Com. v. Almodovar, E. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S33013-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    ERNESTO ALMODOVAR                     :
    :
    Appellant           :   No. 2462 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 23, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0004094-2017
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    ERNESTO ALMODOVAR                     :
    :
    Appellant           :   No. 2463 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 23, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0004095-2017
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    ERNESTO ALMODOVAR                     :
    :
    Appellant           :   No. 2464 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 23, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0004096-2017
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
    J-S33013-21
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILED JANUARY 13, 2022
    Ernesto Almodovar appeals from his April 23, 2018 judgment of
    sentence of thirty-one to sixty-three years of incarceration followed by
    fourteen years of probation, which was entered after a jury found him guilty
    of three counts of attempted murder, three counts of aggravated assault,
    possessing a prohibited firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, and
    carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia at docket numbers CP-51-CR-
    0004094-2017 (“Docket 4094”), CP-51-CR-0004095-2017 (“Docket 4095”),
    and CP-51-CR-0004096-2017 (“Docket 4096”). We affirm.
    The trial court has aptly summarized the facts of this case, as follows:
    On August 30, 2016[,] around 6:30 p.m., Appellant
    indiscriminately fired twenty-three bullets into a crowded street,
    severely injuring three different victims. The victims included
    Rakeem Baker (“Mr. Baker”), Bartley Foster (“Mr. Foster”), and
    J.S., who was only twelve years old at the time.5 The incident
    occurred near the intersection of N. Sheridan St. and W. Clearfield
    St. in Philadelphia, outside of La Dominicana Grocery at 625
    Clearfield St. Witnesses testified that there were between forty
    and fifty people in the area when the shooting occurred.
    ________
    5 Mr. Baker is [the complainant] under Docket 4094. Mr.
    Foster is the complainant under Docket 4095-2017. J.S. is
    the complainant under Docket 4096.
    J.S. testified that . . . she and her friend, Samira, went to La
    Dominicana Grocery to pick up a few items for Samira’s mother.
    As the girls were exiting the store, they heard several gunshots.
    The girls and the store cashier rushed to the back of the store and
    hid until the shooting stopped. At some point, a bullet struck J.S.
    in the back of her right thigh, . . . . [B]efore she ran back into the
    store, [J.S.] had an unobstructed view of the shooter. . . . [She
    also] noticed a tattoo on the shooter’s arm[.]
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    ....
    [Mr. Baker] was shot in his left eye and suffered an exit wound on
    his neck. Mr. Foster sustained four bullet wounds, which broke
    the tibia and femur in his right leg and caused unspecified injuries
    in his left leg. . . . Both Mr. Baker and Mr. Foster stated that they
    did not see the individual who shot them.
    [While examining the 600 block of W. Clearfield Street, the
    investigating officers] recovered twenty-three fired cartridge
    cases (“FCCs”). Specifically, officers recovered eleven 7.62-
    caliber casings, which were projected from an AK-47 (a military-
    grade assault rifle), and twelve .40 caliber FCCs, which were shot
    from a .40 caliber automatic handgun. . . . As [officers] surveyed
    the area, [they were] approached by a witness, who told the
    [officers that] a Toyota vehicle that was involved in the shooting
    had a partial tag of KDS, and that same vehicle was parked around
    the corner. [Officers] discovered a gold, ’98 Toyota Camry with
    the license plate number “KDS-2294.” . . . .
    [As they surveyed the vehicle, officers] noticed the muzzle of a
    rifle sticking out from a pile of clothing, which was located behind
    the passenger seat. . . . The officers recovered the firearm—a
    7.62 caliber assault rifle—from the vehicle. The officers also found
    a .40 caliber Glock that had an extended 30-round clip. Both
    weapons were loaded when officers recovered them. A ballistics
    test later confirmed that the firearms recovered from the ’98
    Toyota Camry matched the twenty-three FCCs recovered from the
    intersection of N. Sheridan St. and W. Clearfield St.
    [Officers] notified the dispatcher about the vehicle and firearms
    and asked the dispatcher to “run” the vehicle’s tag information.
    The dispatcher informed [officers] that the vehicle was registered
    to Yeidy Torres (“Ms. Torres”) [at] a residence that was located
    only a few blocks away from the crime scene.              [Officers
    immediately traveled to the residence,] knocked on the door and
    were immediately met by Ms. Torres, who was visibly upset and
    shaken. Before the officers could speak, Ms. Torres stated, “I
    want to report my car as stolen.” The officers asked Ms. Torres
    whether she had already filed a stolen vehicle report; she
    indicated that she had not. The officers also confirmed that there
    were no pending reports of a stolen ’98 Toyota Camry.
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    J-S33013-21
    [While] the officers were interviewing Ms. Torres, her cell phone
    was “repeatedly ringing” as the contact name “Ernesto” and a
    photo of Appellant displayed on the screen.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/20, at 3-7 (cleaned up).     Thereafter, Ms. Torres
    admitted that Appellant, who was her child’s father, had asked her to report
    her car as being stolen.   She provided officers with Appellant’s name and
    advised them that he regularly used the car.
    Following her release from the hospital, J.S. picked Appellant as the
    shooter from a photographic line-up prepared by police.        See N.T. Trial,
    2/15/18, at 49-50, 112.    J.S. also identified an individual named Thomas
    Bradley as “running away” from the scene of the shooting. Id. at 88-89, 120.
    Several items belonging to Bradley were also found in Ms. Torres’s vehicle.
    On April 11, 2017, Appellant was arrested in connection with these
    events. At all three docket numbers, he was charged with one count each of
    attempted murder, aggravated assault, simple assault, and recklessly
    endangering another person (“REAP”). At Docket 4095, Appellant was also
    charged with possession of firearms prohibited, firearms not to be carried
    without a license, and carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia. The three
    dockets were joined for trial. J.S. testified and identified him as the shooter
    at multiple junctures. See N.T. Trial, 2/15/18, at 40, 76, 95. In relevant
    part, Appellant argued that the shooting was perpetrated by Bradley.
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    J-S33013-21
    Ultimately, a jury found Appellant guilty of the above-noted offenses. On April
    23, 2018, he was sentenced to the above-noted sentences.1
    Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the sufficiency
    of the evidence, the weight of the evidence, and the discretionary aspects of
    his sentence.     The motion was denied by operation of law.       Although no
    immediate direct appeal was filed, Appellant filed a timely pro se petition
    ____________________________________________
    1  During Appellant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court stated its intent to
    sentence him to fifteen and one-half to thirty-one years of incarceration for
    each count of attempted murder and a concurrent term of ten to twenty years
    of incarceration for each count of aggravated assault at Dockets 4094 and
    4095. These terms of incarceration were ordered to run concurrently. Also
    at Docket 4095, Appellant was further sentenced to seven years of probation
    for possessing a prohibited firearm. At Docket 4906, Appellant was sentenced
    to fifteen and one-half to thirty-one years of incarceration for attempted
    murder and seven years of probation for aggravated assault. These penalties
    were ordered to run consecutively to those imposed at Dockets 4094 and
    4095. See N.T. Sentencing, 4/23/18, at 11-12. Thus, the trial court
    manifested an intent to sentence Appellant to an aggregate term of thirty-one
    to sixty-two years of incarceration, followed by fourteen years of probation.
    However, the sentencing orders entered by the trial court differed from
    the hearing transcript. With respect to the attempted murder counts at
    Dockets 4094 and 4095, the trial court set Appellant’s sentence at fifteen and
    one-half to thirty-one and one-half years. Moreover, the order at Docket
    4096 provided that the seven-year period of probation would run concurrently,
    not consecutively, to the period of probation at Docket 4095. Neither the
    parties nor the trial court have addressed these discrepancies.             “In
    Pennsylvania, the text of the sentencing order, and not the statements a trial
    court makes about a defendant's sentence, is determinative of the court's
    sentencing intentions and the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v.
    Borrin, 
    80 A.3d 1219
    , 1226 (Pa. 2013); see also Commonwealth v.
    Quinlan, 
    639 A.2d 1235
    , 1239 (Pa.Super. 1994) (“Oral statements made by
    the judge in passing sentence, but not incorporated in the written sentence
    signed by [the sentencing judge], are not part of the judgment of sentence.”
    (emphasis added)). Thus, Appellant’s criminal sentence is as set forth in the
    sentencing orders.
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    J-S33013-21
    pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) seeking restoration of his
    right to appeal.       Following the appointment of counsel, the trial court
    reinstated Appellant’s direct appellate rights nunc pro tunc.         Thereafter,
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal at each of the above-captioned docket
    numbers.     Both he and the trial court have complied with their respective
    obligations pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2         On April 23, 2020, this Court
    consolidated these appeals sua sponte.
    ____________________________________________
    2   The trial court directed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on August 27, 2019. Appellant’s trial counsel
    sought an extension of time to file, which was granted. On November 6, 2019,
    Appellant’s trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw advising the trial court that
    Appellant had indicated a wish “to proceed pro se with the direct appeal of his
    case” and requesting that the court hold a hearing pursuant to
    Commonwealth v. Grazier, 
    713 A.2d 81
     (Pa. 1998). See Motion to
    Withdraw, 11/6/19, at ¶¶ 4-6. The trial court did not immediately respond to
    this filing. In the interim, trial counsel filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on
    Appellant’s behalf to avoid waiver, which raised the same issues Appellant has
    raised in his brief to this Court. The trial court did not file a responsive Rule
    1925(a) opinion at that time.
    In response to a subsequent application filed by trial counsel, this Court
    remanded the case for a Grazier hearing. However, the COVID-19 pandemic
    caused the hearing to be rescheduled several times until it was held on
    February 5, 2021. Ultimately, the trial court granted Appellant’s request to
    proceed pro se. Thereafter, Appellant pro se filed a pro se Rule 1925(b)
    raising claims for relief that were different than those raised by trial counsel.
    See Pro Se Rule 1925(b) Statement, 2/19/21. Several weeks later, Appellant
    filed a motion in the trial court to withdraw his request for self-representation
    and seeking the re-appointment of trial counsel. See Motion to Withdraw
    Request for Self-Representation, 5/13/21, at ¶ 1. Additionally, Appellant
    disclaimed the additional issues that he had sought to raise in his pro se Rule
    1925(b) statement. Id. at ¶ 2 (“Petitioner also recognizes the issues he
    wishes to raise for relief would be best served during PCRA proceedings[.]”).
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    J-S33013-21
    Appellant has raised the following issues for our consideration:
    I. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions
    where the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth was, at most, equally consistent with Appellant’s
    innocence as with his guilt and, therefore, pursuant to the
    “equipoise doctrine,” insufficient as a matter of law?
    II. Was the verdict also contrary to the clear weight of the
    evidence such as to shock one’s sense of justice where the only
    evidence implicating Appellant was the inconsistent and inherently
    contradictory testimony of a witness who could not describe him
    and was confused about basic details of the crime?
    III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant
    to an aggregate sentence of 31 ½ to 62 years of incarceration
    where the court failed to consider any individualized sentencing
    ____________________________________________
    Although the trial court did not explicitly grant Appellant’s pro se motion,
    private replacement counsel entered her appearance on Appellant’s behalf.
    Shortly thereafter, the trial court sent a letter to this Court seeking guidance
    regarding the issues raised in Appellant’s pro se Rule 1925(b) statement. See
    Letter, 4/5/21, at 2 (unpaginated) (“[I]s this court required to file a Rule
    1925(a) opinion addressing Appellant’s February 19[, 2021] statement of
    errors complained of on appeal?”). This Court responded by letter and advised
    the trial court that “no action” was required.             Letter, 4/6/21, at 1
    (unpaginated). In its letter, the trial court also noted that replacement
    counsel had filed a motion seeking leave to amend Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)
    statement on March 22, 2021. Neither this filing nor an order granting leave
    to amend appears in the certified record.
    To the extent Appellant sought to amend his Rule 1925(b) statement
    with his pro se filing, he was unsuccessful due to his failure to seek to do so.
    See Commonwealth v. Woods, 
    909 A.2d 372
    , 378 (Pa.Super. 2006). With
    respect to the March 22, 2021 motion from replacement counsel, we may not
    speculate as to matters that are de hors the certified record. See Pa.R.A.P.
    1921. Even assuming, arguendo, a colorable request to amend under Rule
    1925 was made, it was not granted, and Appellant has not raised any claim
    for relief in this Court. Furthermore, Appellant has not raised any arguments
    concerning these procedural irregularities in his brief. Thus, we will confine
    our review to the issues discussed in Appellant’s brief and preserved in his
    initial, timely Rule 1925(b) statement.
    -7-
    J-S33013-21
    factors and provided no rationale whatsoever for imposing such a
    lengthy sentence?
    Appellant’s brief at 5 (cleaned up).
    Appellant’s first claim challenges the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s
    evidence. The standard and scope of our review is well-established:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
    is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
    most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
    to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
    a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not
    weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
    finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
    established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt
    may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
    and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
    be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
    may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
    evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
    must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
    considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
    credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
    is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Ventura, 
    975 A.2d 1128
    , 1142 (Pa.Super. 2009)
    (cleaned up).
    “In addition to proving the statutory elements of the crimes charged
    beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth must also establish the
    identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes.” Commonwealth
    v. Strafford, 
    194 A.3d 168
    , 175 (Pa.Super. 2018).               “‘Evidence of
    identification need not be positive and certain to sustain a conviction.’” 
    Id.
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Orr, 
    38 A.3d 868
    , 874 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en
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    banc)). Furthermore, “‘any indefiniteness and uncertainty in the identification
    testimony goes to its weight. Direct evidence of identity is, of course, not
    necessary and a defendant may be convicted solely on circumstantial
    evidence.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Commonwealth v. Hickman, 
    309 A.2d 564
    , 566
    (Pa. 1973)).
    Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth did not sufficiently establish
    that he was the shooter on the day in question.         However, J.S. positively
    identified him as the shooter before and, critically, during Appellant’s trial.
    See N.T. Trial, 2/15/18, at 40, 76. This testimony, alone, provides a sufficient
    basis to establish his identity as the perpetrator. See Commonwealth v.
    Duncan, 
    373 A.2d 1051
    , 1053-54 (Pa. 1977) (testimony of a single
    eyewitness sufficient to support conviction for third-degree murder);
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    180 A.3d 474
    , 478 (Pa.Super. 2018) (“A
    victim's in-court testimony, identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of a
    crime, is by itself sufficient to establish the identity element of that crime.”).
    Appellant has also invoked the “equipoise principle,” which states that
    “[w]hen two equally reasonable and mutually inconsistent inferences can be
    drawn from the same set of circumstances, a jury must not be permitted to
    guess which inference it will adopt, especially when one of the two guesses
    may result in depriving a defendant of his life or his liberty.” Commonwealth
    v. Woong Knee New, 
    47 A.2d 450
    , 468 (Pa. 1946). This doctrine addresses
    the “rare situation” where “the entirety of the evidence adduced at trial,
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    J-S33013-21
    viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, yields competing
    ultimate inferences equally consistent with the defendant’s innocence as with
    his guilt, thereby rendering the factfinder’s guilty verdict the product of
    surmise or conjecture.” In Interest of J.B., 
    189 A.3d 390
    , 412 (Pa. 2018).
    As noted above, Appellant argued at trial that the shooting was
    perpetrated by Bradley. However, the only evidence speaking to his identity
    as the shooter was an anonymous 911 caller who reported hearing from other
    unnamed, third parties that the shooting was perpetrated by someone named
    “Thomas.”      See N.T. Trial, 2/16/18, at 188.       Viewing this evidence in
    combination with Bradley’s presence at the scene of the shooting and the
    discovery of his belongings in Ms. Torres’s vehicle, Appellant argues that the
    Commonwealth’s evidence is in “equipoise” regarding Appellant’s identity as
    the shooter in this case.3 We disagree.
    While it may be a sheer possibility that Bradley was the shooter on the
    day in question, we reject Appellant’s position that this potentiality was
    equally consistent with Appellant’s guilt.         As noted above, Appellant’s
    identification as the shooter by an eyewitness was sufficient to sustain his
    ____________________________________________
    3 Appellant’s argument on this point largely disparages the credibility of the
    Commonwealth’s eyewitness identification evidence. Any “[v]ariances in
    testimony . . . go to the credibility of the witnesses and not the sufficiency of
    the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    180 A.3d 474
    , 478 (2018).
    Thus, to the extent that Appellant seeks to challenge the believability of J.S.’s
    testimony identifying Appellant as the shooter, such an argument is properly
    addressed to the weight of the evidence.
    - 10 -
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    guilt. See Duncan, supra at 1053-54; Johnson, supra at 478. There is no
    competing eyewitness testimony indicating that Bradley was the shooter and
    we do not believe that an anonymous tip providing one-half of Bradley’s name
    creates an equal probability that he was the shooter. See Commonwealth
    v. Brown, 
    996 A.2d 473
    , 477 (Pa. 2010) (“[W]e have recognized a known
    informant is far less likely to produce false information.”). We also emphasize
    that “the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
    preclude every possibility of innocence.” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 
    109 A.3d 711
    , 716 (Pa. Super. 2015). Thus, we find no merit in Appellant’s claim.
    Appellant’s second claim challenges the weight of the Commonwealth
    by disparaging the credibility of J.S.’s identification. Specifically, Appellant
    asserts that J.S.’s testimony conflicted with the initial description she provided
    to detectives in the immediate aftermath of the shooting. See Appellant’s
    brief at 29-31. The legal principles governing our review are well-established:
    The law pertaining to weight of the evidence claims is well-settled.
    The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder
    of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
    and to determine the credibility of witnesses. A new trial is not
    warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and must
    have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the credibility
    of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine
    that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of
    greater weight than to ignore them or to give them equal weight
    with all the facts is to deny justice.
    On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to
    whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury
    verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a
    weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of
    discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the
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    verdict is against the weight of the evidence. An appellate court
    may not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence
    as to shock one’s sense of justice.
    Gonzalez, supra at 723 (cleaned up).
    Appellant has complied with Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)(2) by filing a post-
    sentence motion raising a weight challenge.       See Post-Sentence Motion,
    4/30/18, at ¶ 4 (“[Appellant] believes that the verdict is against the weight of
    the evidence.”). His claim was denied by operation of law and no specific
    issue concerning the weight of the Commonwealth’s evidence was ever
    discussed. In his Rule 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal, Appellant averred only that the trial court “erred and unfairly
    prejudiced [Appellant] when the [trial court] denied the post-sentence
    [m]otion, because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.”
    Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/3/19, at ¶ 2. Appellant offered no
    specific allegations identifying the basis of his argument concerning the weight
    of the Commonwealth’s evidence. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court
    concluded Appellant had waived this issue due to the vagueness of his Rule
    1925(b) statement. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/20, at 8 n.6 (“Although
    Appellant properly preserved his challenge to the weight of the evidence in a
    post-sentence motion, the issue is waived nonetheless, as he failed to properly
    frame the issue for appellate review.”). We agree.
    This Court has previously held that a defendant who neglects to offer
    specific reasons as to why his verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence
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    in his Rule 1925(b) statement waives the argument. See Commonwealth
    v. Freeman, 
    128 A.3d 1231
    , 1248-49 (Pa.Super. 2015) (“[A concise
    statement] which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised
    on appeal is the functional equivalent of not [concise statement] at all.”);
    Commonwealth v. Seibert, 
    799 A.2d 54
    , 62 (Pa.Super. 2002) (“When an
    appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought to
    be pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its preparation of a legal
    analysis which is pertinent to those issues.”). Here, Appellant offered nothing
    more than a bald allegation challenging the weight of the evidence, which
    impeded the trial court’s review of the claim. Thus, it is waived.
    Appellant’s third claim concerns the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence, wherein he asserts that the trial court “imposed a sentence without
    consideration of all relevant factors and without explaining its rationale for the
    imposition of the sentence[.]” Appellant’s brief at 34; see Commonwealth
    v. Fowler, 
    930 A.2d 586
    , 593 (Pa.Super. 2007) (holding that a claim that the
    sentencing court considered improper factors and failed to state its reasons
    for sentencing in open court is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
    sentencing). Specifically, Appellant asserts that the trial court “impermissibly
    relied solely on the seriousness of the crime while failing to take into account
    any individualized assessment of his needs or any other relevant sentencing
    factor[.]” Appellant’s brief at 34.
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    J-S33013-21
    We note that “[a]n appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges
    to the discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an appellant
    challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s
    jurisdiction.”     Commonwealth v. Samuel, 
    102 A.3d 1001
    , 1006-07
    (Pa.Super. 2014). In determining whether Appellant has secured this Court’s
    jurisdiction, we consider whether: (1) Appellant has filed a timely notice of
    appeal; (2) the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
    reconsider and modify sentence; (3) the brief includes a “concise statement
    of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
    discretionary aspects of a sentence” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4)
    Appellant has presented a “substantial question” that the sentence is not
    appropriate under the Sentencing Code. 
    Id.
    Appellant has complied with the first two of these requirements by filing
    a timely notice of appeal and preserving his claim in a post-sentence motion.
    See Post-Sentence Motion, 4/30/18, at ¶ 5.        Furthermore, Appellant has
    appended a Rule 2119(f) statement to his brief as required by Pennsylvania
    law. See Appellant’s brief at 33. Thus, we will review the contents of the
    Rule 2119(f) statement to discern whether Appellant has raised a substantial
    question.        See Commonwealth v. Provenzano, 
    50 A.3d 148
    , 154
    (Pa.Super. 2012) (“[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of questions
    presented and the prefatory [Rule] 2119(f) statement to determine whether
    a substantial question exists.”).
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    J-S33013-21
    Appellant’s argument is straightforward and alleges that the trial court
    “relied solely on the seriousness of [A]pellant’s crime in imposing an unduly
    harsh sentence without considering any individualized sentencing factors or
    providing an explanation for the imposition of a lengthy sentence.” Appellant’s
    brief at 33. This Court has previously held that a defendant does “raise a
    substantial question by alleging that the sentencing court did not sufficiently
    state its reasons for the sentence.” Commonwealth v. McNabb, 
    819 A.2d 54
    , 56 (Pa.Super. 2003).       Furthermore, “[h]e also raises a substantial
    question by alleging his sentence is excessive due to the trial court’ s reliance
    on impermissible factors.” 
    Id.
     Thus, we will address the merits of Appellant’s
    challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
    Our standard of review in this context is as follows:
    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
    absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
    of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
    the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
    sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercises its
    judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
    arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
    A sentencing judge has broad discretion in determining a
    reasonable penalty, and appellate courts afford the sentencing
    court great deference, as it is the sentencing court that is in the
    best position to view the defendant’s character, displays of
    remorse, defiance, or indifference, and the overall effect and
    nature of the crime. When imposing a sentence, the sentencing
    court must consider “the protection of the public, the gravity of
    the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and
    on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). As we have stated, [a] court is required to
    consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the
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    character of the defendant. In particular, the sentencing court
    should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, his age,
    personal characteristics, and his potential for rehabilitation.
    ....
    Our Supreme Court has determined that where the trial court is
    informed by a [presentence investigation report (“PSI”)], it is
    presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing
    factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so
    informed, its discretion should not be disturbed. The sentencing
    judge can satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing
    sentencing be placed on the record by indicating that he or she
    has been informed by the [PSI]; thus properly considering and
    weighing all relevant factors.
    Commonwealth v. Edwards, 
    194 A.3d 625
    , 637-38 (Pa.Super. 2018)
    (cleaned up).
    A sentencing court is also statutorily required to disclose in open court
    the reasons for the sentences imposed. See 42 Pa.C.S § 9721(b) (“In every
    case in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, . . .
    the court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the
    time of sentencing, a statement of the reasons for the sentence imposed.”).
    However, “[t]he court is not required to parrot the words of the Sentencing
    Code, stating every factor that must be considered under Section 9712(b)[.]”
    Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d 736
    , 761 (Pa.Super. 2014). Rather,
    the trial court “can satisfy this disclosure requirement by indicating, on the
    record, that he has been informed by a [PSI].” Commonwealth v. Egan,
    
    679 A.2d 237
    , 239 (Pa.Super. 1996)
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    J-S33013-21
    A PSI was generated and considered by the trial court.            See N.T.
    Sentencing, 4/23/18, at 14 (“And, again, this sentence does take into
    consideration the reports that were generated.”). Therefore, we presume the
    trial court was fully informed of the relevant circumstances and conclude that
    the trial court’s duty to disclose during Appellant’s sentencing has been
    fulfilled. Egan, supra at 239. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court
    justified the sentence imposed, as follows:
    In the case at bar, the nature of Appellant’s crimes [were]
    extraordinarily violent and demands a sentence that is significant
    both as a deterrent and as a punishment. On August 30, 2016,
    Appellant indiscriminately fired twenty-three bullets into a
    crowded residential street. His use of two different firearms—
    including a military-grade assault rifle and a Glock with an
    extended clip—reflect a specific intent to inflict extreme pain,
    suffering, and death. Appellant’s lack of provocation and the
    indifference with which he targeted dozens of random bystanders
    demonstrate that he [is] an absolute danger to society. Moreover,
    the stunning fact that he only managed to shoot three people and
    that none of his victims died is nothing short of a miracle. Had
    Appellant aimed differently or had the people on [the street] been
    in slightly different locations, this incident could have easily
    resulted in [the] deaths of several innocent people.
    Additionally, Appellant’s actions will have a severe,
    permanent impact on Mr. Baker, Mr. Foster, J.S. As a result of
    Appellant’s actions, Mr. Baker lost vision in his left eye. Mr. Foster
    was shot four times in his left leg; his injuries were so severe that
    fragments of his broken bones were scattered in the back of the
    police vehicle as he was being transported to the hospital. He
    required extensive treatments and surgeries which spanned the
    course of thirty days, and as a result of his injuries, he can longer
    run, jump, or participate in any weight-bearing activities. J.S.,
    who was only twelve years old at the time, was shot in her right
    thigh. As a result of her injuries, she lost her spot on her track
    team and can no longer run or play basketball as well as she used
    to. Further, each victim will undoubtedly continue to suffer
    psychological trauma from the incident. . . .
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    J-S33013-21
    Appellant’s sentence also accounts for his history,
    characteristics, and this court’s observations of Appellant—which
    includes this court’s thorough review of his [PSI]. . . . Additionally,
    Appellant’s sentence is consistent with his rehabilitative needs, as
    this court order him to undergo drug treatment, mental health
    treatment, job training, and anger management.
    Finally, in fashioning its sentence, this court considered the
    guidelines put forth by the Pennsylvania Commission on
    Sentencing and imposed a sentence that was squarely within the
    guidelines’ standard range.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/21, at 15-16 (cleaned up). We discern no abuse of
    discretion in the trial court’s reasoning. Thus, no relief is due.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/13/2022
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