Sanchez v. Dutchess Cnty. Dep't of Cmty. & Fam. Servs. ( 2023 )

21-2408
Sanchez v. Dutchess Cnty. Dep’t of Cmty. & Fam. Servs.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 24th day of April, two thousand twenty-three.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
BETH ROBINSON,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Matthew Sanchez, Tianna S. Sanchez,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. 21-2408
County of Dutchess, Benjamin Doty, Glen
Brown, Candace Lynch,
Defendants-Appellees,
Dutchess County Dept. of Community &
Family Services, Dutchess County Dept. of
Probation, Webutuck School District,
Millerton Police Dept., Hon, Joseph Egitto,
Hon. Casey McCabe,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: Matthew Sanchez, pro se,
Tianna Sanchez, pro se,
Glenham, NY.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: David L. Posner, McCabe
& Mack LLP,
Poughkeepsie, NY, for
Appellees.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York (Seibel, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the order is VACATED.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Matthew and Tianna Sanchez, proceeding without legal
representation, appeal the district court’s order dismissing their case under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute.
In September 2018, the district court stayed the underlying action pending
resolution of related state court proceedings in New York, and directed the parties to
provide periodic status updates. On June 14, 2021, Defendants-Appellees wrote a letter
to the district court, informing it that the New York Appellate Division rendered its
decision. On June 15, 2021, the district court issued a notice written on Defendants’ June
14 letter, asking Plaintiffs to tell the district court how they wanted to proceed. The
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district court wrote that if Plaintiffs did not respond within two weeks, it would assume
that they did not want to pursue their federal court action and the district court would
dismiss the action without prejudice. On July 14, 2021, having not heard from Plaintiffs,
the district court dismissed the action “without prejudice for failure to prosecute.” On
July 26, 2021, Plaintiffs wrote to the district court requesting “an update in [their] case”
and stating that they “have not received any documents from the court or the defendant’s
counsel.” We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
A district court’s decision to dismiss a case under Rule 41(b) for a plaintiff’s failure
to prosecute the case is a discretionary determination that we review for abuse of
discretion. Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d 569, 575 (2d Cir. 2009). “Abuse of discretion” is a
term of art that does not connote abusive conduct in the ordinary sense of that
term. See In re The City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 943 n.21 (2d Cir. 2010). A district court
abuses its discretion when its “decision rests on an error of law (such as application of
the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or when its ruling cannot
be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Lewis, 564 F.3d at 575. 1
Under Rule 41(b), the district court may “dismiss a complaint for failure to comply
with a court order, treating the noncompliance as a failure to prosecute.” Simmons v.
1In quotations from caselaw and the parties’ briefing, this order omits all internal quotation
marks, alterations, footnotes, and citations, unless otherwise noted.
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Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1995). Dismissal under Rule 41(b) is a “harsh remedy”
and should not be used often, especially when, as here, the plaintiff appears before the
court without an attorney. See Lewis, 564 F.3d at 575–76; see also Baptiste v. Sommers, 768
F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that a pro se litigant’s case “should be dismissed
for failure to prosecute only when the circumstances are sufficiently extreme”).
Although a district court has the discretion to dismiss a case under Rule 41(b), its
discretion is not limitless. Before a district court decides to dismiss a case under Rule
41(b), it must consider the following five factors: (1) whether the plaintiff’s failure to
prosecute caused significant delay; (2) whether the plaintiff was notified that further
delay would result in dismissal; (3) whether further delay would prejudice the defendant;
(4) whether the court carefully balanced its need to make sure it can continue to efficiently
tend to other cases that come before against the plaintiff’s right to argue their case; and
(5) whether the court adequately considered whether a less harsh sanction would be as
effective. United States ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 254 (2d Cir. 2004);
see also Baptiste, 768 F.3d at 216 (“No single factor is generally dispositive.”). We have
also held that before dismissing a case, the district court must make a finding that the
plaintiff failed to prosecute the case intentionally, in bad faith, or with reasonable fault.
Baptiste, 768 F.3d at 217, 219. We need not decide whether this requirement applies to a
dismissal without prejudice, as in this case, because we vacate and remand for the reasons
set forth below.
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We do not require a district court to discuss these five factors on the record, but “a
decision to dismiss stands a better chance on appeal if the appellate court has the benefit
of the district court’s reasoning.” Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp., 222 F.3d
52, 63 (2d Cir. 2000).
The entirety of the district court’s order is as follows:
The Court has heard nothing from Plaintiffs since its order of June 14, 2021
(Doc. 86). Accordingly, the claims in this case are dismissed without
prejudice for failure to prosecute. The Clerk shall send Plaintiffs a copy of
this text order and close the case.
D. Ct. Dkt. No. 87 (July 14, 2021).
Given the factors pointing against dismissal, we cannot evaluate whether the
district court exceeded its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs’ case. For example, the one-
month delay is not necessarily a “significant duration.” See Nita v. Conn. Dep’t of Env’t
Prot., 16 F.3d 482, 486 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a delay of less than two months weighed
against dismissal). The record is also unclear as to whether Plaintiffs received notice in
light of their July 26, 2021 letter requesting an update. We do note, however, that the
various status updates provided by defense counsel to the district court, as well as the
district court’s June 14 order, were mailed to the post office box identified by Plaintiffs as
their address.
We further cannot identify evidence that the one-month delay prejudiced
Defendants or that it added to the congestion of the district court in any way. See Lucas
v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535–36 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the prejudice factor weighed
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against dismissal where there was “absolutely no evidence” that the delay “prejudiced
the defendants in any way” and that “[t]here must be compelling evidence of an extreme
effect on court congestion before a litigant’s right to be heard is subrogated to the
convenience of the court.”). In arguing that “four years had elapsed” since the events
subject to this action, Appellee Br. 10, Defendants overlook the cause of the four-year
delay—the district court’s appropriate abstention pending resolution of the family and
criminal court proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
In dismissing the case without prejudice, the district court clearly considered less
severe sanctions than dismissal with prejudice, but we cannot tell whether and how it
considered the other factors. We thus remand for reconsideration of the dismissal order.
We decline Defendants’ request that we affirm the dismissal of Dutchess County
as a party to the underlying action, as the scope of this appeal is limited to review of the
dismissal order. See Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 186 F.3d 186, 191–93 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that an interlocutory summary judgment order was not reviewable on an appeal from an
order dismissing an action on Rule 41(b) grounds).
Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s dismissal order, and we REMAND
for further proceedings consistent with this order.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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