Carl Barton v. Hewlett Packard Co , 635 F. App'x 46 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ________________
    No. 14-4785
    ________________
    CARL J. BARTON,
    Appellant
    v.
    HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY
    ________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D. C. Civ. No. 2-13-cv-00554
    District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
    ________________
    Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    on October 8, 2015
    Before: FUENTES, SMITH and BARRY, Circuit Judges
    (Filed: December 15, 2015)
    ________________
    OPINION*
    ________________
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
    Plaintiff Carl Barton appeals the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in
    favor of defendant Hewlett-Packard (“HP”). For the following reasons, we will affirm
    the District Court’s judgment.
    I.
    Barton was a software salesperson for HP. In April 2012, HP issued Barton a
    Sales Letter describing his eligibility for sales commissions in fiscal year 2012. The
    letter set Barton’s sales quota (i.e., revenue target) at $1.3 million and his base
    commission rate at 6.52%, meaning that Barton would be eligible for a commission of
    $84,760 if he met his sales quota. If Barton exceeded his sales quota, he was eligible for
    “accelerated” commission rates ranging up to 18.25% for sales exceeding $2.288 million.
    The Sales Letter stated that “HP reserves the right to adjust the terms of the Sales
    Plan or to cancel it at any time.” J.A. 169. The letter also incorporated a similar
    provision from HP’s Global Compensation Policy: “HP reserves the right to adjust or
    cancel the terms of Sales plans, or Sales letters with or without notice at any time,
    including but not limited to adjusting accounts, goals/quota, target incentive amount
    (TIA) or to address changing or unforeseen business conditions or to correct
    administrative errors.” J.A. 176. HP also reserved final authority to resolve any dispute
    about commission payments: “In the event of any dispute regarding the application of, or
    payment under the terms of this letter and applicable policies and guidelines, Hewlett-
    Packard shall decide each such dispute in its sole discretion.” J.A. 169. Finally, the
    Sales Letter assigned HP “the right to review and in its sole discretion adjust incentive
    2
    payments associated with large transactions for which the incentive payments are
    disproportionate when compared with the employee’s assigned quota or contribution to
    toward the transactions.” J.A. 168.
    In March 2012, General Motors Corporation proposed to enter into an unlimited
    enterprise licensing agreement for HP’s entire suite of software products, including
    Vertica, the software product that Barton sold. Barton was not a member of the HP team
    that negotiated the license. Nevertheless, he claims that he developed the pricing model
    that the HP team used to negotiate the price of Vertica. General Motors ultimately
    entered into a licensing agreement that priced Vertica at $8.28 million. Barton claims
    that his pricing model resulted in an additional $6.2 million in revenue for HP that the
    negotiators would not otherwise have realized.
    HP decided to compensate its salespersons for the General Motors license
    agreement, but did not award accelerated commission rates for the total revenue of the
    deal. Barton was paid at his base commission rate of 6.52%, resulting in a payment of
    $539,452. Barton claims that his role in the deal warranted payment at an accelerated
    rate, resulting in a commission of $1,273,019.
    3
    Barton brought this breach-of-contract action to recover $733,477.54 in unpaid
    sales commissions. The District Court concluded that the Sales Letter was not an
    enforceable contract and granted summary judgment to HP.1
    II.
    The parties agree that Barton’s claim is governed by Pennsylvania law.      “Under
    Pennsylvania law, contract formation requires: (1) a mutual manifestation of an intention
    to be bound, (2) terms sufficiently definite to be enforced, and (3) consideration.”2
    Here, HP clearly manifested its intention not to be bound by the commission rates
    set forth in the Sales Letter. HP reserved the right to “adjust the terms of the Sales Plan
    or to cancel it any time”; to “adjust or cancel the terms of Sales plans, or Sales letters
    with or without notice at any time”; to “change or discontinue” its Global Sales
    Compensation Policy “with or without notice at any time”; and to decide any dispute
    regarding commission payments “in its sole discretion.” J.A. 169, 176. As other courts
    of appeal have recognized, no contract is formed if an employer retains complete
    1
    We have jurisdiction over Barton’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise
    plenary review over the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment. Howley v.
    Mellon Fin. Corp., 
    625 F.3d 788
    , 792 (3d Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate
    based on the interpretation of a contract where “the contract is so clear that it can be read
    only one way.” Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. v. USX Corp., 
    249 F.3d 191
    , 201
    (3d Cir. 2001).
    2
    Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 
    560 F.3d 156
    , 160 (3d Cir. 2009).
    4
    discretion to modify or cancel an employee’s commission.3 This conclusion accords with
    hornbook Pennsylvania law.4
    Barton argues that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can
    overcome the express disclaimer language in the Sales Letter and convert HP’s illusory
    promise into an enforceable obligation. But the duty of good faith and fair dealing only
    applies to a party’s performance of an existing contract, and “does not extend to issues of
    contract formation.”5 The Pennsylvania cases upon which Barton relies do not suggest
    otherwise. Rather, they each concern a party’s good-faith obligation to perform a
    discrete, discretionary task under an otherwise enforceable contract.6 None support the
    3
    See Geras v. IBM, 
    638 F.3d 1311
    , 1317 (10th Cir. 2011) (sales letter was not a contract
    because “[a]lthough the letter contained a description of IBM’s present policies,
    including its policies for adjusting payments, it reiterated that IBM retained the discretion
    to alter or cancel these policies, even after sales had occurred”); Kavitz v. IBM, 458 Fed.
    Appx. 18, 20 (2d Cir. 2012) (fact that employer “retained unfettered discretion under the
    Plan to adjust its terms or even to cancel the Plan entirely confirms that the document is
    not an enforceable contract”).
    4
    See Lackner v. Glosser, 
    892 A.2d 21
    , 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (“If the promise is
    entirely optional with the promisor, it is illusory, lacks consideration, and is
    unenforceable.” (citing Geisinger Clinic v. Di Cuccio, 
    414 Pa. Super. 85
    , 
    606 A.2d 509
    ,
    512 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992))).
    5
    Novinger Group, Inc. v. Hartford Ins., Inc., 
    514 F. Supp. 2d 662
    , 671 (M.D. Pa. 2007);
    see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 & cmt. c (rule imposing duty of good
    faith and fair dealing in performance and enforcement of contracts “does not deal with
    good faith in the formation of a contract”).
    6
    See Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 
    341 Pa. Super. 42
    , 60-61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)
    (party had good faith obligation to determine amounts actually owed under a judgment
    note); Starr v. O-I Brockway Glass, 
    432 Pa. Super. 255
    , 259-60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)
    (party had good faith obligation to determine whether it was able to purchase property
    from a third party); Jamison v. Concepts Plus, Inc., 
    380 Pa. Super. 431
    , 432-40 (Pa.
    Super. Ct. 1988) (party had good faith obligation to obtain necessary approvals and
    permits).
    5
    proposition that the duty of good faith can create a binding contract where, as here, one
    party expressly disclaims any obligation to perform.
    Barton also argues that the Sales Letter has “the look and feel of a contract” and
    contains various “indicators” of contractual intent, such as fixed quotas and commission
    rates, “mandatory language” concerning the terms of incentive calculations, and
    references to “Legal Info” and “Terms & Conditions.” But we determine the parties’
    intent by examining the entire writing,7 and HP’s clear, unequivocal, and repeated
    reservation of the choice to perform defeats any inference that HP otherwise intended to
    be bound. Likewise, the fact that both parties signed the agreement is not controlling
    because “[s]ignatures are not dispositive evidence of contractual intent.”8 The plain
    language of the Sales Letter unambiguously grants HP the right to perform or not perform
    at its own election, and therefore is not an enforceable contract.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s December 9, 2014 Order
    granting summary judgment to HP.
    
    7 Will. v
    . Metzler, 
    132 F.3d 937
    , 947 (3d Cir. 1997).
    8
    Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 
    584 F.3d 575
    , 584 (3d Cir. 2009). Barton also
    urges us to certify to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the question of whether contract
    formation is precluded when one party retains discretion to change or cancel the terms of
    a deal at any time. We decline to do so, as the answer to this question involves a
    straightforward application of ordinary contract-law principles.
    6