis to conclude that the district
judge could not be fair upon remand. We do not disagree with the government on
this point. However, the record on appeal does not require us to conclude that the
district judge could not be impartial in conducting the further proceedings we are
ordering. United States v. Johnson, 850 F.3d 515, 525 (2d Cir. 2017) (reassigning
the case where only factors two and three weighed in favor of reassignment).
Nevertheless, we take the unusual step of directing reassignment to a different
judge for the reason identified in the second factor, which is the institutional
interest in ensuring that there will be no basis upon which the impartiality of those
proceedings could be questioned. Here, the district judge expressed serious concern
that Langston was committing a fraud on the district court, suggested that counsel
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assisted in that effort, and denied counsel any CJA fees. Further, as we have
already detailed, the district court provided inadequate notice regarding Langston’s
need to present a defense and then proceeded with that hearing over the objections
of both Langston and his counsel. In light of these actions, we conclude that the
“appearance of justice would best be preserved by reassignment.” United States v.
Padilla, 186 F.3d 136, 142–43 (2d Cir. 1999) (reassigning the case based on the
district judge’s remarks to counsel and the defendant). Regarding the third factor,
we view any duplication required by having a different judge conduct the hearing on
revocation of supervised release and reach a new decision to be justified in the
interest of preserving the appearance of justice, and we do not deem that
duplication so extensive as to outweigh that interest.
The judgment of the district court is VACATED, and the case is
REMANDED for a new hearing on the charged violations of supervised release to
be held before a different judge.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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