Sharma v. Garland ( 2023 )

20-3259
Sharma v. Garland
BIA
Wright, IJ
A208 617 697
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 21st day of April, two thousand twenty-
three.
PRESENT:
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
Chief Judge,
STEVEN J. MENASHI,
EUNICE C. LEE,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
JAIDEEP SHARMA,
Petitioner,
v. 20-3259
NAC
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, Esq., New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Holly M. Smith,
Assistant Director; Kohsei
Ugumori, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Jaideep Sharma, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of an August 28, 2020, decision of the BIA
affirming a September 13, 2018, decision of an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding
of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Jaideep Sharma, No. A 208 617 697 (B.I.A. Aug.
28, 2020), aff’g No. A 208 617 697 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept.
13, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history.
We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions
“for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of
Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The
applicable standards of review are well established. “[T]he
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
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reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “Accordingly, we
review the agency’s decision for substantial evidence and
must defer to the factfinder’s findings based on such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 113
(2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018)
(reviewing adverse credibility determinations for substantial
evidence).
A factfinder “may base a credibility determination on .
. . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s
written and oral statements,” “the internal consistency of
each such statement,” “the consistency of such statements
with other evidence of record,” and “any inaccuracies or
falsehoods in such statements,” and it may do so “without
regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility
determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances,
it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an
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adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534
F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d
at 76.
Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility
determination in this case. Sharma alleged persecution by
ruling parties in India because of his membership in the
Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (“SADA”) party. The agency
reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Sharma’s own
statements and his documentary evidence. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Sharma’s application and testimony
provided that members of the ruling parties twice attacked
him, he reported the first attack to the police, and the
police warned him that he would be arrested and jailed if he
made further reports. He testified that the police pushed
him out of the station, but he confirmed that he was not
arrested, interrogated, or prosecuted. However, he submitted
two documents that directly contradicted these statements.
His father’s affidavit said that “police also filed false
charges against my son,” Certified Administrative Record
(“CAR”) 103, and a letter from a SADA official said that
Sharma was “arrested, interrogated and prosecuted by Punjab
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Police because of his political activities,” id. at 106–07.
The agency was not required to accept Sharma’s explanations
for these inconsistencies. “A petitioner must do more than
offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements
to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-
finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” Majidi
v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted). When questioned about the
inconsistency, he admitted that the document from the party
official was “not correct,” CAR at 88, and he said that his
father’s statement might be inaccurate because his father
lacks education and may not have understood what was in the
affidavit, see id. at 84. The agency was not required to
credit these explanations because the explanations did not
resolve the inconsistencies and Sharma testified at the
beginning of the hearing that his supporting documents were
true and correct. Id.The inconsistency between Sharma’s statements and his
documentary evidence is alone substantial evidence for the
adverse credibility determination. See Likai Gao v. Barr,
968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single
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inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ
was compelled to find him credible.”); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480
F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single false document . .
. may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance
of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”).
The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all
three claims are based on the same factual predicate. See
Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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