Sultan v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  •      20-2827
    Sultan v. Garland
    BIA
    Nelson, IJ
    A095 952 529
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 30th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            DENNY CHIN,
    8            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    9            ALISON J. NATHAN,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   ALI ALI SULTAN, AKA RAHAMAT ALI
    14   SULTAN,
    15            Petitioner,
    16
    17                       v.                                  20-2827
    18                                                           NAC
    19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                     Pankaj Malik, Warshaw Burstein,
    25                                       LLP, New York, NY.
    26
    27   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
    28                                       Attorney General; Anthony P.
    1                                    Nicastro, Assistant Director;
    2                                    Linda Y. Cheng, Trial Attorney,
    3                                    Office of Immigration Litigation,
    4                                    United States Department of
    5                                    Justice, Washington, DC.
    6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    9    is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
    10       Petitioner       Ali Ali Sultan, a native and                 citizen of
    11   Trinidad and Tobago, seeks review of a July 28, 2020 decision
    12   of the BIA affirming a June 7, 2018 decision of an Immigration
    13   Judge   (“IJ”),      which   denied    his    application      for   asylum,
    14   withholding    of    removal,    and   relief      under    the   Convention
    15   Against   Torture     (“CAT”),    as   well    as   an     application      for
    16   cancellation of removal.         In re Ali Ali Sultan, No. A 095 952
    17   529 (B.I.A. July 28, 2020), aff’g No. A 095 952 529 (Immig.
    18   Ct. N.Y.C. June 7, 2018).        We assume the parties’ familiarity
    19   with the underlying facts and procedural history.
    20       We have considered both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for
    21   the sake of completeness.”            Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland
    22   Sec., 
    448 F.3d 524
    , 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                    Sultan primarily
    23   challenges     the    agency’s    denial      of    his     motion    for     a
    24   continuance.      We find no abuse of discretion in that ruling
    2
    1   and       conclude      that    Sultan   has       not    otherwise    sufficiently
    2   exhausted or argued his claims for relief from removal.
    3        I.     Motion to Continue
    4             “We review the agency’s denial of a continuance for abuse
    5   of discretion.”            Flores v. Holder, 
    779 F.3d 159
    , 164 (2d Cir.
    6   2015).           The    agency    abuses      its       discretion    “if   (1) [its]
    7   decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the
    8   wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding
    9   or (2) [its] decision—though not necessarily the product of
    10   a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot
    11   be    located          within    the   range       of    permissible    decisions.”
    12   Morgan v. Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 549
    , 551–52 (2d Cir. 2006)
    13   (quotation marks omitted).                 “IJs have . . . broad discretion
    14   with respect to calendaring matters.”                        Sanusi v. Gonzales,
    15   
    445 F.3d 193
    ,     199    (2d   Cir.       2006)    (finding    no   abuse   of
    16   discretion where an IJ denied a third motion to continue
    17   “after months of delay”).                While an IJ “may grant a motion
    18   for continuance for good cause shown,” 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.29
    ,
    19   the moving party has the burden of establishing good cause,
    20   see Matter of L–A–B–R–, 
    27 I. & N. Dec. 405
    , 413 (A.G. 2018).
    21             The IJ did not abuse her discretion in concluding that
    3
    1   Sultan did not show good cause for a continuance.               A motion
    2   for a continuance based on lack of preparation must be
    3   supported    by   “a   reasonable       showing   that   the    lack       of
    4   preparation occurred despite a good faith effort to be ready
    5   to proceed.”      Matter of Sibrun, 
    18 I. & N. Dec. 354
    , 356
    6   (B.I.A. 1983).     Sultan offered no evidence to establish the
    7   circumstances preventing him from being prepared for the
    8   hearing or any good faith effort to be ready for the hearing,
    9   beyond counsel’s assertions when arguing for the continuance.
    10         Sultan also argues that the denial of the continuance
    11   deprived him of due process.            To succeed on a due process
    12   claim, a petitioner “must show that []he was denied a full
    13   and   fair   opportunity   to   present     h[is] claims   or    .     .   .
    14   otherwise deprived . . . of fundamental fairness,” Burger v.
    15   Gonzales, 
    498 F.3d 131
    , 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks
    16   and citations omitted), and “some cognizable prejudice fairly
    17   attributable to the challenged process,” Garcia-Villeda v.
    18   Mukasey, 
    531 F.3d 141
    , 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks
    19   and citations omitted).     Sultan made no such showing.          He had
    20   opportunities to present evidence and testify, and he has not
    21   established how witness testimony or the appearance of a
    4
    1   different attorney would have changed the outcome.                    For
    2   example, he did not provide objective evidence that Muslims
    3   or ethnic Indians in Trinidad and Tobago are targeted for
    4   persecution or that he would be singled out for torture for
    5   any reason.     See Garcia-Villeda, 
    531 F.3d at 149
     (denying a
    6   due   process    claim   where    the   “[p]etitioner      fail[ed]    to
    7   demonstrate how the alleged shortcomings . . . prejudiced the
    8   outcome”).
    9     II. Applications for Relief from Removal
    10         We require petitioners to exhaust the specific forms of
    11   relief they request and sufficiently argue the issues and
    12   challenge the agency’s denial of relief in their petitions
    13   for review.      See Foster v. INS, 
    376 F.3d 75
    , 78 (2d Cir.
    14   2004); Karaj v. Gonzales, 
    462 F.3d 113
    , 119–20 (2d Cir. 2006).
    15   Sultan   has    failed   to   exhaust    and   has   not   sufficiently
    16   challenged the agency’s denial of relief from removal.                 As
    17   the BIA pointed out, Sultan did not challenge the denial of
    18   cancellation of removal or the denial of asylum as time barred
    19   on appeal to the BIA.         Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to
    20   review those forms of relief.           See Karaj, 
    462 F.3d at
    119–
    21   20.   Nor did he identify factual or legal errors in the denial
    5
    1   of withholding of removal and CAT relief on appeal to the
    2   BIA.    See Foster, 
    376 F.3d at 78
    .   Moreover, Sultan’s briefs
    3   in support of his petition do not identify specific errors in
    4   the agency’s decisions.    See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426
    
    5 F.3d 540
    , 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (deeming claim abandoned
    6   where not sufficiently argued).       We therefore dismiss the
    7   petition insofar as Sultan challenges the agency’s denial of
    8   relief from removal, which he failed to exhaust.
    9          Even if we were to reach the merits of his arguments
    10   relating to withholding of removal and CAT relief, we do not
    11   identify any error in the agency’s decision.     Sultan alleged
    12   that he was fired from his job, but under the circumstances
    13   here, that harm alone does not amount to past persecution.
    14   See Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 
    633 F.3d 64
    , 72 (2d Cir. 2011)
    15   (“[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not include
    16   every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”
    17   (quotation marks omitted)); Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of
    
    18 Just., 433
     F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (distinguishing
    19   between persecution and harassment).       Moreover, the 2017
    20   State Department report, which is the only country conditions
    21   evidence in the record, does not support Sultan’s fear of
    6
    1   future persecution or torture because it does not confirm his
    2   allegation that Indian-Muslims are targeted for persecution
    3   or singled out for rape and murder, as Sultan claims.                    See 8
    
    4 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16
    (c)(2) (placing burden on CAT applicant to
    5   show torture is “more likely than not”), 1208.18(a)(1)–(2)
    6   (defining torture); Wei Sun v. Sessions, 
    883 F.3d 23
    , 27–28
    7   (2d   Cir.   2018)    (“Eligibility         for    withholding    of    removal
    8   requires a clear probability of persecution, i.e., it is more
    9   likely   than   not     that     the       alien    would    be   subject   to
    10   persecution.”        (ellipsis    and        internal       quotation    marks
    11   omitted)).
    12         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    13   DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.                 All pending motions
    14   and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.
    15                                      FOR THE COURT:
    16                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    17                                      Clerk of Court
    7