Edward Miller, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania , 588 F. App'x 96 ( 2014 )

BLD-052 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-3005
___________
EDWARD CHARLES MILLER, JR.,
Appellant
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; DETECTIVE MARY J. ANDERS;
ROBERT M. FALIN, DDA; WILLIAM R. CARPENTER, Judge
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 13-cv-06291)
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary
Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 4, 2014
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 11, 2014)
_________________
OPINION*
_________________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se litigant Edward Miller, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals the District
Court’s order dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set
forth below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
Miller was convicted of Criminal Attempt to Commit Statutory Sexual Assault in
2004, following an internet “sting” operation executed by Appellee Detective Mary
Anders. He is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in Waymart,
Pennsylvania. The evidence adduced to obtain his conviction included chats that were
stored on a hard drive and zip disc maintained by Detective Anders. After his direct
appeal failed, Miller filed a petition for post-conviction relief. He claimed that the post-
conviction attorney directed a computer forensics expert to examine the hard drive and
zip disc that were submitted as evidence at Miller’s trial. But when the expert arrived at
the detective’s office to do so, she was informed that the hard drive and zip disc had been
destroyed. Miller’s post-conviction petition was denied as untimely, the Superior Court
affirmed the denial, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review.
Miller filed the complaint at bar pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the
disappearance of the hard drive and zip disc constituted intentional destruction of critical
evidence that prevented him from proving his innocence and thus violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. As defendants, Miller named Robert Falin, the Deputy District Attorney
who represented the Commonwealth in its opposition to his post-conviction petition;
Judge William Carpenter of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, who
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denied his post-conviction petition; the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and Detective
Anders. He sought compensatory damages and a new trial as relief. 1
The District Court dismissed the claims against the Commonwealth and Judge
Carpenter sua sponte. The remaining defendants, Attorney Falin and Detective Anders,
moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint. They
argued that Miller’s claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and
that they were protected by prosecutorial and qualified immunity. The District Court
agreed that Miller’s claims were incurably barred by Heck, and granted the motion to
dismiss with prejudice. Miller filed a timely notice of appeal. He also filed a motion to
amend his complaint in this Court, in which he reduced the compensatory damages
requested from $6.8 million to $366,000, and in which he argued that his complaint is not
barred by Heck. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary
review over the District Court’s order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d
Cir. 2000).
The District Court correctly dismissed the complaint as barred by Heck. The
Heck Court held that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district
1
Relief in the form of a new trial or a release from custody indicates a challenge to “the
very fact or duration of [one’s] physical imprisonment” and may be sought only through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not through a civil rights complaint such as the one
at bar. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). We note that Miller has
separately filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that is currently pending in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See Miller v. Pennsylvania, E.D. Pa., No. 2:13-cv-
06224. In light of that action, we need not consider whether the § 1983 complaint at bar
should instead be construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.” 512 U.S. at 487. Miller is a state prisoner seeking damages in a § 1983
suit. He contends that the Appellees failed to preserve exculpatory evidence that could
have proven his innocence. In addition to damages, he wants a new trial. Because a
judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, he must
demonstrate that his conviction has been invalidated to proceed with his suit. See id. He
has not done so. His complaint was thus rightly dismissed.
In his “Motion to Amend Appellant’s 1983 Cause of Action Complaint” and the
reply thereto, Miller argues that his complaint is outside Heck’s purview because he is
not questioning the validity of his conviction, but rather questioning the Appellees’
destruction of exculpatory evidence. This characterization does not distinguish him from
the complainant in Heck, who argued that two prosecutors and an investigator knowingly
destroyed exculpatory evidence that could have proven his innocence. See id. at 479.
The Supreme Court held that such an argument necessarily implied the invalidity of his
conviction, and that principle clearly applies to Miller’s complaint. See id. at 490.
We are satisfied that amendment to Miller’s complaint would be futile, and we
therefore conclude that the District Court properly dismissed the complaint with
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prejudice.2 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R.
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Miller’s “Motion to Amend Appellant’s 1983 Cause of Action
Complaint” is denied.
2
As to the claims against the Commonwealth and Judge Carpenter, we note that they
also fail under Heck for the reasons described above. Moreover, as the District Court
rightly reasoned, Judge Carpenter and the Commonwealth enjoy immunity that shields
them from Miller’s claims. See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania., 211 F.3d 760,
768 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that judges are immune from suit under § 1983 for damages
arising from their judicial acts); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1981)
(explaining that the Eleventh Amendment bars civil rights suits in federal court against
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania).
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