State Troopers Fraternal Assoc v. State of New Jersey , 585 F. App'x 828 ( 2014 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 13-4822
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STATE TROOPERS FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY, INC.,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
SUPERINTENDENT NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 3-13-cv-01065)
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 12, 2014
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 15, 2014)
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OPINION
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
The State Troopers Fraternal Association of New Jersey (STFA) appeals the denial
of its request to enjoin an internal investigation of its president, New Jersey State Trooper
Christopher Burgos. Because the District Court correctly found that the union cannot
succeed on the merits of its claim, we will affirm.
I
Christopher Burgos is a New Jersey state trooper and the elected president of the
STFA, the union representing all New Jersey state troopers below the rank of sergeant. As
president, Burgos represents the union during labor negotiations and supports union
members facing internal discipline, regularly acting as a liaison between the State Police
Office of Professional Standards (OPS) and union members and their counsel.
In January 2013, Burgos was notified that he was the target of an internal
investigation involving an alleged leak of a confidential document. Specifically, OPS had
(apparently accidentally) emailed attorney Katherine Hartman, who represented troopers
in matters before OPS, a copy of a report containing the preliminary findings of an
internal investigation involving a union member. Hartman, in turn, forwarded the
document to Burgos to review in his role as union president—a task Burgos claims he
routinely performed with similar files. Burgos then sent the document to the attorneys
representing the two troopers discussed in the report.
OPS ordered Burgos to submit to an interview as part of the investigation or face
possible dismissal or suspension. In response, the STFA filed a complaint in U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey seeking to enjoin the State from investigating Burgos
in either an administrative or criminal capacity. Following a hearing on February 22,
2
2013, the District Court denied the STFA’s request for an injunction, but told the union it
could return for further review if the interview gave rise to First Amendment concerns.
At the interview, Burgos was told he was being investigated for violating two State
Police rules and regulations, including one prohibiting “unauthorized release of
information.” He was questioned about conversations he had with union attorneys and
other union executives and asked to turn over email conversations between himself and
his attorneys. He also learned in the interview that OPS was investigating him for “theft”
of the document.
About two months after the interview, on April 25, 2013, the STFA filed an
amended complaint that sought temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief to
block any further investigation of Burgos. The STFA claimed the investigation was
intended to harass the union for representing its members and to retaliate against it for
disclosing a document the state found embarrassing. The STFA also argued that the
investigation was chilling its president’s and members’ right to engage in protected First
Amendment association, and contended it would cause union members to avoid placing
their trust in the union president. In December 2013, some two months after a second
hearing, the District Court denied the STFA’s request, finding it had not satisfied the
applicable standard for a preliminary or permanent injunction. The OPS, meanwhile, has
continued to investigate Burgos. This appeal followed.
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II1
On appeal, the STFA argues that the District Court erred by failing to accept its
pleaded facts as true and by concluding it did not meet the requirements for injunctive
relief.
As stated, the District Court conducted two hearings. After the District Court
declined to grant temporary relief at the first hearing, the STFA filed an amended
complaint that continued to seek “temporary, preliminary, and permanent” injunctive
relief. At the second hearing, in October, counsel for the State sought clarification that
only the request for permanent injunctive relief remained at issue. Counsel for the STFA
seemed to ratify this understanding. See Tr. at 33 (SA 33). Nevertheless, because the
District Court’s opinion and order addressed all forms of injunctive relief, we will do so
as well.
Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy” and appropriate only in
limited circumstances. Kos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d
Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “A party seeking a
preliminary injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will
suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will
not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the public interest
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4
favors such relief.” Id. “The burden lies with the plaintiff to establish every element in its
favor.” P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428
F.3d 504, 508 (3d Cir. 2005). A permanent injunction requires actual success on the
merits. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 482 (3d Cir. 2001). “In deciding whether a
permanent injunction should be issued, the court must determine if the plaintiff has
actually succeeded on the merits” and, “[i]f so, the court must then consider the
appropriate remedy.” ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84
F.3d 1471, 1477 n.3 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
We review a district court’s grant or denial of an injunction for abuse of discretion.
NAACP v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011). “An
abuse of discretion occurs when the District Court’s conclusion rests upon a clearly
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law
to fact.” Id. at 475–76 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We do not
interfere with a district court’s discretionary judgments, unless it clearly erred in weighing
the relevant factors and reaching a conclusion.” Id. at 476.
III
The STFA first argues that the District Court failed to accept the facts as it pleaded
them. Specifically, the union contends that the District Court accepted the State’s
“assumption . . . that Burgos’ actions in forwarding discovery that he receives in the
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ordinary course of business was somehow unauthorized” and that “the document [at
issue] is a confidential document . . . not routinely disclosed until the final disposition of
an individual case.” STFA Br. 19. Contrary to the STFA’s argument, the District Court’s
role is not to adjudicate the merits of the underlying dispute—i.e., whether Burgos
violated department policy. Rather, the District Court must determine whether the First
Amendment precludes an internal investigation into the alleged violation from even
proceeding. In other words, what matters for purposes of analyzing the injunction request
is not whether Burgos’s actions were actually unauthorized or whether the document was
actually confidential, but that the State has some basis to believe those things and wants to
investigate. And regardless of whether Burgos is actually culpable of any misconduct, it is
clear that the state is investigating him for that reason.
IV
The STFA also claims the District Court erred in determining that the union
“failed to demonstrate actual success on the merits of its First Amendment claim of
‘expressive association.’” STFA Br. 1. In its brief, the union argues that “the STFA and
the STFA president’s union activities are privileged activities protected by the First
Amendment from coerced disclosure” and, further, that “[t]he First Amendment is
violated when a union is compelled to reveal nonpublic, internal communications.” STFA
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Br. 26. This is an inaccurate statement of the law.2
The Supreme Court recognizes “‘a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the
redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion . . . as an indispensable means of
preserving other individual liberties.’” Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity v. University of
Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 617–18 (1984). “Thus, there is no constitutional right to associate for a purpose that
is not protected by the First Amendment.” Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Community Affairs
of N.J., 919 F.2d 183, 199 (3d Cir. 1990). “Intrusion into the internal structure or affairs
of an association,” like a “regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not
desire,” is one type of government action that may unconstitutionally burden the freedom
of association. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
In Dale, the Supreme Court analyzed the Boy Scouts’ expressive association claim
using a three-step test. Pi Lambda Phi, 229 F.3d at 442 (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 648, 650,
657–58). The Court considered whether the group engaged in expressive association, then
analyzed “whether the state action at issue significantly affected the group’s ability to
advocate its viewpoints.” Id. (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 648, 650). “Finally, it weighed the
2
Similarly, the STFA’s reliance in the First Amendment portion of its brief on
cases involving statutory protection for union activity is misplaced.
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state’s interest implicated in its action against the burden imposed on the associational
expression to determine if the state interest justified the burden.” Id. (citing Dale, 530
U.S. at 657–58). Here, assuming that the STFA engages in expressive association, it still
cannot show that the internal investigation of Trooper Burgos infringes that right.
“The second step in the Dale analysis involves determining whether the state
action at issue significantly affected the group’s ability to advocate its viewpoints.” Id. at
445. Here again, there is no indication that the State’s investigation of Burgos has
significantly affected the STFA’s ability to engage in protected expressive activity, or will
have a chilling effect thereon. Although the STFA cites in its brief the foundational
expressive association case NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), it
does not explain how the investigation of Trooper Burgos is a burden on the union’s right
to association even remotely akin to the state of Alabama’s attempts to force the NAACP
to disclose its membership list in the midst of the civil rights movement.
Moreover, Burgos’s status as union president does not exempt him from
compliance with State Police rules and regulations. See Pi Lambda Phi, 229 F.3d at 445(holding that a university was well within its power to discipline a fraternity for rules
violations in a way that “directly restrict[ed] a group’s non-expressive activity, even when
those actions would have an indirect effect on expressive activity . . . without a
constitutional violation of associational rights.”). As the District Court noted, Trooper
Burgos may not be the most culpable person involved in the release of the document, but
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the possibility that an investigation may be misguided does not make it violative of the
First Amendment.
The STFA failed to show either a likelihood of success or actual success on the
merits of its First Amendment claim. Consequently, injunctive relief was unwarranted,
and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying it. Accordingly, we will
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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