Patricia Bryson v. Commissioner Social Security , 639 F. App'x 784 ( 2016 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 14-3416
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PATRICIA QUINN BRYSON,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-01258)
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on April 30, 2015
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 25, 2016)
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OPINION*
________________
ROTH, Circuit Judge
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
Patricia Quinn Bryson appeals the District Court’s denial of her summary
judgment motion and grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social
Security. The District Court determined that substantial evidence supported the
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of Bryson’s application for Social Security
Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. We will affirm.
I.
On January 6, 2010, Bryson applied for benefits on the basis that she had been
disabled since October 13, 2009. In his February 23, 2012 decision, the ALJ performed
the five-step, sequential analysis for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 1 The
ALJ determined that (1) Bryson has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
October 13, 2009; (2) Bryson suffers from severe impairments, including costochondritis,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, hypertension, migraines, depression, anxiety, and
personality disorder; (3) Bryson does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments; (4) Bryson has
the residual functional capacity to perform a modified range of light work;2 and (5) based
on Bryson’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are
jobs in the national economy that Bryson can perform. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded
that Bryson was not disabled from October 13, 2009, through February 23, 2012. The
Appeals Council denied Bryson’s request for review.
1
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20,
24-25 (2003).
2
“Light work” is defined as involving “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b).
2
Bryson then filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania seeking review of the Commissioner’s final decision. The District Court
affirmed.
II.3
We review “any findings of fact made by an ALJ under the deferential ‘substantial
evidence’ standard” and will affirm as long as the ALJ’s conclusions are supported by
substantial evidence. 4 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla,” and is defined
as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” 5 If the ALJ’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings,
“even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently.”6
Bryson first contends that the ALJ erred by failing to meaningfully consider the
finding of examining psychological consultant, Dr. Farangis Goshtasbpour, that Bryson’s
preoccupation with her health issues may interfere with her ability to sustain long-term
employment. But the ALJ properly considered Dr. Goshtasbpour’s opinion as a whole.
The ALJ first described Dr. Goshtasbpour’s determination that Bryson had no notable
learning disability, was able to understand, retain, and follow instructions reasonably
well, and had the ability to concentrate long enough to perform simple repetitive tasks.
The ALJ then discussed Dr. Goshtasbpour’s conclusion that Bryson was stable enough to
3
The District Court had jurisdiction to review a final administrative decision by the
Social Security Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction to
review the District Court’s order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
4
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
5
Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted).
6
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
3
perform day-to-day work, stating that he would afford “substantial weight” to this
opinion because it was consistent with the medical evidence. Although the ALJ did not
state his reasons for rejecting Dr. Goshtasbpour’s statement that Bryson may be
preoccupied with her health issues, an ALJ need not discuss “every relevant treatment
note” to sufficiently develop the record. 7 We find that the ALJ’s discussion of Dr.
Goshtasbpour’s opinion was more than sufficient to permit meaningful review.
Bryson next asserts that the ALJ erred by not recontacting Dr. Goshtasbpour.
Under the regulation in effect at the time, an ALJ must recontact a medical source “when
the report . . . contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved, the report does not
contain all the necessary information, or does not appear to be based on medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 8 This action is necessary only
when the evidence received is “inadequate” for making a disability determination. 9 That
was not the case here. The ALJ considered ample evidence presented by mental health
professionals and Bryson’s own medical records. One stray reference to Bryson’s
preoccupation with her health condition did not render this evidence inadequate or
confusing. The ALJ did not, therefore, err by failing to recontact Dr. Goshtasbpour.
7
See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Jones v. Barnhart,
364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that an ALJ need not “use particular
language or adhere to a particular format” but only “ensure that there is sufficient
development of the record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review”).
8
Johnson v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting then-20
C.F.R. § 416.912(e)(1)) (internal quotations omitted). This rule was withdrawn effective
March 26, 2012, and recontacting a medical source is now discretionary. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520b(c)-(d).
9
See Johnson, 529 F.3d at 205.
4
Finally, Bryson argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the medical opinion of
Bryson’s treating physician, Dr. Edward Salopek, regarding Bryson’s residual functional
capacity. An ALJ generally must give “more weight” to opinions from treating
physicians.10 When the ALJ determines that a treating physician’s opinion on the nature
and severity of an impairment is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence,” the ALJ must give that opinion “controlling weight.” 11 When the medical
evidence conflicts, however, “the ALJ may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot reject
evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.’” 12 Here, the ALJ did not afford Dr.
Salopek’s opinion controlling weight because it was not consistent with the medical
evidence as a whole, with Dr. Salopek’s own treatment records, or with Bryson’s
subjective complaints. Despite Bryson’s claims, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision to instead credit the findings of Dr. Tuan Huynh and Dr. Betron Haywood. Nor
did the ALJ improperly use his own medical judgment in making this determination.
III.
We conclude that the ALJ’s denial of Bryson’s application is supported by
substantial evidence. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s denial of her summary
judgment motion and its grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of
Social Security.
10
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).
11
Id.
12
Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186
F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999)).
5