Gene Yaw v. Delaware River Basin Commissio ( 2022 )


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  •                                        PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _______________
    No. 21-2315
    _______________
    GENE YAW, Senator; LISA BAKER, Senator;
    THE PENNSYLVANIA SENATE REPUBLICAN
    CAUCUS, in their Official Legislative Capacities and as
    Trustees of the Natural Resources of the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania; DAMASCUS TOWNSHIP, in its Official and
    as Trustee of the Natural Resources of the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania; DYBERRY TOWNSHIP; WAYNE
    COUNTY; CARBON COUNTY
    v.
    THE DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMMISSION
    DELAWARE RIVERKEEPER NETWORK; MAYA K.
    VAN ROSSUM; SENATOR STEVEN SANTARSIERO;
    SENATOR CAROLYN COMITTA; SENATOR AMANDA
    CAPPELLETTI; SENATOR MARIA COLLETT;
    SENATOR WAYNE FONTANA; SENATOR ART
    HAYWOOD; SENATOR VINCE HUGHES; SENATOR
    JOHN KANE; SENATOR TIM KEARNEY; SENATOR
    KATIE MUTH; SENATOR JOHN SABATINA; SENATOR
    NIKIL SAVAL; SENATOR JUDY SCHWANK; SENATOR
    SHARIF STREET; SENATOR TINA TARTAGLIONE;
    SENATOR ANTHONY WILLIAMS;
    BUCKS COUNTY; MONTGOMERY COUNTY
    (Intervenors in District Court)
    Gene Yaw, Senator; Lisa Baker, Senator, The Pennsylvania
    Senate Republican Caucus, In their Official Legislative Ca-
    pacities and as Trustees of the natural resources of the Com-
    monwealth of Pennsylvania; Damascus Township, In its Offi-
    cial Capacity and as Trustee of the Natural Resources of the
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;
    Dyberry Township; Wayne County
    Appellants
    _______________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00119)
    District Judge: Paul S. Diamond
    _______________
    Argued: March 31, 2022
    Before: RESTREPO, ROTH, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: September 16, 2022)
    _______________
    Shohin H. Vance [ARGUED]
    Matthew H. Haverstick
    Joshua J. Voss
    Samantha G. Zimmer
    2
    Kleinbard
    Three Logan Square
    1717 Arch Street, 5th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Jeffrey S. Treat
    926 Court Street
    Honesdale, PA 18431
    Counsel for Appellants
    John S. Stapleton
    LeVan Stapleton Segal Cochran
    601 Route 73 North
    Four Greentree Centre
    Suite 303
    Marlton, NJ 08053
    Kenneth J. Warren [ARGUED]
    Warren Environmental Counsel
    975 Mill Road
    Millridge Manor House Suite A
    Bryn Mawr, PA 19010
    Counsel for Appellee Delaware River Basin
    Commission
    Joseph J. Khan
    Bucks County Law Department
    55 East Court Street, 5th Floor
    Doylestown, PA 18901
    Counsel for Intervenor County of Bucks
    Kacy C. Manahan [ARGUED]
    Delaware Riverkeeper Network
    3
    925 Canal Street, Suite 3701
    Bristol, PA 19007
    Counsel for Intervenors Delaware Riverkeeper
    Network and Maya K. Van Rossum
    Robert A. Wiygul [ARGUED]
    Peter V. Keays
    Steven T. Miano
    Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller
    One Logan Square
    18th & Cherry Streets, 27th Floor
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Counsel for Intervenor Senator Steven Santarsiero,
    et al
    Paul J. Cohen, II
    Clean Air Council
    135 South 19th Street, Suite 300
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Jessica R. O’Neill
    PennFuture
    1429 Walnut Street, Suite 400
    Philadelphia, PA 19102
    Counsel for Amicus Curiae
    _______________
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    _______________
    4
    FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
    In February 2021, the Delaware River Basin
    Commission banned high-volume hydraulic fracturing
    (commonly known as “fracking”) within the Delaware River
    Basin. The ban reflected the Commission’s determination that
    fracking “poses significant, immediate and long-term risks to
    the development, conservation, utilization, management, and
    preservation of the [Basin’s] water resources.”1 The ban also
    codified what had been a “de facto moratorium” on natural gas
    extraction in the Basin since 2010.2
    Plaintiffs-Appellants—two Pennsylvania state senators,
    the Pennsylvania Senate Republican Caucus, and several
    Pennsylvania municipalities—filed this lawsuit challenging
    the ban. Among other things, they allege that, in enacting the
    ban, the Commission exceeded its authority under the
    Delaware River Basin Compact, violated the Takings Clause
    of the United States Constitution, illegally exercised the power
    of eminent domain, and violated the Constitution’s guarantee
    of a republican form of government. The District Court did not
    reach the merits of these claims because it found that Plaintiffs-
    Appellants lack standing to pursue them in federal court.
    Although Plaintiffs-Appellants advance several
    arguments for why they have standing to challenge the ban,
    none of them have alleged the kinds of injuries that Article III
    demands. In our view, the state senators and the Senate
    Republican Caucus lack standing because the legislative
    injuries they allege affect the state legislature as a whole, and
    1
    Joint Appendix (“JA”) 0371.
    2
    JA0305.
    5
    under well-established Supreme Court caselaw, “individual
    members lack standing to assert the institutional interests of a
    legislature.”3 The municipalities lack standing because the
    economic injuries they allege are “conjectural” and
    “hypothetical” rather than “actual and imminent.”4 And none
    of the Plaintiffs-Appellants have standing as trustees of
    Pennsylvania’s public natural resources under the
    Environmental Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania
    Constitution because the Commission’s ban on fracking has
    not cognizably harmed the trust.
    Our holding today is narrow. The fact that the plaintiffs
    in this case lack standing to challenge the ban on fracking does
    not mean that it will go unchallenged. Indeed, we have already
    found that at least one party has Article III standing to
    challenge the ban in federal court.5 Plaintiffs-Appellants are
    also free to seek redress through other means. They can lobby
    the Commission to reverse course based on their policy
    concerns. They can try to amend the Delaware River Basin
    Compact through concurrent legislation of the member states.
    Or, they can persuade a party with standing to assert the
    institutional injuries they allege to bring a version of this
    lawsuit. What Plaintiffs-Appellants cannot do is seek redress
    in federal court for broad institutional injuries about which they
    have no standing to complain.
    3
    Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 
    139 S. Ct. 1945
    ,
    1953–54 (2019).
    4
    Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 
    578 U.S. 330
    , 339 (2016) (quoting
    Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560 (1992)).
    5
    See Wayne Land and Min. Grp. LLC v. Del. River Basin
    Comm’n, 
    894 F.3d 509
    , 524–25 (3d Cir. 2018).
    6
    Because Plaintiffs-Appellants lack Article III standing
    to pursue their claims, we will affirm the order of the District
    Court.
    I.6
    A.
    The Delaware River Basin (the “Basin”) is the drainage
    basin of the Delaware River. It consists of large swaths of land
    in Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York. In
    1961, these four states and the federal government entered into
    the Delaware River Basin Compact (the “Compact”), an
    interstate compact aimed at facilitating a unified approach to
    the “planning, conservation, utilization, development,
    management and control of the [Basin’s] water resources.”7
    The Compact created the Delaware River Basin Commission
    (the “Commission”), a “body politic and corporate” consisting
    of the governors of the four member states (or their alternates)
    and a federal representative appointed by the President of the
    United States.8 The Commission has a variety of powers,
    including the power to: establish standards of “planning,
    design and operation of all projects and facilities in the basin
    which affect its water resources”; plan, construct, and complete
    any projects determined to be “necessary, convenient or
    useful” to the purposes of the Compact; and conduct research
    6
    Because this case is at the motion to dismiss stage, we accept
    all factual allegations in the complaint as true. See N. Jersey
    Brain & Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., 
    801 F.3d 369
    , 371 (3d Cir.
    2015).
    7
    JA0327.
    8
    JA0328.
    7
    on water resources and their conservation.9 The Commission
    also has the power to review private projects in the Basin for
    approval: under Section 3.8 of the Compact, “[n]o project
    having a substantial effect on the water resources of the basin
    shall . . . be undertaken by any person, corporation or
    governmental authority unless it shall have been first submitted
    to and approved by the [C]ommission.”10
    In 2010, relying on its power of review, the Commission
    instituted a “de facto moratorium” on natural gas extraction in
    the Basin.11 The moratorium remained in place until February
    25, 2021, at which time the Commission voted to adopt a
    regulation formally banning oil and gas extraction through
    high-volume hydraulic fracturing within the Basin. The
    regulation provides: “High volume hydraulic fracturing in
    hydrocarbon bearing rock formations is prohibited within the
    Delaware River Basin.”12 The regulation defines “hydraulic
    fracturing” as:
    a technique used to stimulate the production of
    oil and natural gas from a well by injecting
    fracturing fluids down the wellbore under
    pressure to create and maintain induced fractures
    in the hydrocarbon-bearing rock of the target
    geologic formation.13
    9
    JA0331.
    10
    JA0332.
    11
    JA0305.
    12
    JA0371.
    13
    JA0370.
    8
    Hydraulic fracturing is considered “high volume” when it uses
    “a combined total of 300,000 or more gallons of water during
    all stages in a well completion.”14 The ban reflected the
    Commission’s determination that fracking “poses significant,
    immediate and long-term risks to the development,
    conservation, utilization, management, and preservation of the
    water resources of the Delaware River Basin and to Special
    Protection Waters of the Basin.”15 The Commission further
    found that:
    Controlling future pollution by prohibiting such
    activity in the Basin is required to effectuate the
    [Commission’s] Comprehensive Plan, avoid
    injury to the waters of the Basin as contemplated
    by the Comprehensive Plan and protect the
    public health and preserve the waters of the
    Basin for uses in accordance with the
    Comprehensive Plan.16
    Outside of the Basin, fracking is big business. This is
    especially true in Pennsylvania, thanks in part to the Marcellus
    Shale Formation, a “geological configuration housing
    significant natural gas reserves.”17 Between 2010 and 2018,
    “natural gas producers . . . paid approximately $10 billion in
    royalties directly to Pennsylvania landowners.”18
    14
    
    Id.
    15
    JA0371.
    16
    
    Id.
    17
    JA0300.
    18
    JA0303.
    9
    B.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants are Pennsylvania State Senators
    Gene Yaw and Lisa Baker; the Pennsylvania Senate Republi-
    can Caucus; and several Pennsylvania towns and counties
    within the Delaware River Basin: Wayne County, Damascus
    Township, and Dyberry Township.19 In early 2021, Plaintiffs-
    Appellants challenged the ban on fracking by suing the Com-
    mission in federal court. Several additional parties then inter-
    vened as defendants, including: the Delaware Riverkeeper Net-
    work and Maya K. van Rossum, its Executive Director; a col-
    lection of Democratic Pennsylvania State Senators; and Bucks
    and Montgomery Counties. In an Amended Complaint filed in
    March 2021, Plaintiffs-Appellants allege that the ban: (1) ex-
    ceeded the Commission’s authority under the Compact; (2) vi-
    olated the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution;
    (3) unlawfully exercised the power of eminent domain; and (4)
    violated the Constitution’s guarantee of a republican form of
    government.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants allege several injuries stemming
    from the ban. First, they allege that the ban has “palpably and
    substantially diminished the legislative powers” of the “Senate
    Plaintiffs”—the two Pennsylvania state senators and the Sen-
    ate Republican Caucus.20 Second, Plaintiffs-Appellants allege
    that the ban has precluded the “Municipal Plaintiffs”—the
    Pennsylvania towns and counties within the Basin—from par-
    ticipating in fracking-related economic development “made
    19
    Carbon County was also a plaintiff below but is not a party
    to this appeal.
    20
    JA0315.
    10
    available to neighboring areas.”21 Finally, Plaintiffs-Appel-
    lants allege that the ban has interfered with their ability to carry
    out their fiduciary duties as trustees of Pennsylvania’s public
    natural resources under the Environmental Rights Amendment
    to the Pennsylvania Constitution (the “ERA”). As a remedy
    for these injuries, Plaintiffs-Appellants seek declaratory relief.
    Defendants-Appellees moved to dismiss the Amended
    Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure, arguing, among other things, that Plaintiffs-
    Appellants lacked standing to pursue their claims in federal
    court. The District Court agreed, concluding that, “[a]lthough
    all Plaintiffs argue vigorously that they have standing, they do
    not.”22 With regard to the Senate Plaintiffs, the District Court
    found that: (1) under controlling Supreme Court precedent,
    individual legislators and party caucuses lack standing to
    pursue the kinds of generalized legislative injuries alleged in
    the Amended Complaint; (2) the Senate Plaintiffs lack standing
    under the ERA because they are not ERA trustees; and (3) even
    if the Senate Plaintiffs were ERA trustees, they have not
    alleged a cognizable injury to the trust. The District Court
    accordingly dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice
    as to the Senate Plaintiffs.
    With regard to the Municipal Plaintiffs, the District
    Court found that: (1) although these plaintiffs are ERA trustees
    under Pennsylvania law, “[that] status alone does not confer
    standing”; (2) by only pointing to a “single missed fracking
    opportunity” twelve years ago, the Municipal Plaintiffs have
    failed to allege economic injuries that are actual or imminent;
    21
    JA0302.
    22
    JA0016.
    11
    and (3) the Municipal Plaintiffs have also failed to satisfy the
    traceability and redressability requirements of Article III
    standing because of the “numerous factors that control the
    amount of natural gas that can be extracted from a given place
    at a given time.”23 The District Court nevertheless found that
    the Municipal Plaintiffs “might be able to articulate how the
    [ban] has actually injured them” and accordingly gave them an
    opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint.24 The
    Municipal Plaintiffs never took that opportunity, however, so
    the Court eventually dismissed the Amended Complaint with
    prejudice as to them as well. This timely appeal followed.
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    .
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise
    plenary review over a district court’s decision to dismiss a
    complaint for lack of standing.25 “[W]hen standing is chal-
    lenged on the basis of the pleadings, we accept as true all ma-
    terial allegations in the complaint, and . . . construe the com-
    plaint in favor of the complaining party.”26
    III.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the District Court erred
    in rejecting each of their three theories of Article III standing:
    23
    JA0024.
    24
    JA0025.
    25
    N. Jersey Brain & Spine Ctr., 801 F.3d at 371 (citing Bald-
    win v. Univ. of Pitt. Med. Ctr., 
    636 F.3d 69
    , 74 (3d Cir. 2011)).
    26
    
    Id.
     (quoting FOCUS v. Allegheny Cnty. Ct. of Common
    Pleas, 
    75 F.3d 834
    , 838 (3d Cir. 1996)).
    12
    (1) legislative, (2) economic, and (3) ERA trustee. We will
    address each theory in turn. But first, some basics on federal
    standing.
    Article III of the U.S. Constitution endows federal
    courts with the “judicial Power of the United States.”27 But it
    limits that power to actual “Cases” or “Controversies.”28 Part
    of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requirement that
    plaintiffs have standing to sue.29 To satisfy the “irreducible
    constitutional minimum” of standing, a plaintiff must establish
    three elements: (1) an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable
    to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely
    redressed by a favorable judicial decision.30 To show an injury
    in fact, the “first and foremost of standing’s three elements,” a
    plaintiff must show an “invasion of a legally protected interest”
    that is both “concrete and particularized,” and “actual or immi-
    nent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”31 The plaintiff, as the
    party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of estab-
    lishing standing and must “clearly . . . allege facts demonstrat-
    ing each element.”32
    The doctrine of standing “limits the category of litigants
    empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek
    27
    U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
    28
    Id. § 2.
    29
    Raines v. Byrd, 
    521 U.S. 811
    , 818 (1997).
    30
    Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338 (internal quotation marks and cita-
    tions omitted).
    31
    Id. at 339 (quoting Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 560
    ).
    32
    Id. at 338 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    13
    redress for a legal wrong.”33 And in so doing, it limits the
    power of federal courts themselves. It “serves to prevent the
    judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the po-
    litical branches” and “confines the federal courts to a properly
    judicial role.”34 As the Supreme Court recently explained, un-
    der Article III:
    federal courts do not adjudicate hypothetical or
    abstract disputes. Federal courts do not possess
    a roving commission to publicly opine on every
    legal question. Federal courts do not exercise
    general legal oversight of the Legislative and Ex-
    ecutive Branches, or of private entities. And fed-
    eral courts do not issue advisory opinions.35
    A.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants first argue that the ban on fracking
    caused the Senate Plaintiffs legislative injuries sufficient to
    give them Article III standing. More specifically, they submit
    that the Senate Plaintiffs have standing because the ban has
    “deprived [them] of their lawmaking authority relative to mil-
    lions of Pennsylvanians residing within the 6,000 square miles
    33
    Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
    Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
    454 U.S. 464
    , 473 (1982)
    and Warth v. Seldin, 
    422 U.S. 490
    , 498–99 (1975)).
    34
    Id. at 338 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
    568 U.S. 398
    , 408 (2013)).
    35
    TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 
    141 S. Ct. 2190
    , 2203 (2021).
    14
    of Sovereign territory subsumed by the Basin and any legisla-
    tion, now or in the future, on this subject has been nullified.”36
    As the District Court found, however, this argument
    runs headlong into the well-established principle that individ-
    ual legislators lack standing to assert institutional injuries be-
    longing to the legislature as a whole. A good place to start is
    the Supreme Court’s decision in Raines v. Byrd, 
    521 U.S. 811
    (1997). Raines involved a challenge to the Line Item Veto Act
    of 1996, which gave the President the authority to cancel cer-
    tain tax and spending measures after they were passed by Con-
    gress and signed into law.37 The plaintiffs were six Members
    of Congress who had voted against the Act and who argued
    that it would unlawfully alter the effect of their votes, divest
    them of their constitutional role in the repeal of legislation, and
    alter the balance of power between the legislative and execu-
    tive branches of the federal government.38 The District Court
    found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Act and
    granted summary judgment in their favor.39
    Hearing the case in an expedited fashion, the Supreme
    Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing and accordingly
    vacated the order of the District Court.40 The Court noted that
    the plaintiffs “[had] not been singled out for specially unfavor-
    able treatment as opposed to other Members of their respective
    bodies.”41 Instead, the plaintiffs had alleged that the Act
    36
    Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 42.
    37
    Raines, 
    521 U.S. at 814
    .
    38
    
    Id. at 816
    .
    39
    
    Id.
    40
    
    Id.
     at 813–14.
    41
    
    Id. at 821
    .
    15
    “cause[d] a type of institutional injury (the diminution of leg-
    islative power), which necessarily damages all Members of
    Congress and both Houses of Congress equally.”42 Moreover,
    the plaintiffs “[did] not claim that they [had] been deprived of
    something to which they personally [were] entitled.”43 Rather,
    their “claim of standing [was] based on a loss of political
    power, not loss of any private right, which would make the in-
    jury more concrete.”44 Overall, the Court found that the plain-
    tiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the Act in federal
    court because they “alleged no injury to themselves as individ-
    uals . . . [and] the institutional injury they allege[d] [was]
    wholly abstract and widely dispersed.”45 The Court also “at-
    tach[ed] some importance to the fact that [the plaintiffs had]
    not been authorized to represent their respective Houses of
    Congress” in the lawsuit.46
    Similarly, in Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-
    Hill, 
    139 S. Ct. 1945
     (2019), the Supreme Court held that the
    Virginia House of Delegates, a “single chamber of a bicameral
    legislature,” lacked standing to appeal a court’s invalidation of
    a redistricting plan that the state legislature had passed.47 Cit-
    ing Raines, the Court held that “[j]ust as individual members
    lack standing to assert the institutional interests of a legislature
    . . . a single House of a bicameral legislature lacks capacity to
    assert interests belonging to the legislature as a whole.”48 In so
    42
    
    Id.
    43
    
    Id.
     (emphasis in original).
    44
    
    Id.
    45
    Id. at 829.
    46
    Id.
    47
    Bethune-Hill, 
    139 S. Ct. at 1950
    .
    48
    
    Id.
     at 1953–54.
    16
    holding, the Court noted that the Virginia Constitution allo-
    cated redistricting authority to the “General Assembly,” of
    which “the House constitute[d] only a part.”49 The Court also
    pointed out that it “ha[d] never held that a judicial decision in-
    validating a state law as unconstitutional inflicts a discrete,
    cognizable injury on each organ of government that partici-
    pated in the law’s passage.”50
    By contrast, in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona In-
    dependent Redistricting Commission, 
    576 U.S. 787
     (2015), the
    Supreme Court held that the Arizona Legislature as a whole
    had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a voter initi-
    ative that transferred its redistricting authority to an independ-
    ent redistricting commission.51 The Court noted that unlike the
    Members of Congress in Raines, the Arizona Legislature
    “[was] an institutional plaintiff asserting institutional injury.”52
    The problem in Raines, the Court explained, was that the plain-
    tiffs were “individual Members of Congress” who could not
    “tenably claim a personal stake in the suit” because the institu-
    tional injury at issue “scarcely zeroed in on any individual
    Member.”53 The Arizona Legislature had also obtained “au-
    thorizing votes in both of its chambers” before initiating its
    lawsuit, further distinguishing the case from Raines.54
    49
    Id. at 1953.
    50
    Id.
    51
    Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
    
    576 U.S. 787
    , 793 (2015).
    52
    Id. at 802.
    53
    Id. at 801–802 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted).
    54
    Id.
    17
    Applying Raines and its progeny, several of our sister
    circuits have also found that individual legislators lack stand-
    ing in cases involving institutional injuries. In Alaska Legisla-
    tive Council v. Babbitt, 
    181 F.3d 1333
     (D.C. Cir. 1999), for
    example, the D.C. Circuit held that the Alaska Legislative
    Council and seventeen members of the Alaska State Legisla-
    ture lacked standing to challenge a federal law that regulated
    the taking of fish and wildlife on federal lands within the
    state.55 Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged that the law
    had “interfered with their state duties” and “nullified their leg-
    islative prerogatives regarding fish and wildlife manage-
    ment.”56 The Court held that these injuries were insufficient to
    give the legislators Article III standing because, “[w]hile state
    legislation or regulations in conflict with [a] federal statute or
    federal regulations may be unenforceable . . . that type of in-
    jury does not entitle individual legislators to seek a judicial
    remedy.”57
    Likewise, in Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 
    824 F.3d 1207
     (10th
    Cir. 2016), the Tenth Circuit held that a group of legislators
    from the Colorado General Assembly lacked standing to chal-
    lenge a provision of the Colorado Constitution that required
    voter approval for certain tax increases.58 The Court held that
    the injury alleged by the legislator-plaintiffs—interference
    with their powers of taxation and appropriation—was institu-
    tional because it was “based on [a] loss of legislative power
    that necessarily impact[ed] all members of the General
    55
    Babbitt, 
    181 F.3d at
    1335–36.
    56
    
    Id. at 1337
    .
    57
    
    Id. at 1338
    .
    58
    Kerr, 824 F.3d at 1211–12.
    18
    Assembly equally.”59 And the Court found that, unlike in Ari-
    zona State Legislature, the plaintiffs in Kerr did not have
    standing to assert such institutional injuries because the state
    legislature had not authorized them to do so.60
    This case is no different. As in Raines, Bethune-Hill,
    Babbitt, and Kerr, the legislative injuries that the Senate Plain-
    tiffs allege are “quintessentially ‘institutional.’”61 The Senate
    Plaintiffs allege that the ban on fracking:
    • “suspends law within the Commonwealth—a
    power reposed exclusively in the General As-
    sembly”;62
    • “displaced and/or suspended the Common-
    wealth’s comprehensive statutory scheme
    within the Basin”;63
    • “attempted to exercise legislative authority
    exclusively vested in the General Assem-
    bly”;64
    • “wholly nullifies any present or future legis-
    lative action purporting to adopt any laws in-
    consistent with the prohibition”;65
    59
    Id. at 1215.
    60
    Id. at 1216.
    61
    JA0017.
    62
    JA0306.
    63
    Id.
    64
    JA0307.
    65
    Id.
    19
    • “deprives over five million citizens of the
    Commonwealth residing within the Basin of
    the right to be governed by laws enacted by
    their duly-elected representatives”;66
    • “significantly dilutes the right of citizens in
    the Commonwealth . . . to choose their own
    officers for governmental administration”;67
    and
    • “palpably and substantially diminishes the
    legislative powers of the Senate Plaintiffs.”68
    These are classic examples of institutional injuries because
    they sound in a general loss of legislative power that is “widely
    dispersed” and “necessarily damages all [members of the Gen-
    eral Assembly] . . . equally.”69 In other words, the Senate
    Plaintiffs “have alleged no injury to themselves as individu-
    als”—only injury to the legislature and the commonwealth of
    which they are a part.70 And just as in Raines, the Senate Plain-
    tiffs have not been authorized to represent the interests of these
    institutions in court. Under Pennsylvania law, the Attorney
    General is the party responsible for representing the Common-
    wealth in civil suits, not individual legislators.71 Nor has the
    66
    Id.
    67
    JA0308.
    68
    JA0315.
    69
    Raines, 
    521 U.S. at 821, 829
    .
    70
    
    Id. at 829
    .
    71
    See 71 Pa. Stat. § 732-204(c) (West 2022) (“The Attorney
    General shall represent the Commonwealth and all
    20
    Pennsylvania General Assembly authorized the Senate Plain-
    tiffs to represent it in this matter. At best, the Senate Plaintiffs
    speak for the majority of the Pennsylvania Senate, which is
    only one of two chambers of the General Assembly. That is
    not enough to give them standing, because “[j]ust as individual
    members lack standing to assert the institutional interests of a
    legislature . . . a single [chamber] of a bicameral legislature
    lacks capacity to assert interests belonging to the legislature as
    a whole.”72
    Plaintiffs-Appellants make several arguments in re-
    sponse. For one, they argue that the legislative standing
    caselaw upon which the District Court relied reflects prudential
    concerns that are unmoored from the traditional requirements
    of Article III. We do not think there is anything anomalous
    about the rule that individual legislators lack standing to assert
    institutional injuries, however. Instead, we think this rule
    flows naturally from bedrock standing requirements, including
    the requirement that plaintiffs have an injury that is particular-
    ized to them, meaning one that affects them in a “personal and
    individual way.”73 Like the Members of Congress in Raines,
    the Senate Plaintiffs lack a particularized injury because the
    ban on fracking affects every member of the General Assembly
    equally and does not “single[] [them] out for specially
    Commonwealth agencies . . . in any action brought by or against
    the Commonwealth or its agencies.”).
    72
    Bethune-Hill, 
    139 S. Ct. at
    1953–54.
    73
    Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (quoting Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at
    560 n.1).
    21
    unfavorable treatment.”74 The rule that individual legislators
    cannot assert institutional injuries also follows from the princi-
    ple that, in general, “[a] litigant must assert his or her own legal
    rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal
    rights or interests of third parties.”75
    In arguing to the contrary, Plaintiffs-Appellants are the
    ones advancing a position unmoored from Article III. Under
    their theory of standing, “any individual legislator would have
    standing to challenge any federal statute or regulation . . . that,
    under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, has a preemptive
    effect on state lawmaking.”76 Article III does not sweep so
    broadly.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants also argue that Raines is inappli-
    cable because it involved federal separation-of-powers con-
    cerns that are absent in lawsuits brought by state officials. But
    decisions following Raines have made clear that its reasoning
    is not limited to cases involving federal parties. In Bethune-
    74
    Raines, 
    521 U.S. at 821
    ; see also Babbitt, 
    181 F.3d at 1337
    (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the injuries
    they alleged were not “particularized to them”); Kerr, 824 F.3d
    at 1216 (holding that the plaintiffs lacked a “personal stake in
    the suit”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    75
    Penn. Psych. Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 
    280 F.3d 278
    , 288 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 
    499 U.S. 400
    , 410 (1991)); see also Bethune-Hill, 
    139 S. Ct. at 1953
     (describing a “mismatch” between the body seeking to
    litigate and the body to which the allegedly diminished power
    belonged).
    76
    Brief of Democratic State Senators and Bucks and Mont-
    gomery Counties at 3 (emphasis in original).
    22
    Hill, for example, the Supreme Court relied on Raines in hold-
    ing that a state legislative plaintiff—the Virginia House of Del-
    egates—lacked standing to assert interests belonging to the
    Virginia Legislature as a whole.77 And although the Court in
    Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission found that the
    Arizona Legislature had standing to sue, the distinction be-
    tween state and federal parties was not central to its analysis.
    Indeed, in holding that the Arizona legislature had standing as
    an “institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury,” the
    Court was explicitly applying the analytical framework from
    Raines to a state dispute.78
    Plaintiffs-Appellants also invoke the Supreme Court’s
    1939 decision in Coleman v. Miller, 
    307 U.S. 433
     (1939).
    There, twenty-four members of the Kansas state legislature
    sought a writ of mandamus in federal court after the legislature
    ratified a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution.79 The
    legislators claimed that the ratification was invalid because the
    Lieutenant Governor had improperly cast the tiebreaking
    vote.80 Among other things, the respondents argued that the
    legislators lacked standing to pursue relief in federal court.81
    Rejecting this argument, the Court found that the legislators
    had standing because their votes, which had been “overridden
    and virtually held for naught,” would have been sufficient to
    defeat ratification if not for the Lieutenant Governor’s
    77
    Bethune-Hill, 
    139 S. Ct. at
    1953–54.
    78
    Ariz. State Legislature, 576 U.S. at 802.
    79
    Coleman, 
    307 U.S. at
    435–36.
    80
    
    Id.
    81
    
    Id. at 437
    .
    23
    actions.82 The Supreme Court later explained that Coleman
    stands “at most” for the narrow proposition that:
    legislators whose votes would have been suffi-
    cient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act
    have standing to sue if that legislative action goes
    into effect (or does not go into effect), on the
    ground that their votes have been completely
    nullified.83
    As the District Court rightly found, Coleman does not
    help Plaintiffs-Appellants because they fail to identify a spe-
    cific legislative act that would have passed (or been defeated)
    but for the alleged usurpation of legislative power caused by
    the Commission’s ban on fracking. Plaintiffs-Appellants point
    to “Act 13,” a law passed by the General Assembly in 2012 to
    regulate natural gas extraction in the Commonwealth.84 But
    they fail to explain how the ban on fracking (or the moratorium
    that preceded it) affected the passage of Act 13 in a way that
    would give them standing under the vote nullification theory
    endorsed in Coleman. And if Plaintiffs-Appellants are simply
    claiming an interest in Act 13’s continued vitality, that is a gen-
    eralized grievance that does not give them standing in federal
    court.85
    82
    
    Id. at 438
    .
    83
    Raines, 
    521 U.S. at 823
    .
    84
    JA301.
    85
    See Russell v. DeJongh, 
    491 F.3d 130
    , 135 (3d Cir. 2007)
    (“[O]nce a bill has become law, a legislator’s interest in seeing
    that the law is followed is no different from a private citizen’s
    interest in proper government.”).
    24
    Finally, Plaintiffs-Appellants point to several state court
    decisions in Pennsylvania holding that individual legislators
    have a legally protected interest in “forestalling the usurpation
    of the state’s lawmaking power.”86 In Fumo v. City of Phila-
    delphia, 
    972 A.2d 487
    , 502 (Pa. 2009), for example, the Su-
    preme Court of Pennsylvania held that individual legislators
    had standing in state court to pursue claims based on “the ef-
    fectiveness of their legislative authority and their vote.” The
    fact that a party has standing in state court does not mean that
    they have standing in federal court, however. As the Seventh
    Circuit recently clarified, Article III standing “limits the power
    of federal courts and is a matter of federal law. It does not turn
    on state law, which obviously cannot alter the scope of the fed-
    eral judicial power.”87 We have likewise explained that, “even
    if Pennsylvania state law would have afforded appellants
    standing if they had brought [an] action in state court, we must
    ensure that they satisfy the federal requirements for standing as
    well.”88 To see that these requirements often differ, one must
    look no further than the Fumo decision itself, which contrasted
    Pennsylvania’s prudential standing doctrine with the constitu-
    tional demands of Article III.89 Moreover, even if Fumo
    showed that the Senate Plaintiffs have suffered an “invasion of
    a legally protected interest” under Pennsylvania law, that is
    only one part of the injury-in-fact requirement.90 To have
    standing in federal court, the Senate Plaintiffs also need to
    86
    Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 42.
    87
    Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chi. Park Dist., 
    971 F.2d 722
    ,
    730–31 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J.) (emphasis in original).
    88
    Goode v. City of Philadelphia, 
    539 F.3d 311
    , 321 (3d Cir.
    2008).
    89
    Fumo, 972 A.2d at 500 n.5.
    90
    Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339.
    25
    allege injuries that are concrete and particularized.91 Because
    they fail to do so for the reasons we have just discussed, the
    Senate Plaintiffs’ alleged legislative injuries do not give them
    standing.92
    B.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants also argue that the Municipal
    Plaintiffs have standing based on economic injuries that they
    suffered, and are continuing to suffer, as a result of the ban.
    This is Plaintiffs-Appellants’ most straightforward theory of
    standing, because “financial harm is a classic and paradigmatic
    91
    Id.
    92
    To be clear, the fact that the individual legislators in this case
    lack standing does not mean that the same will be true in other
    cases. As the Tenth Circuit explained in Kerr, “[a]n individual
    legislator certainly retains the ability to bring a suit to redress
    a personal injury, as opposed to an institutional injury. For
    example, if a particular subset of legislators was barred from
    exercising their right to vote on bills, such an injury would
    likely be sufficient to establish a personal injury.” Kerr, 824
    F.3d at 1216 (emphasis added); see also Raines, 
    521 U.S. at 821
     (suggesting a different outcome if the plaintiffs had been
    “singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to
    other Members of their respective bodies”). The bottom line is
    that “[l]egislators, like other litigants in federal court, must sat-
    isfy the jurisdictional prerequisites of Article III standing,”
    DeJongh, 
    491 F.3d at 133
    , including the need for a “personal
    stake in the dispute,” Raines, 
    521 U.S. at 380
     (internal quota-
    tion marks omitted).
    26
    form of injury in fact.”93 We nevertheless agree with the Dis-
    trict Court that this theory of standing also fails because the
    economic injuries the Municipal Plaintiffs allege are either too
    old or too speculative to support the relief that they are seeking.
    “Injury-in-fact is not Mount Everest,” and an “identifi-
    able trifle of injury” will suffice.94 That said, to have an injury-
    in-fact for standing purposes, a plaintiff must have an injury
    that is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”95
    For this reason, we have explained that “[p]laintiffs do not al-
    lege an injury-in-fact when they rely on a chain of contingen-
    cies or mere speculation.”96 In Finkelman v. National Football
    League, 
    810 F.3d 187
     (3d Cir. 2016), for example, we consid-
    ered whether a plaintiff had standing to sue the National Foot-
    ball League (“NFL”) based on the theory that he paid a higher
    price for Super Bowl tickets because the NFL restricted the
    number of tickets it released to the public, driving up prices on
    the resale market.97 Although this theory of standing appeared
    promising “[a]t first blush,” it failed under closer examination
    because the complicated economics of the resale market meant
    that “while it might [have been] the case that the NFL’s with-
    holding increased ticket prices on the resale market, it might
    93
    Cottrell v. Alcon Laby’s, 
    874 F.3d 154
    , 163 (3d Cir. 2017)
    (cleaned up).
    94
    Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 
    432 F.3d 286
    , 294
    (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
    ted).
    95
    Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 560
     (internal quotation marks and cita-
    tions omitted).
    96
    Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 
    810 F.3d 187
    , 193 (3d
    Cir. 2016) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    97
    Id. at 200.
    27
    also [have been] the case that it had no effect.”98 We ultimately
    found that the plaintiff lacked standing because we could “only
    speculate” about the price effects of the NFL’s actions and
    “speculation is not enough to sustain Article III standing.”99
    Moreover, “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing sepa-
    rately for each form of relief sought.”100 When a plaintiff seeks
    retrospective (backward-looking) relief in the form of money
    damages, they can establish standing through evidence of a
    past injury.101 But when a plaintiff seeks prospective (forward-
    looking) relief in the form of an injunction or a declaratory
    judgment, they must show that they are “likely to suffer future
    injury.”102 The future injury must also be “imminent,” mean-
    ing that it is “certainly impending” rather than just merely
    “possible.”103
    In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs-Appellants al-
    lege that, “[a]lthough [the] Municipal Plaintiffs’ low popula-
    tion density and terrain renders them particularly well-suited
    98
    Id. (emphasis in original).
    99
    Id.
    100
    Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC),
    
    528 U.S. 167
    , 185 (2000).
    101
    See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
    515 U.S. 200
    , 210–
    11 (1995).
    102
    McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc, 
    672 F.3d 213
    , 223 (3d Cir.
    2012) (emphasis added) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
    
    461 U.S. 95
    , 105 (1983)); see also CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of
    Philadelphia, 
    703 F.3d 612
    , 628 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that
    declaratory relief is, by definition, “prospective in nature”).
    103
    Clapper, 
    568 U.S. at 409
     (internal quotation marks and ci-
    tations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
    28
    for natural gas exploration and extraction,” the ban on fracking
    has excluded them “from participating in the economic devel-
    opment made available to neighboring areas.”104 Between
    2006 and 2017, for example, a single natural gas producer paid
    over $1 billion in royalties to landowners in Susquehanna
    County, which adjoins Plaintiff-Appellant Wayne County but
    is located outside of the Basin. Plaintiffs-Appellants also al-
    lege that before the Commission’s moratorium on natural gas
    extraction in 2010, “countless landowners within the Basin had
    negotiated and/or executed leases with natural gas producers”
    that were later rendered valueless.105 For example, “a group of
    landowners in Wayne County expended approximately
    $750,000 in legal fees to negotiate a lease that was estimated
    to yield over $187 million during its term, but as a result of the
    Commission’s moratorium, the contract became ineffectual
    and . . . was terminated.”106 Finally, Plaintiffs-Appellants al-
    lege that, under Act 13, municipalities in which unconven-
    tional natural gas wells are located have received sizable dis-
    tributions from the Well Fund, a statewide fund comprised of
    fees from the development of unconventional wells. In 2019,
    for example, municipalities throughout Pennsylvania received
    over $109 million in distributions, including $5.7 million to
    Susquehanna County.
    The District Court found these allegations insufficient
    to give the Municipal Plaintiffs standing. The Court found that
    the Municipal Plaintiffs have failed to allege that fracking
    would likely occur within their borders but for the Commis-
    sion’s ban and that the “theoretical possibility” of missed
    104
    JA0302.
    105
    JA0303.
    106
    
    Id.
    29
    fracking opportunities does not give them standing.107 The
    Court also found that the “single missed fracking opportunity”
    cited in the Amended Complaint does not give the Municipal
    Plaintiffs standing because that potential project occurred over
    12 years ago and “obviously [does] not show that some twelve
    years later, any of the Municipalities is suffering a current in-
    jury.”108
    On appeal, Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the “single
    missed fracking opportunity” in Wayne County is enough to
    give them standing because they need only allege a “trifle of
    injury.”109 But this argument overlooks the fact that Plaintiffs-
    Appellants are seeking prospective rather than retrospective re-
    lief.110 As a consequence, they cannot base their standing on
    past injuries.111 The District Court was therefore correct to
    conclude that while the missed fracking opportunity in Wayne
    County might have given the Municipal Plaintiffs standing
    twelve years ago, it does not do so today.
    The only remaining question is whether the Municipal
    Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the kind of ongoing or im-
    minent economic harm needed to sustain their request for pro-
    spective relief. Like the District Court, we think not. Although
    the Municipal Plaintiffs have identified fracking projects that
    are currently underway in neighboring counties, they have
    107
    JA0024.
    108
    
    Id.
    109
    Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 63 (quoting Bow-
    man, 672 F.2d at 1145).
    110
    Specifically, Plaintiffs-Appellants are seeking a declaratory
    judgment.
    111
    McNair, 672 F.3d at 223.
    30
    failed to identify any recent projects within their borders that
    would have moved forward if not for the ban.112 The Munici-
    pal Plaintiffs have also failed to identify any projects that
    would be ready and able to proceed in the near future if the ban
    is lifted.113 Instead, they have made only general allegations
    about the suitability of their terrain and the presence of natural
    gas reserves without mentioning “the viability of or actual in-
    terest in extraction.”114 As one group of Defendants-Appellees
    puts it, the Municipal Plaintiffs have failed to allege “that the
    reserves within their borders could feasibly be extracted via
    fracking, or that but for the [ban], a permit would have been
    112
    Perhaps recognizing this problem, Plaintiffs-Appellants ask
    us to take judicial notice of a potential fracking project in
    Wayne County that is the subject of a separate case in the
    United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsyl-
    vania. But Plaintiffs-Appellants did not plead any facts about
    this project in their Amended Complaint, and the Municipal
    Plaintiffs did not file a Second Amended Complaint even after
    the District Court gave them the opportunity to do so. We
    “generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time
    on appeal” and will not do so here given the multiple opportu-
    nities Plaintiffs-Appellants had to raise this project in support
    of their claim to standing. Orie v. Dist. Att’y Allegheny Cnty.,
    
    946 F.3d 187
    , 195 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted).
    113
    See Ellison v. Am. Bd. of Orthopedic Surgery, 
    11 F.4th 200
    ,
    206 (3d Cir. 2021) (explaining that where a plaintiff has alleg-
    edly been denied a benefit or opportunity, evidence that they
    are “able and ready” to seek the benefit “lends concrete sub-
    stance and imminence to an injury that would otherwise be
    purely hypothetical.”).
    114
    JA0024.
    31
    issued and withstood likely legal challenges, [or] that fracking
    would in fact occur, or that the fracking would result in actual
    extraction of natural gas and [the] payment of fees into the
    Well Fund.”115 This lack of detail is fatal to the Municipal
    Plaintiffs’ standing, because it renders their economic injuries
    “hypothetical” and “conjectural” rather than “actual or immi-
    nent.”116
    At most, the Municipal Plaintiffs have shown a possi-
    bility of future economic injury through the loss of hypothetical
    future fracking projects within their borders. But that is not
    enough to give them standing, because “[a]llegations of possi-
    ble future injury are not sufficient.”117 The Municipal Plain-
    tiffs accordingly lack standing based on economic injuries, as
    the District Court found.
    C.
    Finally, Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that both the Senate
    and Municipal Plaintiffs have standing based on injuries they
    115
    Brief of Democratic State Senators and Bucks and Mont-
    gomery Counties at 52.
    116
    Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339; see also Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 564
    (stating that “some day” intentions without “any description of
    concrete plans” or “any specification of when the some day will
    be” do not give rise to an actual or imminent injury for standing
    purposes); MGM Resorts Int’l Glob. Gaming Develop., LLC v.
    Malloy, 
    861 F.3d 40
    , 42–43 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that MGM
    lacked standing to challenge a Connecticut law because it
    “failed to allege any specific plans to develop a casino in Con-
    necticut,” rendering the alleged harm “too speculative to sup-
    port Article III standing”).
    117
    Clapper, 
    568 U.S. at 409
     (emphasis in original).
    32
    suffered as “trustees of [Pennsylvania’s] natural resources” un-
    der the ERA.118 Although this is Plaintiffs-Appellants’ most
    legally creative theory of standing, it too falls short.
    Pennsylvania voters ratified the ERA in 1971 after dec-
    ades of “virtually unrestrained exploitation” of the state’s nat-
    ural resources led to “destructive and lasting consequences not
    only for the environment but also for the citizens’ quality of
    life.”119 The Amendment provides:
    The people have a right to clean air, pure water,
    and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, his-
    toric and esthetic values of the environment.
    Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
    common property of all the people, including
    generations yet to come. As trustee of these re-
    sources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
    maintain them for the benefit of all the people.120
    The first sentence of the ERA is a “prohibitory clause” that
    limits the state’s ability to infringe on citizens’ right to clean
    air, pure water, and the preservation of the environment.121
    The second and third sentences create a public trust pursuant
    to which Pennsylvania’s “[public] natural resources are the
    corpus . . . , the Commonwealth is the trustee, and the people
    are the named beneficiaries.”122
    118
    Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 61–62.
    119
    Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 
    161 A.3d 911
    ,
    918–19 (Pa. 2017) (“PEDF”).
    120
    PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
    121
    PEDF, 161 A.3d at 931.
    122
    Id. at 931–32.
    33
    Plaintiffs-Appellants’ argument for standing under the
    ERA proceeds in two parts. First, they argue that because the
    Commonwealth’s trustee obligations extend to “all agencies
    and entities of the Commonwealth government, both statewide
    and local,” they are all trustees of Pennsylvania’s public natu-
    ral resources under the ERA.123 Second, they argue that the
    Commission’s ban on fracking has harmed them in their roles
    as ERA trustees because it has “precluded [them] from exer-
    cising their constitutionally enshrined fiduciary obliga-
    tions.”124
    We need not resolve the first issue, because even if we
    assume that all of the Plaintiffs-Appellants are ERA trustees
    under Pennsylvania law, they have failed to show that the ban
    on fracking is causing them, or will imminently cause them, a
    concrete injury-in-fact in connection with that role. Plaintiffs-
    Appellants assert that “any attempt by a non-trustee to admin-
    ister the Trust or take control of its corpus is a per se injury”
    and “[g]iven that the Commission is not a trustee under the
    ERA, its interference with the Trust’s administration is an in-
    jury-in-fact.”125 Plaintiffs-Appellants offer no legal support
    for these broad assertions, however, and they conflict with the
    understanding that, “under Article III, an injury in law is not
    an injury in fact.”126 In TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 
    141 S. Ct. 2190
     (2021), for example, the Supreme Court held that
    thousands of class action plaintiffs lacked Article III standing
    to sue a credit reporting agency under the Fair Credit Reporting
    Act because the agency’s inclusion of inaccurate information
    123
    
    Id.
     at 932 n.23.
    124
    Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 58–59.
    125
    Id. at 63.
    126
    TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2205.
    34
    in the plaintiffs’ internal credit files—while a violation of the
    Act—did not cause them concrete harm.127 In so holding, the
    Court reiterated that, to be sufficiently concrete for Article III
    purposes, a plaintiff’s injury must be “real, and not abstract.”128
    The Supreme Court has also explained that a plaintiff cannot
    “allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete
    harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.”129
    That, in a nutshell, is the problem with Plaintiffs-Appel-
    lants’ ERA trustee theory of standing: it complains of a bare
    procedural violation divorced from any concrete harm. Plain-
    tiffs-Appellants allege, for example, the ban on fracking has
    “interfered with [their] management of the Trust.”130 But they
    fail to explain what, exactly, the ban is preventing them from
    doing. At their most specific, Plaintiffs-Appellants assert that,
    as trustees, they may “bring and defend actions that impact the
    Trust, and take reasonable steps to increase the value of the
    Trust’s assets.”131 But tellingly, Plaintiffs-Appellants do not
    allege any specific actions that they are actually trying to bring
    or defend, or any “reasonable steps” that they are actually try-
    ing to take as ERA trustees. As pled, these injuries are neither
    concrete nor “actual or imminent”; they are wholly abstract.132
    Perhaps understanding this, Plaintiffs-Appellants ad-
    vance one final argument: that the ban on fracking harms the
    public trust created by the ERA by decreasing fracking
    127
    Id. at 2210.
    128
    Id. at 2204 (listing cases).
    129
    Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341.
    130
    JA0308.
    131
    JA0296.
    132
    Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339.
    35
    revenues in Pennsylvania. The idea is that the corpus of the
    trust includes not only the state’s public natural resources, in-
    cluding its oil and gas reserves, but also “any funds derived
    from the sale or lease of those resources.”133 Plaintiffs-Appel-
    lants thus allege that by reducing fracking revenues, the ban
    has “directly and substantially injured the Trust’s corpus.”134
    As several environmental organizations explain in a
    joint amicus brief, however, this argument fundamentally mis-
    understands the ERA and would turn it “upside down” if ac-
    cepted.135 Plaintiffs-Appellants are arguing that the ERA, a
    state constitutional amendment intended to protect Pennsylva-
    nia’s natural resources from exploitation by placing them in a
    public trust, actually “requires the liquidation of public natural
    resources for cash—that this actually improves the public
    trust.”136 We disagree. The problem with this argument is that
    it ignores the explicit purpose of the ERA and mistakes the
    unique public trust it created for a run-of-the-mill financial
    trust in which the trustees have a duty to maximize profits. The
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has explained that the purpose
    of the public trust created by the ERA is not to make money; it
    is to “conserve and maintain” the state’s public natural re-
    sources.137 To promote this purpose, the ERA “imposes two
    basic duties on the Commonwealth as the trustee.”138 First,
    “the Commonwealth has a duty to prohibit the degradation,
    133
    Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 52.
    134
    JA0308.
    135
    Brief of Environmental Amici at 22.
    136
    Id. at 23.
    137
    PEDF, 161 A.3d at 933 n.26 (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, §
    27).
    138
    Id. at 933.
    36
    diminution, and depletion of [Pennsylvania’s] public natural
    resources, whether these harms might result from direct state
    action or from the actions of private parties.”139 Second, “the
    Commonwealth must act affirmatively via legislative action to
    protect the environment.”140 Importantly, under the ERA, the
    Commonwealth is not a “mere proprietor” that “deals at arms’
    length with its citizens, measuring its gains by the balance
    sheet profits and appreciation it realizes.”141 Instead, it is a “fi-
    duciary, measuring its successes by the benefits it bestows
    upon all citizens in their utilization of natural resources under
    law.”142
    Plaintiffs-Appellants nevertheless point to the fact that
    under Pennsylvania caselaw, certain proceeds from natural gas
    extraction “must remain in the trust and must be devoted to the
    conservation and maintenance of [Pennsylvania’s] public nat-
    ural resources.”143 But the fact that the ERA requires certain
    fracking proceeds to remain in the trust does not mean that trus-
    tees somehow have a duty to keep fracking. To the contrary,
    the duty of loyalty requires trustees to “manage the corpus of
    the trust so as to accomplish the trust’s purposes,” which here
    is the conservation and maintenance of Pennsylvania’s public
    natural resources.144 And although it is possible to conceive of
    139
    Id.
    140
    Id.
    141
    Id. at 932 (cleaned up).
    142
    Id. (emphasis added).
    143
    Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 52 (quoting PEDF,
    161 A.3d at 936).
    144
    PEDF, 161 A.3d at 932 (emphasis added) (citing Metzger
    v. Lehigh Valley Tr. & Safe Deposit Co., 
    69 A. 1037
    , 1038
    (1908)).
    37
    a situation where the sale of trust assets might be necessary to
    advance the purposes of a conservation trust or save it from
    insolvency, Plaintiffs-Appellants have not alleged that any-
    thing like that is happening here.
    When the nature of the public trust created by the ERA
    is properly understood, it becomes clear that neither the trust
    nor its corpus is being concretely harmed by the Commission’s
    decision to ban fracking in the Basin. To the contrary, the ban
    promotes the purposes of the trust and protects its corpus by
    preventing Pennsylvania’s natural gas reserves, part of the
    Commonwealth’s “public natural resources,” from being de-
    pleted.145 Thus, even if Plaintiffs-Appellants were trustees of
    Pennsylvania’s public natural resources under the ERA, they
    have failed to show that the ban on fracking is causing them
    harm in that role, let alone the kind of concrete injury-in-fact
    required to give them standing in federal court. For this reason,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants’ final theory of standing also fails.
    IV.
    Because we agree with the District Court that Plaintiffs-
    Appellants lack standing to challenge the Commission’s ban
    on fracking, we will affirm.
    145
    PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
    38