United States v. Marvin Tillman , 305 F. App'x 846 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-16-2009
    USA v. Marvin Tillman
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 08-1706
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    Recommended Citation
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    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/2017
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 08-1706
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    MARVIN TILLMAN,
    Appellant
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D. C. No. 2-06-cr-00528-3)
    District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
    Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    on December 11, 2008
    Before: McKEE, SMITH and ROTH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: January 16, 2009)
    OPINION
    ROTH, Circuit Judge:
    Marvin Tillman appeals from a judgment of sentence after pleading guilty to
    conspiring to rob an armored vehicle and to commit and threaten physical violence in
    furtherance of that plan, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The District Court had
    jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18
    U.S.C. 3742(a).    We exercise plenary review of an interpretation of the Sentencing
    Guidelines and review factual findings for clear error. United States v. Grier, 
    475 F.3d 556
    ,
    570 (3d Cir. 2007). We will affirm.
    We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings,
    which we describe only as necessary to explain our decision.
    Tillman first argues that the District Court erred in calculating the loss amount as
    $1,165,000—the amount in the armored car at the time of the robbery—rather than
    $88,355—the amount actually transferred to the getaway vehicle.1 The facts are undisputed,
    however, that Tillman’s coconspirators were in sole possession and control of the armored
    car and, in fact, drove it some distance before they fled to the getaway vehicle. Accordingly,
    the District Court’s calculation was proper. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, Appl. Note 3 (“‘Loss’ is
    the value of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed.”); United States v. Parker, 
    903 F.2d 1
    Section 2B3.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, which governs robberies, provides for a
    four-level increase if the loss amount is more than $800,000 but less than $1,500,000,
    U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(E), and a two-level increase if the loss is more than $50,000 but
    less than $250,000, id. § 2B3.1(b)(7)(C).
    2
    91, 105 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[The conspirators] removed the car’s occupants and drove the car
    away. . . . The fact that [they] did not transfer all of the cash from the stolen car to their
    getaway car does not mean that they had not taken it.”).
    Tillman next argues that the District Court erred in applying a seven-level increase to
    Tillman’s offense level because a firearm was discharged during the robbery.             It is
    undisputed, however, that one of Tillman’s coconspirators fired his gun during the robbery.
    The District Court’s explicit finding that this was both in furtherance of the conspiracy and
    reasonably foreseeable is, thus, not clearly erroneous. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, Appl. Note
    2(b)(1) (“getaway driver in an armed bank robbery” responsible for assault injury to bank
    teller); United States v. Dupree, 
    323 F.3d 480
    , 490 (6th Cir. 2003) (reasonably foreseeable
    that firearm would be involved in robbery of armored car); United States v. Molina, 
    106 F.3d 1118
    , 1121–22 (2d Cir. 1997) (same).
    Finally, Tillman argues that the District Court should have granted his motion for a
    downward departure. Tillman does not argue, however, that the District Court
    misapprehended the law concerning its ability to grant the requested departure, and we will
    not review a District Court’s discretionary decision to deny departure. United States v.
    Cooper, 
    437 F.3d 324
    , 332–33 (3d Cir. 2006). In any event, the District Court ultimately
    sentenced Tillman to a 140-month term of imprisonment, well below his Sentencing
    Guidelines range of 151–188 months.
    Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.
    3