Carlos Hernandez v. United States , 608 F. App'x 105 ( 2015 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-1401
___________
CARLOS ZUNIGA HERNANDEZ,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-00647)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 12, 2015
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 2, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Carlos Zuniga Hernandez, a federal prisoner, filed suit against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). He alleged that correctional officers and
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
prison officials did not properly respond to his complaints of physical and sexual assault
by another inmate in January 2009, which led him to suffer injuries at that inmate’s hands
in a subsequent altercation. The United States sought summary judgment, asserting that
Zuniga Hernandez’s claims were barred by the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA.
The District Court, adopting a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation over
Zuniga Hernandez’s objections, granted the United States’ motion. Considering the facts
as presented by the United States as undisputed and assessing the applicability of the
discretionary function exception,1 the District Court concluded that Zuniga Hernandez’s
claims failed as a matter of law. The District Court entered judgment in favor of the
United States on October 2, 2013.
On October 17, 2013, Zuniga Hernandez filed a letter in which he asked that a
“supplemental declaration” that he had previously submitted “in an earnest attempt to fill
the void of evidence referred to by the magistrate judge,” and which crossed in the mail
with the District Court’s judgment, be accepted as a motion for reconsideration. Despite
Zuniga Hernandez’s reference to it, no “supplemental declaration” appears in the record.
1
Zuniga Hernandez twice sought an extension of time to file a response to the summary
judgment motion. On the granting of both requests, Zuniga Hernandez was directed to
file not only a brief but also a counterstatement of material facts to respond to the
statement of facts submitted by the United States. Zuniga Hernandez filed a brief, but he
did not file a counterstatement of material facts or any affidavit or declaration. In his
brief, he argued that the factual record submitted by the United States supported his
allegations that he reported sexual assaults on January 9, 2009, and January 14, 2009, and
that, given his reports, correctional officers and officials were without discretion
regarding their response under the regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 115.5, et seq. Zuniga
Hernandez also stated that the allegations in his complaint should be taken as true for
purposes of the summary judgment motion.
2
In December 2013, Zuniga Hernandez filed a motion “seeking affirmative relief
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)” and leave to present supplemental evidence. He asked the
District Court to vacate its ruling, arguing that the decision was based on a
“misapprehension of fact and incorrect application of law.” Citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h),
he further stated that the ruling ignored defendants’ obligations to exercise their duty of
care in response to reports of rape. He claimed that he was raped on January 9, 2009, and
January 13, 2009, and immediately reported the attacks, but correctional officers did not
undertake their required investigatory and enforcement duties (which led to the
altercation with the other inmate and his injuries). The United States opposed the motion
on the basis that Zuniga Hernandez had not shown any basis for reconsideration.
On January 28, 2014, the District Court denied the motion. The District Court
noted the accepted bases for relief under Rule 60(b) and concluded that Zuniga
Hernandez merely sought to relitigate the issues already addressed without presenting a
clear error of law. The District Court also rejected Zuniga Hernandez’s claim of a
“misapprehension of fact,” noting that Zuniga Hernandez failed to submit any evidence
in the summary judgment proceedings and did not put forth any evidence that was not
previously available to the District Court. On February 14, 2014, the District Court
received Zuniga Hernandez’s notice of appeal (dated February 5, 2014) from “the final
judgment of the District Court.”
Our first question is the scope of this appeal. The answer depends on the
timeliness of the filing of the notice of appeal, which turns in part on two subsidiary
questions, the significance of Zuniga Hernandez’s October letter and the nature and effect
3
of his December filing. The time limit of Rule 4(a)(1) for commencing an appeal is
mandatory and jurisdictional. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-14 (2007). A
notice of appeal in a civil case in which the United States is a party must be filed within
60 days of the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed. Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(B)(i). A timely motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure tolls the deadline, as does a motion for relief under Rule 60, if it is filed within
28 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(iv) & (v).
Zuniga Hernandez asks us to consider the letter that he filed in October 2013 as a
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), so that we would have a jurisdictional hook
to review the order denying summary judgment. However, that letter does not so much
seek reconsideration as ask the District Court to consider as a motion for reconsideration
a supplemental declaration that may have been put in the mail but that does not appear on
the docket. We cannot deem the October letter a Rule 59(e) motion.2
The next question concerns what type of motion Zuniga Hernandez filed in
December. A pro se pleading must be “judged by its substance rather than according to
its form or label.” See Lewis v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 878 F.2d 714, 722 n.20 (3d Cir.
1989). Zuniga Hernandez, in seeking an order to vacate the District Court’s judgment,
cited Rule 60(b)(6), requested leave to present supplemental and “new” evidence, and
2
Zuniga Hernandez also asks us to consider the letter as a notice of appeal, but we cannot
do so because the document does not evidence that Zuniga Hernandez had an intention to
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) (describing the required contents of a notice of appeal);
3d Cir. L.A.R. 3.4 (explaining that a document filed by a pro se litigant after a district
court’s decision will be deemed a notice of appeal despite an informal form or title “if it
evidences an intention to appeal”) (emphasis added).
4
also cited traditional bases for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) (essentially, errors of fact
and law resulting in manifest injustice).
As either a Rule 59(e) motion or a Rule 60 motion, Zuniga Hernandez’s
submission was not filed within the time periods that would afford him tolling under Rule
4(a)(4). Although we have not decided whether Rule 4(a)(4) is a jurisdictional rule or a
claims-processing rule, see Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 459 n.14 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing the matter and suggesting it is a claims-processing rule that should generally
be enforced sua sponte); Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446 n.18 (3d Cir.
2012), we need not decide the matter in this case where the United States argues that
Zuniga Hernandez’s appeal of the District Court’s order granting summary judgment was
untimely because the motion was untimely. See Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273,
280 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2010).
Zuniga Hernandez’s appeal is timely as to the order denying his Rule 59/60 hybrid
motion. We have jurisdiction over that decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Long, 670
F.3d at 446 n.19 (explaining that we have jurisdiction over a timely appeal of an order
ruling on an untimely motion for reconsideration); cf. Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr., Inc., 802
F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (explaining that “most post judgment orders
are final decisions within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as long as the district court has
completely disposed of the matter”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Our review of an order denying a motion for reconsideration is for abuse of
discretion, but, to the extent the denial is based on the interpretation and application of a
legal precept, review is plenary. See Koshatka v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329,
5
333 (3d Cir. 1985). Also, we generally review orders denying Rule 60(b) motions for
abuse of discretion. See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 & n.5 (3d Cir.
2008) (explaining also that we exercise plenary review over orders granting or denying
relief under Rule 60(b)(4)).
Zuniga Hernandez was not entitled to reconsideration based on information that
was previously available to him. “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to
correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco
Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Zuniga Hernandez asserted that he
was entitled to reconsideration because he had “supplemental evidence”; he also filed a
document entitled “affidavit in support,” as well as exhibits. However, a litigant may not
submit that evidence in support of a motion for reconsideration unless that evidence is
newly discovered. Id. His “affidavit” (although dated in December) and other evidence
did not constitute new evidence; all that he submitted (other than copies of decisions in
his case) was information that was available at the summary judgment stage. Because
Zuniga Hernandez did not put before the District Court material new evidence that could
not have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence, he was not entitled to
reopening under Rule 60(b), either. See Compass Tech., Inc. v. Tseng Labs, Inc., 71 F.3d
1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1995).
Zuniga Hernandez also claimed errors of law and fact. He asked the District Court
to reexamine the facts found by the Magistrate Judge, claiming that the report and
recommendation “ignor[ed] the com[m]ission of felony rape on two separate occasions
reported as crimes to the BOP.” The District Court did not abuse its discretion in
6
concluding there was no error in its fact-finding because Zuniga Hernandez had not
submitted evidence of rape or its report to controvert the United States’ version of the
facts. Under the circumstances of this case, the District Court permissibly relied on its
application of its Local Rule 56.1 to deem admitted the United States’ statement of the
facts. See Anchorage Assoc. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 174-76 (3d Cir.
1990) (considering a different local rule related to summary judgment proceedings and
explaining that local rules consistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of
Procedure are permitted); Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting,
inter alia, that pro se litigants must follow procedural rules). Zuniga Hernandez clearly
had warning and was told (more than once in light of the extensions of time) of his filing
obligations. He nonetheless did not file a statement of disputed facts or any evidence
with his response to the motion for summary judgment.3 Accordingly, the District Court
did not err in treating the facts as undisputed in its analysis of the merits of Zuniga
3
He instead sought to rely on the allegations in his complaint. Without further factual
details, in his complaint, Zuniga Hernandez stated that an inmate “sexually assaulted”
him on January 9, 2009, and January 13, 2009. He did not provide further facts about the
incidents. We note that the “allegations” he described in his motion for reconsideration
(regarding rape and its report) do not exist in his complaint. Although he used the term
rape in brief in response to the motion for summary judgment, he appeared to use it to
describe something that occurred after the sexual assaults (he stated that his case was
“about sexual abuse and assault, which was allowed through Defendant’s negligence to
blossom into rape,” and that if corrections officers had followed procedures after he
reported the two sexual assaults, he “would never have been raped and suffered other
physical injuries”). Regardless, in its undisputed statement of facts, the United States
described Zuniga Hernandez’s first report as one about unspecified problems with
another inmate and the second as a report of pressure for sex without physical contact or
threats from the other inmate.
7
Hernandez’s case. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
reconsideration based on a “misapprehension of facts.”
Zuniga Hernandez also sought reconsideration on the basis that the District Court
erred in applying the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. “Legal error,
without more, cannot justify granting a Rule 60(b) motion.” Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d
155, 158 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that a Rule 60(b) motion cannot substitute for an
appeal). But we consider the District Court’s legal analysis on summary judgment to
determine whether reconsideration was warranted. See Harsco Corp., 779 F.2d at 909.
To determine if the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applies, a court
must consider first whether the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment or
choice. Mitchell v. United States, 225 F.3d 361, 363 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). If a statute or a regulation prescribes a particular cause of
action for an employee to follow, then the first part of the test is not met. Id. If it is met,
a court is tasked to then determine whether the discretionary function exception was
designed to shield the type of judgment or choice at issue. Id. (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
The United States owes a duty of care to federal prisoners under 18 U.S.C. § 4042,
which states, in relevant part, that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) shall “provide for the
safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses
against the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 4042(a)(2). Other relevant regulations are 28
C.F.R. § 541.10(a) (relating to disciplinary action against inmates) and 28 C.F.R.
§ 541.22(a) (regarding placements in administrative segregation). For the reasons given
8
by the District Court (and in the authority cited by the District Court), the statute and
those regulations afford the BOP discretion in deciding how to best protect an inmate.
Furthermore, as the District Court and those authorities concluded, the judgment involved
in how best to protect one inmate from the threat of attack by another is the type of
judgment that the exception was designed to shield.
We must also note one additional policy, effective at the time of the incident,
which includes directions for prison officials in dealing with sexually abusive behavior.4
The policy, Program Statement “P5342.06, Sexually Abusive Behavior Prevention and
Intervention Program, effective 4/27/2005,” gave the operations lieutenant discretion in
safeguarding the inmate, but appears to have required 1) other staff members to report
sexually abusive behavior complaints to lieutenants, and 2) the lieutenants to make a
prompt referral to the prison psychology services and to notify to certain other prison
officials of a reported or suspected victim of sexually abusive behavior. We do not have
to resolve, however, whether the discretionary function exception is inapplicable to the
extent that P5342.06 specifically prescribed a course of action, including the notification
of the lieutenant and the referral to psychological services. Based on the undisputed
facts, Hernandez’s first report (before the assault in which he was injured) was a
complaint about unspecified problems with another inmate. The second report (which he
made after after the assault) was a report of pressure for sex without physical contact or
4
Zuniga Hernandez also argued that additional regulations that begin at 28 C.F.R.
§ 115.5 (the National Standards for the Prison Rape Elimination Act) required a
particular course of action to ensure his safety. However, we do not consider them
because they were not effective in 2009; they became effective in 2012.
9
threats from the other inmate. Neither report fell within the definitions of sexually
abusive behaviors listed in P5342.06 (sexual fondling, sexual misconduct by staff
members, sexual assault with an object, and rape).5
For these reasons, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Zuniga
Hernandez’s motion to the extent that he sought reconsideration under Rule 59(e). As we
have explained, and because Zuniga Hernandez also did not make the necessary
“showing of exceptional circumstances” to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6), see Coltec
Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 273 (3d Cir. 2002), we conclude that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening, either. We will affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
5
P5342.06 also included a recommendation that all staff “should report to the Operations
Lieutenant, any behaviors that could lead to sexually abusive behaviors.” But a
recommendation is different from a requirement.
10