United States v. Francisco Alfaro , 539 F. App'x 61 ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-1893
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
FRANCISCO ALFARO
aka Robby Vazquez
Francisco Alfaro,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 11-cr-00835-001 )
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 8, 2013
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Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG, and BARRY Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 30, 2013 )
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, Francisco Alfaro challenges the reasonableness and procedural
soundness of a two-year term of supervised release the District Court imposed as part of
Alfaro’s sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
On December 7, 2011, Alfaro, a citizen of Costa Rica, pleaded guilty to willfully
and knowingly making a false statement in a passport application in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1542 in the District of New Jersey. On March 12, 2012, Alfaro was sentenced to
time-served, which totaled around twenty months, though the guidelines range was only
one to seven months.
The court also imposed a term of two years of supervised release and a special
condition as part of that supervised release term: that Alfaro cooperate with U.S.
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). As part of this condition, the District
Court required that, “[i]f deported, [Alfaro] shall not re-enter the United States without
written permission of the Attorney General. If [Alfaro] re-enter[s] the United States, [he
is to] report in person to the nearest U.S. Probation Office within 48 hours.” App. at 8.
The Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), prepared by the U.S. Probation Office, stated
that the “the Court may impose a term of supervised release of not more than 3 years. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2)” and that “[t]he guideline range for a term of supervised release is at
least 1 but not more than 3 years, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(b). Supervised release is
required if the Court imposes a term of imprisonment of more than one year, unless a
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departure is granted in accordance with the Application Notes of U.S.S.G. §§ 5D1.1 and
5D1.2.” The PSR did not mention U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) which provides that “[t]he court
ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release in a case in which supervised
release is not required by statute and the defendant is a deportable alien who likely will
be deported after imprisonment.” Application Note 5 further explains the import of this
subsection:
In a case in which the defendant is a deportable alien specified in
subsection (c) and supervised release is not required by statute, the court
ordinarily should not impose a term of supervised release. Unless such a
defendant legally returns to the United States, supervised release is
unnecessary. If such a defendant illegally returns to the United States, the
need to afford adequate deterrence and protect the public ordinarily is
adequately served by a new prosecution. The court should, however,
consider imposing a term of supervised release on such a defendant if the
court determines it would provide an added measure of deterrence and
protection based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1, cmt. n. 5. At sentencing no one discussed U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c).
The District Court gave the following explanation for the sentence it imposed:
I did … read the presentence report and certainly understand where Mr.
Alfaro falls under the Sentencing Guidelines. I also understand that I’m not
bound by the Guidelines, and I have used them only in an advisory
capacity. But the sentence that I impose is one I feel is appropriate within
my discretion. He has a criminal history category of 2, and he has a total
offense level of 6. I would note that under the 3553(a) factors, a sentence
that should be imposed is one that in fact promotes respect for the law and
also provides just punishment for the activity engaged in by Mr. Alfaro, and
hopefully deter[s] not only Mr. Alfaro, but others that are contemplating
engaging in activity of this nature, specifically reentering this country when
they have in fact—they are not a citizen here.
In addition to that, I’m satisfied that the sentence I impose will be one
which does not create any unwarranted sentencing disparities, but will be
keeping with what is appropriate under all of the circumstances. [App. at
56.]
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Before imposing sentence, the District Court questioned the parties regarding
whether an ICE detainer had already been lodged against Alfaro, and when it was
determined that the answer to this question was not clear, the District Court held Alfaro
for an additional 24 hours so that ICE could handle administrative issues. Alfaro did not
take exception to any portion of the PSR nor did Alfaro make any objections at the
sentencing hearing.
After sentencing, Alfaro filed a pro se notice of appeal, and on September 25,
2012, he was removed to Costa Rica.
II.
Before addressing the merits, the Court must address the government’s argument
that this case is now moot given Alfaro’s removal to Costa Rica, as this question
implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case.1 See United States v.
Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We are required to confront a question about
our jurisdiction before we can proceed to the [merits of appellant’s claim].”); see also
United States v. Huff, 703 F.3d 609, 611 (3d Cir. 2013).
We ordinarily presume that a defendant who is serving a term of supervised
release has a live “case or controversy” sufficient to a hear a challenge to the imposition
of the supervised release term. See United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir.
2008). The question here, however, is whether Alfaro’s removal to Costa Rica mooted his
1
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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appeal given that many of the practical restraints of supervised release no longer apply to
him. The United States, as the party “arguing that [the] case is moot[,] must bear a heavy
burden of demonstrating the facts underlying that contention.” In re Price, 370 F.3d 362,
366 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the government simply
argues that Alfaro “would only be affected by the terms of [his] supervised release if he
illegally returns to this country before the expiration of his supervised release in March
2014.” Gov’t Br. at 9 (emphasis added). Even if we were to agree with the government’s
legal premise, the government has not described the facts that would make it unlikely that
Alfaro could obtain permission to reenter the U.S. legally before the end of his release
term. In short, the government has failed to meet its burden that the case is moot. Thus
we conclude that this Court has jurisdiction to hear Alfaro’s appeal.
III.
Satisfied that we have jurisdiction, we now turn to the merits of Alfaro’s appeal.
The government argues that plain error review applies because at no point did Alfaro
object to either the PSR recommending a supervised release term of one to three years or
the imposition of the supervised release term at his sentencing. The sentencing record
confirms that Alfaro raised no objections, and the government is indeed correct that plain
error review therefore applies. United States v. Berger, 689 F.3d 297, 299 (3d Cir. 2012).
Under this standard, “[w]e may … set aside [Alfaro’s] sentence only if: (1) the District
Court erred; (2) the court’s error was clear or obvious; (3) [Alfaro] can show that the
error affected his substantial rights, i.e., that it prejudiced him; and (4) not correcting the
error would seriously impair the fairness, integrity, or reputation of a judicial
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proceeding.” United States v. Reynoso, 254 F.3d 467, 469 (3d Cir. 2001); see also
Berger, 689 F.3d at 299 (quoting same).
Our review of whether a District Court erred in imposing a sentence upon a
criminal defendant is twofold. First, we consider whether the sentencing court committed
any procedural errors “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Second, if the District Court
committed no procedural error, we consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness. A
sentence is substantively unreasonable only if “no reasonable sentencing court would
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district
court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.
Alfaro objects to the procedures used by the District Court in exercising its
discretion. Sentencing courts shall consider “the factors set forth in [§] 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)” in determining whether to
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impose a term of supervised release and its length. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c).2 Alfaro argues
that the District Court failed to address the § 3553(a) factors when it imposed a term of
supervised release. We agree with Alfaro only in part. The record below contains no
mention of U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c), which disfavors the use of supervised release for
defendants who are likely to be removed after serving a term of imprisonment.
We need not decide whether there was an error because Alfaro failed to bring this
potential error to the District Court’s attention at any point, and he cannot satisfy his
burden to show that it was clear or obvious, that it prejudiced him, and that failing to
correct the error would “impair the fairness, integrity, or reputation of a judicial
proceeding.” Reynoso, 254 F.3d at 469. Because the District Court was within its right to
impose a term of supervised release under § 5D1.1, any potential error was not plain. See
United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 107 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding “there was no plain
error because the 5-year supervised release term was clearly within the range that the
court was authorized to impose” even though the district court erroneously thought there
was a five-year, rather than three-year, minimum of supervised release); see contra,
United States v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110, 118 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Having decided today that the
tolling of Cole’s period of supervised release during his time of exclusion from the
United States was unlawful [and prejudiced him], we would be casting doubt on the
2
Section 3553(a)(1) refers to “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant”, (a)(2) refers to “the need for the sentence imposed … (B) to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”, (a)(4) refers to the
applicable guidelines range, (a)(5) refers to any pertinent policy statements issued by the
sentencing commission, and (a)(6) refers to the need to avoid sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(a)(2)(D),(a)(4)-(a)(6).
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fairness, integrity, and reputation of our proceedings if we were to allow tolling without
statutory authorization.”).
Having reviewed Alfaro’s remaining challenges to the substantive and procedural
reasonableness of his supervised release term under the legal frameworks set forth above,
we conclude these arguments are without merit.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence of supervised release imposed
by the District Court.
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