Sonja Taylor-Bray v. Delaware Department of Service , 627 F. App'x 79 ( 2015 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 15-1848
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SONIA L. TAYLOR-BRAY,
Appellant
v.
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES
FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR FAMILIES;
VIVIAN RAPPOSELLI; RICK SHAW; SUSAN JONES;
JOHN STEVENSON; DONALD MCILVAIN, in their
official capacities; DELAWARE PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD; CHARLES
LONG; ELIZABETH MARON; R. ROBERT CURRIE,
JR.; KATHIE A. KARSNITZ, in their official capacities;
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE COUNTY AND
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL;
JOHN SEFERIAN; MIKE BEGATTO; PAT BAILEY;
CAMERON HENRY, in their official capacities
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-12-cv-00019)
District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark
__________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 18, 2015
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 22, 2015)
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OPINION*
________________
PER CURIAM
Sonia Taylor-Bray appeals from an order of the District Court granting summary
judgment to the Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth, and their Families
(“DSCYF”). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
Taylor-Bray’s appeal concerns only her Title VII employment discrimination
claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., against DSCYF.1 Taylor-Bray was employed by the
DSCYF as a youth rehabilitation counselor at the Stevenson House in Milford, Delaware,
a secure facility for incarcerated youth and pretrial juvenile detainees. Her job duties
included assisting in the handling of serious disturbances or subduing unruly residents,
which could involve physically restraining youth and responding to physical
confrontations. Taylor-Bray sustained a workplace injury on June 9, 2008.2 When she
returned to work following the injury, she was placed on light-duty pursuant to her
physician’s request, and therefore assigned to a night-shift control room post at the
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1
Taylor-Bray’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 against numerous other
defendants were dismissed by the District Court early in the litigation. She does not
challenge these dismissals on appeal.
2
The summary judgment record shows that Taylor-Bray suffered a small herniated disc
in her lower back.
2
Stevenson House by her supervisor Donald Mcilvain and/or Superintendent John
Stevenson.
On December 9, 2008, Taylor-Bray’s physician placed her on permanent medium-
duty restrictions. She requested an accommodation pursuant to the Americans with
Disabilities Act on the basis that she could no longer restrain the residents, and she filed
numerous grievances, raising issues of violations of overtime policy, bumping rights for
shift work, and restrictive duties with respect to seniority. A human resources specialist
informed Taylor-Bray on February 25, 2009 that she could not keep her light-duty
assignment indefinitely; agency policy limited light-duty assignments to thirty days.
Taylor-Bray was instructed to apply for short term disability insurance benefits. She did
not do so initially and instead sought workers’ compensation benefits. She subsequently
applied for and received short-term disability benefits. She was instructed to transition to
the long term disability benefits program, but failed to do so.
Meanwhile, as of May 5, 2009, Taylor-Bray’s physician continued her on
permanent, medium-duty restrictions. There were, however, no medium-duty positions
available as a youth rehabilitative counselor and, in June 2009, a recommendation was
made to terminate Taylor-Bray’s employment due to her inability to perform the essential
functions of her job. On July 20, 2009, Taylor-Bray’s physician provided a return to
work slip that indicated that she was able to perform all essential aspects of a job with
permanent medium-duty restrictions. Because her physician did not release her to full
duty, she was advised that her employment would be terminated. Taylor-Bray was
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terminated from her position by the Secretary of DSCYF due to her inability to perform
the essential functions of her position, effective July 22, 2009.
After she was terminated, Taylor-Bray filed grievances through the collective
bargaining agreement, claiming discrimination due to her disability. A hearing was held
on September 23, 2009, and, on October 2, 2009, the hearing officer denied the
grievance, finding that Taylor-Bray’s termination was for just cause. She filed
grievances with the Delaware Merit Employee Relations Board, which were dismissed
because the issues were controlled by the collective bargaining agreement. She also
unsuccessfully pursued unfair labor practices charges before the Public Employment
Relations Board.
Taylor-Bray also filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation, in connection
with her termination from employment.3 A notice of her right to sue was mailed to her
on December 20, 2011, and this civil action, filed in forma pauperis in the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware, followed. The parties engaged in discovery
and Taylor-Bray was deposed, testifying about similarly situated males who received
preferential treatment, and that having to physically restrain the residents
disproportionately affected women employees. After the close of discovery, DSCYF
moved for summary judgment, arguing that Taylor-Bray failed to identify valid male
comparators, and failed to show that the proffered reason for her termination was a
3
Taylor-Bray filed a separate charge of discrimination with the EEOC asserting disability
discrimination, and that issue is the subject of a separate civil action.
4
pretext for discrimination on the basis of gender or retaliation. Taylor-Bray also moved
for summary judgment. In an order entered on March 17, 2015, the District Court
awarded summary judgment to DSCYF. Judgment was entered on March 20, 2015.
Taylor-Bray appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In her pro
se brief she argues that the District Court’s emphasis on the “same-supervisor” element in
its analysis of her comparators was incorrect; that she properly identified similarly
situated male employees who were treated more favorably; that the reason for her
termination was a pretext for discrimination, and that retaliation could be inferred
because her grievances were left unanswered or unresolved.
We will affirm. We review a District Court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007). Summary
judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for
summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, id. at 587,
but the nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of her pleading, Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)(2). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256
(1986).
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To make out a prima facie case of discrimination, Taylor-Bray was required to
show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job; (3)
despite her qualifications, she was terminated; and (4) the termination was under
circumstances that raise an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The primary focus is ultimately on whether the
employer treated some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin. See Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d
789, 798 (3d Cir. 2003).
DSCYF argued in its summary judgment motion that no similarly-situated man
was treated better than Taylor-Bray. Taylor-Bray countered that seven individuals were
treated more favorably than she. In the context of personnel actions, the plaintiff is not
required to show that she is identical to the comparator, but she must show substantial
similarity. Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). Relevant
factors include, but are not limited to, whether the comparators “1) had the same job
description, 2) were subject to the same standards, 3) were subject to the same supervisor,
and 4) had comparable experience, education, and other qualifications.” Salas v.
Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections, 493 F.3d 913, 923 (7th Cir. 2007). The District Court
addressed all seven comparators identified by Taylor-Bray and provided cogent reasons
for rejecting them, including that some had different supervisors, some were able to
perform the essential functions of the job once removed from restrictive duty, some had
different medical issues, some held different positions and worked at different facilities,
one was on administrative leave, and one was actually terminated just as Taylor-Bray was
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terminated. Taylor-Bray has not persuaded us that the District Court erred in its
analysis.4 The individual comparator’s supervisor was but one of many factors
considered by the District Court and not a particularly decisive one. We agree with the
District Court that no reasonable juror could find that any of Taylor-Bray’s proposed
comparators were actually similarly situated to her.
Taylor-Bray contended that the job requirement of physically restraining youths
has a discriminatory impact on women. To make out a prima facie case of disparate
impact gender discrimination, Taylor-Bray must show that the job requirements of her
position are discriminatory in effect. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
The District Court determined that the challenged requirement – possessing the physical
ability to restrain youth – was job-related, that the position is held equally among men
and women, and that light-duty positions are provided to both men and women equally
when needed. The summary judgment record fully supports the District Court’s
determination.
Even if Taylor-Bray could make out a prima facie case of gender discrimination,
she produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that DSCYF’s reason
for its employment decision was a pretext for discrimination. If a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to proffer
some “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for its actions. See Woodson v. Scott
4
Taylor-Bray has discussed a new comparator in her brief on appeal, Nathaniel Bolden.
Inasmuch as she did not present this comparator to the District Court and has not shown
that there were extraordinary circumstances, we will not consider this comparator. See
Bailey v. United Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 194, 203-204 (3d Cir. 2001).
7
Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997). To demonstrate pretext under the
summary judgment standard, a plaintiff must offer evidence that “casts sufficient doubt
upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could
reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d
759, 762 (3d Cir. 1994). DSCYF’s proffered reason for terminating Taylor-Bray was
supported by her own medical records in that her physician never cleared her to return to
full duty. Here, no reasonable juror could find that DSCYF’s reason for terminating
Taylor-Bray was a pretext for gender discrimination. The summary judgment record
establishes that Taylor-Bray was terminated because she was unable to perform the
essential functions of her position, her physician having determined that she was
permanently restricted to medium-duty work. Moreover, before being terminated, she
was allowed to remain in light-duty status for almost three months. DSCYF’s proffered
reason for its action was neither “weak, incoherent, implausible, or so inconsistent” that a
reasonable juror could find it unworthy of credence. See Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 800.
Last, we find no error in the District Court’s determination of Taylor-Bray’s
retaliation claim. Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who
complain about discriminatory treatment. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006). A prima facie claim of retaliation requires a
showing of “(1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either
after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal
connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse
action.” Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). The
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District Court determined that the fact of the temporal proximity of Taylor-Bray’s
internal grievances, in relation to DSCYF’s decision that she could not remain
indefinitely on light duty, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, but
that DSCYF had, nevertheless, proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its
decision to terminate her. On appeal, Taylor-Bray raises two arguments. First, she
argues that the District Court erred because it ignored the fact that some of her grievances
were left unresolved, but whether or not her grievances were resolved is a matter that
relates solely to her collective bargaining agreement. This argument has no bearing on
her Title VII retaliation claim. She also argues that it was suspect that she initially was
encouraged to apply for short term disability benefits and was not recommended for
termination, and then later was terminated, but this issue relates to whether or not she
made out a prima facie claim for retaliation, an issue decided in her favor by the District
Court. The District Court ultimately rejected her retaliation claim because DSCYF
proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for her termination and not because she
failed to make out a prima facie case. Here, no reasonable juror could conclude that there
was any causal connection between Taylor-Bray’s protected activity and DSCYF’s
decision to terminate her.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court awarding
summary judgment to DSCYF.
9