In Re:Congoleum Corp , 426 F.3d 675 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2005 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    10-13-2005
    In Re:Congoleum Corp
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
    Docket No. 04-3609
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    Recommended Citation
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    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/296
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    PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 04-3609
    IN RE: CONGOLEUM CORP., ET AL.
    CENTURY INDEMNITY COMPANY, AS SUCCESSOR TO
    CCI INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SUCCESSOR TO
    INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICAN;
    ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY f/k/a
    CIGNA INSURANCE COMPANY; ACE PROPERTY
    & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY f/k/a CIGNA
    PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Appellants
    vs.
    CONGOLEUM CORPORATION; CONGOLEUM SALES,
    INC.; CONGOLEUM FISCAL, INC.
    ____________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
    (D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-01709)
    District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
    ____________
    Argued July 15, 2005
    Before: SLOVITER, McKEE and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
    Filed October 13, 2005
    ____________
    Tancred V. Schiavoni, Esquire (ARGUED)
    Jonathan J. Kim, Esquire
    O’Melveny & Myers LLP
    7 Times Square
    Times Square Tower
    New York, New York 10036
    Marty F. Siegal, Esquire
    Siegal & Napierkowski
    220 Lake Drive East
    Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08002
    Leonard P. Goldberger, Esquire
    White & Williams LLP
    1800 One Liberty Place
    Philadelphia, PA 19103
    Attorneys for Appellants Century Indemnity Company; Ace
    American Insurance Company; Ace Property & Casualty
    Insurance Company
    Richard W. Hill, Esquire (ARGUED)
    Rachel L. Diehl, Esquire
    Kevin J. Licciardi, Esquire
    McCarter & English, LLP
    Four Gateway Center
    100 Mulberry Street
    Newark, New Jersey 07102
    Kerry A. Brennan, Esquire (ARGUED)
    Richard L. Epling, Esquire
    Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
    1540 Broadway
    New York, New York 10036
    Paul S. Hollander, Esq.
    Okin, Hollander & DeLuca
    One Parker Plaza
    12 th Floor
    Fort Lee, NJ 07024
    Attorneys for Appellees Congoleum Corporation, Congoleum
    Sales, Inc., Congoleum Fiscal, Inc. and Gilbert Heintz &
    Randolph, LLP
    ____________
    OPINION
    ____________
    WEIS, Circuit Judge.
    In this pre-packaged Chapter 11 reorganization, we
    hold that evidence of pre-petition conduct in this case by a law firm
    is relevant to a review of a debtor’s application to retain the firm as
    special insurance counsel. We conclude that the bankruptcy judge
    should not have granted the application here. The firm had acted
    as counsel for the debtor pre-petition in negotiating settlement
    arrangements with asbestos injury claimants represented by
    attorneys who were co-counsel with the firm in insurance matters
    for those same claimants. We conclude that conflicts existed which
    precluded the firm’s retention under the Rules of Professional
    Conduct and the Bankruptcy Code.
    Facing nearly 100,000 claims for injury caused by
    asbestos in its products and the exhaustion of its primary liability
    insurance coverage, Congoleum filed a declaratory judgment in the
    Superior Court of New Jersey in 2001 against a number of excess
    carriers.1 The complaint was filed by the law firm of Dughi, Hewit
    & Pallatucci, which had represented Congoleum in insurance
    matters for more than ten years.2
    1
    Congoleum Corporation v. Ace American Ins. Co.,
    et al., Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex
    County, Docket No. MID-L 8908-01.
    2
    We take judicial notice of the state court
    proceedings insofar as they are relevant here. See Furnari v.
    Warden, Allenwood Federal Correctional Inst., 
    218 F.3d 250
    , 255
    (3d Cir. 2000); In re Indian Palms Assocs., Ltd., 
    61 F.3d 197
    , 205
    (3d Cir. 1995) (concluding that judicial notice can be taken of
    certain facts such as that a document was filed, a position taken, an
    3
    While that litigation continued, Congoleum 3 sought
    relief in the Bankruptcy Court in a Chapter 11 pre-packaged plan
    of reorganization designed to channel existing and future asbestos
    claims to a trust as authorized by 
    11 U.S.C. § 524
    (g). Approval of
    the plan would enable Congoleum to preserve its assets and
    continue in business because the trust would assume its asbestos
    liability. Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that 75%
    of current asbestos claimants approve a plan of reorganization
    before a channeling order may be issued. As a result, garnering
    support from a large number of claimants is crucial to the success
    of a plan.
    A unique feature of asbestos personal injury litigation
    is the fact that a small group of law firms represents hundreds of
    thousands of plaintiffs. Another notable aspect is that, because
    over time they may have been exposed to asbestos in various
    environments, some of the injured persons may have claims against
    a number of defendants.
    The realities of securing favorable votes from
    thousands of claimants to meet the 75% approval requirement
    forces debtors to work closely with the few attorneys who represent
    large numbers of injured claimants. A prepackaged plan of
    reorganization acceptable to the debtor must be satisfactory for the
    claimants as well4 and, consequently, extensive negotiations are
    necessary.
    admission or allegation made “as long as it is not unfair to a party
    to do so and does not undermine the trial court’s factfinding
    authority.”).
    3
    Congoleum Corporation, Congoleum Sales, Inc.
    and Congoleum Fiscal, Inc. filed for bankruptcy. We will refer to
    those entities as “Congoleum.”
    4
    Pre-packaged bankruptcies employing a channeling
    injunction are not eligible for the “cram down” provision contained
    in 
    11 U.S.C. § 1129
    (b)(1) which allows the bankruptcy court to
    confirm a plan of reorganization over creditors’ objections in
    certain circumstances.
    4
    I.
    In this case, negotiations between the debtor and
    counsel for plaintiffs produced a proposal that involved the
    creation of a trust funded primarily by proceeds from Congoleum’s
    insurance carriers to pay for settlements of existing, as well as
    future asbestos personal injury claims. Congoleum was to
    contribute to the trust a $2.7 million promissary note payable ten
    years after confirmation and ABI, Congoleum’s parent corporation,
    was to contribute $250,000 cash and the pledge of its shares in
    Congoleum to secure Congoleum’s promissory note. Notably,
    neither Congoleum nor related entities were required to contribute
    equity to the trust.5
    The pre-petition activity that occurred in this case is
    5
    
    11 U.S.C.A. § 524
    (g) provides for the bankruptcy
    channeling injunction and subsection (2)(B) contains the
    requirements for the injunction; it requires that –
    (i) the injunction is to be implemented in connection
    with a trust that, pursuant to the plan of reorganization –
    (I) is to assume the liabilities of a debtor ...;
    (II) is to be funded in whole or in part by the
    securities of 1 or more debtors involved in such plan
    and by the obligation of such debtor or debtors to
    make future payments, including dividends;
    (III) is to own, or by the exercise of rights granted
    under such plan would be entitled to own if specified
    contingencies occur, a majority of the voting shares
    of –
    (aa) each such debtor;
    (bb) the parent corporation of each
    such debtor; or
    (cc) a subsidiary of each such debtor
    that is also a debtor; and
    (IV) is to use its assets or income to pay claims and
    demands; ...
    
    11 U.S.C.A. § 524
    (g)(emphasis added).
    5
    fairly typical of that in a number of asbestos pre-packaged plans.
    Joseph F. Rice and Perry Weitz, two plaintiffs’ lawyers,6 negotiated
    a settlement of numerous asbestos claims with Congoleum’s
    counsel, Gilbert, Heintz & Randolph, LLP (“Gilbert”). The
    agreement employed a matrix to “resolve and settle” the amounts
    the various classes of claimants would receive as damages. For
    example, mesothelioma victims were each allocated $100,000. In
    contrast, those with non-malignant injuries would receive $1,000.7
    To qualify for compensation, a participating claimant
    was required to provide evidence of injury and exposure to
    Congoleum products.        Claims of the qualified participating
    claimants would be secured to 75% of the matrix values and the
    remainder would be treated as unsecured claims. In contrast to the
    claims of participating claimants addressed in the settlement
    agreement, claims settled with a separate group of claimants pre-
    petition would be secured in full.
    II.
    The role Gilbert played in preparing the plan is
    challenged in this proceeding. In October 2002, Perry Weitz
    recommended that Congoleum retain Gilbert to assist in solving
    insurance coverage for Congoleum’s mounting asbestos liability.
    Gilbert specializes in insurance coverage disputes and product
    6
    Perry Weitz is a partner in the law firm of Weitz &
    Luxenberg, P.C. Joseph Rice is a partner in the law firm of Motley
    Rice, LLC. Those two firms represent hundreds of thousands of
    asbestos claimants. Weitz and Rice executed the Claimant
    Agreement as representatives of participating asbestos claimants.
    7
    The settlement amounts were assigned as follows:
    (1) mesothelioma – $100,000;
    (2) lung cancer – $30,000;
    (3) other cancers – $10,000;
    (4) Level II non-malignant disease – $3,000; and
    (5) Level I – nonmalignant disease – $1,000.
    6
    liability matters. It serves in a variety of capacities related to
    various asbestos mass tort cases and represents defendants as well
    as claimant and creditor committees in various asbestos
    bankruptcies.
    At the time he recommended the firm to Congoleum,
    Weitz had existing co-counsel relationships with Gilbert in other
    asbestos related proceedings.8 The arrangements were that Gilbert
    would represent the claimants in seeking recovery from the insurers
    of asbestos defendants.
    Gilbert described its work as co-counsel with Weitz
    as providing:
    “insurance-related advice to certain
    claimants in asbestos and other
    contexts. [Gilbert] represents certain
    asbestos-re la te d bo d ily injur y
    claimants in proceedings against a
    primary insurer with respect to that
    insurer’s coverage obligations . . . in
    pursuing coverage claims against
    insurers . . . and in pursuing coverage
    from insurers of similar defendants.”
    Gilbert explained that it did not represent the individual claimants
    with respect to the establishment of their tort claims, “but only with
    respect to the collection of insurance monies to pay claims that may
    be established.”
    On February 6, 2003, Gilbert entered into a formal
    retention agreement to advise and represent Congoleum in efforts
    to negotiate with claimants’ counsel to settle “pending asbestos-
    related bodily injury” claims, and arrange for the “terms of a ‘pre-
    packaged’ plan of reorganization.” For these services, Gilbert was
    to receive a fixed fee of $2 million from Congoleum. Congoleum
    8
    Perry Weitz’s suggestion that Congoleum contact
    Gilbert occurred in the midst of negotiations of claims against
    Congoleum by two individuals suffering from mesothelioma,
    Messrs. Cook and Arseneault.
    7
    also paid Perry Weitz and Joseph Rice 9 $1 million each for fees and
    expenses they “incurred or may incur in connection with”
    negotiating the pre-packaged plan.
    In its letter of retention, Gilbert disclosed to
    Congoleum its many representations in the asbestos field, including
    that it had been retained to represent individual tort claimants “to
    provide legal advice with respect to insurance matters.” Gilbert
    explained that its “co-counsel with respect to many of these matters
    is [Weitz].” Gilbert also stated that it
    “represents other clients, not listed
    here, that are or may be adverse to the
    [sic] Congoleum with respect to
    asbestos related claims. GHR will
    continue to represent these and other
    similarly situated clients in these
    capacities in the future. ... In light of
    the Firm’s representation of entities
    that are potentially adverse to
    Congoleum in other matters, GHR
    9
    No party has raised objections to the fees of $2
    million payable to Gilbert and the $1 million each payable to Weitz
    and Rice. That matter is not before us and we do not rule on it at
    this point.
    In In re: Combustion Engineering, 
    295 B.R. 459
    (Bankr. D. N.J. 2003) (vacated on other grounds, 
    391 F.3d 190
    (2004)), a pre-packaged asbestos bankruptcy case, Joseph Rice
    sought a $20 million fee for his pre-petition work. That fee was to
    be paid by a corporation affiliated with the debtor, but was
    disallowed by the bankruptcy judge because Rice had a conflict of
    interest.
    In In re Pittsburgh Corning, 
    308 B.R. 716
     (Bankr.
    W.D. Pa. 2004), the bankruptcy court refused to allow a fee of $30
    million to be received by Gilbert in representing the asbestos
    claimants’ committee. The judge found Gilbert had a conflict of
    interest in that pre-package asbestos proceeding.
    8
    cannot provide any legal services to
    Congoleum that could impair its
    ability to represent fully its corporate
    and other clients. Congoleum agrees
    that GHR may continue to represent or
    to undertake to represent existing or
    new clients as described above or in
    other matters, even though the
    positions taken by other clients in
    those matters may be adverse to the
    positions taken by Congoleum in those
    or other matters. Congoleum will not,
    in [sic] the basis of GHR’s
    representation of them, object to
    GHR’s continuing or undertaking the
    representation of other clients in
    matters where the positions taken by
    such clients are adverse to those taken
    by Congoleum in those or other
    matters.”
    In addition to negotiating on Congoleum’s behalf
    with claimants’ counsel to structure the contemplated bankruptcy
    reorganization, Gilbert participated in the declaratory judgment
    action in New Jersey state court, although the Dughi firm is the
    lead trial counsel in that proceeding.
    Congoleum filed its reorganization petition on
    December 31, 2003 and on January 23, 2004 applied for
    bankruptcy court approval to retain Gilbert as “special insurance
    counsel.” The application stated that Gilbert “would be primarily
    responsible for strategic advice on insurance issues, including but
    not limited to insurance-related settlement negotiations, and the
    representation of the Debtors with respect to insurance issues
    arising in the context of the Chapter 11 Cases.”
    The application continued, “GHR was the primary
    counsel that negotiated with representatives of asbestos plaintiffs
    to create the structure of the Debtors’ Plan. GHR also represented
    Congoleum in negotiating and drafting asbestos settlement
    9
    agreements that liquidated numerous claims asserted against
    Congoleum in the tort system. The settlement of numerous
    asbestos claims allowed the Debtors to negotiate the Plan, which
    contemplates that the primary assets dedicated to pay asbestos
    claims will be Congoleum’s right to receive insurance proceeds.”
    The following services “among other things” were
    to be provided by Gilbert:
    “(a) advising and representing the
    D ebtors in insurance-related
    settlement negotiations and mediations
    with insurers and other parties;
    (b) pursuant to request of the Debtors,
    advising and assisting the Debtors in
    consultations with parties-in-interest
    regarding unresolved, potentially
    available insurance coverage;
    (c) advising the Debtors as to the
    appropriate steps necessary to assert
    claims against and obtain proceeds
    from insurers;
    (d) reviewing and analyzing
    insurance-related documents, data,
    applications, orders, operating reports,
    schedules and other materials;
    (e) representing the Debtors at
    hearings concerning insurance-related
    issues in the bankruptcy case;
    (f) advising and assisting the Debtors
    in preparing appropriate insurance-
    related legal pleadings and proposed
    insurance-related orders in the
    bankruptcy case;
    (g) pursuant to requests of the
    Debtors, advising and assisting the
    Debtors with respect to insurance-
    10
    related issues in connection with the
    formulation negotiation and
    confirm ation of a plan of
    reorganization;
    (h) pursuant to requests of the
    Debtors, assisting and advising the
    Debtors generally with respect to
    insurance-related issues during the
    Chapter 11 Cases, and such other
    services as may be in the best interest
    of the Debtors; and
    (i) preparing appropriate pleadings
    and orders, conducting discovery, and
    representing Congoleum in the
    Coverage Litigation (if the automatic
    stay is not maintained) or in any
    adversarial proceeding relating to the
    determination of insurance rights or
    collection of insurance claims;
    provided, however, that the Debtors
    anticipate that [Dughi] will continue
    to act as primary litigation counsel in
    the Coverage Litigation and GHR’s
    role in this regard will consist of
    coordinating the Coverage Litigation
    with insurance settlement efforts and
    assisting [Dughi] as required.”
    Certain of Congoleum’s liability insurers who had
    not participated in the formulation of the plan objected to the
    application to retain Gilbert. They alleged that Gilbert was in
    conflict because of the duties it owed the individual claimants it
    represented as co-counsel with Weitz. The insurers also pointed
    out that the Kenesis Group, LLC (“Kenesis”), a third party owned
    70% by Gilbert and hired pre-petition by Congoleum to screen
    claimants, had already been disqualified from being retained to
    review claims in In re ACandS, Inc., 
    297 B.R. 395
     (Bankr. D. Del.
    2003), a proceeding in which Gilbert had been involved. They
    argued that Gilbert’s extensive relationship to Perry Weitz and
    11
    Joseph Rice in other asbestos matters violated both the
    disinterestedness requirement of section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy
    Code and the Rules of Professional Conduct. Moreover, the details
    of the fee arrangement between Gilbert and Weitz had not been
    disclosed. The insurers also asked for discovery to further explore
    Gilbert’s relationship with other parties involved in the bankruptcy.
    On March 1, 2004, the bankruptcy judge heard
    argument on Congoleum’s application to retain Gilbert. The
    United States Trustee appeared and stated that he did “not object
    to Gilbert Heintz’ retention.” The Trustee conceded, however, that
    “[t]here are certainly potential conflicts. And when it’s potential
    under Marvel,10 there’s a weighing of whether it’s going to become
    actual or not ... [a]nd we need to see what happens here.”
    Gilbert contended that its conduct pre-petition was
    not relevant to its employment as special counsel. It argued that,
    as to the matters listed in the application, the interests of the
    individuals it represented as co-counsel with Weitz were aligned
    with Congoleum’s interests to obtain recovery from the insurers.
    The bankruptcy judge granted the application to
    employ Gilbert, holding that the standards set in section 327(e) of
    the Bankruptcy Code, rather than those in section 327(a), applied
    and, hence, the requirement of disinterestedness of section 327(a)
    was not pertinent. The judge noted the difference between pre- and
    post- petition representation and said,
    “[w]hatever else may have gone on in
    the pre-petition negotiations, even if
    GHR was bad, bad, bad, now today,
    both the Debtor and GHR want to
    preserve and maximize the Debtor’s
    insurance assets. I’m not making a
    finding about whether GHR acted
    improperly pre-petition.
    I’m just saying that its pre-petition
    10
    In re: Marvel Entertainment Group, 
    140 F.3d 463
    (3d Cir. 1998).
    12
    behavior cannot carry the day on a
    post-petition retention application for
    different services.”
    In addition to the challenge to Gilbert’s retention, the
    insurers also contested Congoleum’s employment of Kenesis
    Group, LLP as consultants and claim processors. Gilbert owned a
    70% interest in Kenesis. Congoleum had paid $1,678,000 for
    Kenesis’ work screening asbestos claimants.11 Congoleum’s
    application described Kenesis’ work pre-petition, indicating that it
    would continue to review claims it had previously processed and
    determined to be deficient to determine whether the defects had
    been cured. In addition, the application indicated that Kenesis
    would perform consulting services for Congoleum’s law firms,
    including Gilbert and Dughi.
    On April 5, 2004, about one month after granting
    Gilbert’s application, the Bankruptcy Court heard argument on the
    Kenesis application.       In response to the objections from
    Congoleum’s insurers and the United States Trustee, the Court
    denied the application. The bankruptcy judge based her denial on
    the “concern that Kenesis [was] not disinterested due to its
    relationship with [Gilbert].” The judge noted that Kenesis had
    been involved in “negotiating the Claimant Agreement [pre-
    petition] and that forms the backbone of the reorganization plan.
    So the Court finds that they were and continue to be involved in
    negotiating the plan.”
    The bankruptcy judge further expressed concern that
    Kenesis might have a conflict of interest with the debtor because
    the payment it received for pre-petition services might be a
    preference. Moreover, the court shared “the U.S. Trustee’s
    concern that Kenesis is not disinterested due to its relationship with
    GHR. The prospect that GHR would be reviewing the work
    product of an entity with such a strong overlap of identity is still
    11
    Kenesis subcontracted its work to The
    Clearinghouse LLC, an organization owned by an individual who
    was on leave of absence from a position as a paralegal at Joseph
    Rice’s law firm. Kenesis purchased The Clearing House before
    beginning claims review work for Congoleum.
    13
    more reason that Kenesis does not meet the standards of 327.”
    The insurers appealed the ruling on Gilbert’s
    retention. The District Court concluded that the bankruptcy judge
    was correct in her rulings on the alignment of interests and the
    application of section 327(e). The district judge commented that
    because the insurance companies were the primary source of funds
    to pay claimants, the carriers “have every interest in making it, to
    put it bluntly, difficult to confirm this bankruptcy, and that
    motivation is not lost on the Court.”
    In their appeal to this Court, the insurers raise several
    issues including: (1) whether the District Court erred in affirming
    the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that retaining Gilbert
    violated neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Rules of Professional
    Conduct; (2) whether the District Court erred by affirming that
    section 327(e) of the Bankruptcy Code applied rather than section
    327(a); (3) whether the District Court erred in not reversing the
    Bankruptcy Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law where
    the Bankruptcy Court neither conducted an evidentiary hearing nor
    allowed discovery; (4) whether the District Court erred by failing
    to consider Gilbert’s economic and other ties to lawyers
    representing asbestos claimants who are adverse to Congoleum;
    and (5) whether the District Court erred by affirming the
    Bankruptcy Court’s denial of the insurers’ Motion for Judicial
    Notice.
    Congoleum questions whether the insurers have
    standing to challenge the retention of special insurance counsel.
    III.
    This is a core proceeding pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 157
    (b)(2). The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 157
     and 1334. We have before us a final order which we
    review under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . In re United Artists Theatre Co.
    V. Walton, 
    315 F.3d 217
     (3d Cir. 2003); In re: Pillowtex, 
    304 F.3d 246
     (3d Cir. 2002).
    Because we are a court of appeals, “twice removed
    from the primary tribunal, we review both the factual and the legal
    determinations of the district court for error.” In re BH & P, Inc.,
    
    949 F.2d 1300
    , 1305 (3d Cir. 1991)(quoting Universal Minerals,
    14
    Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 
    669 F.2d 98
    , 101-02 (3d Cir. 1981)).
    In order to determine whether the District Court erred, we review
    the bankruptcy court's findings by the standards the District Court
    should have employed. 
    Id. at 1306
    .
    IV.
    At the outset we must consider Congoleum’s
    contention that the insurers lack standing to bring this appeal.
    Congoleum argues that the insurers are not creditors of the debtor,
    are not persons aggrieved by the retention order, and under the
    more restricted bankruptcy standards, lack appellate standing. In
    support of its position, Congoleum cites Travelers Insurance
    Company v. H.K. Porter Company, Inc., 
    45 F.3d 737
     (3d Cir.
    1995) and In re: Dykes, 
    10 F.3d 184
     (3d Cir. 1993).
    Article III standing need not be financial and only
    need be fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action. See Miller v.
    Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp., 
    362 F.3d 209
    , 221 (3d Cir. 2004)
    (listing the elements of Article III standing). In the bankruptcy
    field, however, we have adopted a jurisprudential rule that limits
    appellate standing to persons or entities that are aggrieved by an
    order which diminishes their property, increases their burdens, or
    detrimentally affects their rights. Travelers, 
    45 F.3d at 742
    .
    We cited the standing distinction in In re:
    Combustion Engineering, Inc., 
    391 F.3d 190
     (3d Cir. 2005). We
    recognized the acute need to limit appeals in bankruptcy cases
    which often involve a myriad of parties indirectly affected by every
    bankruptcy court order. Combustion Engineering involved a pre-
    packaged Chapter 11 plan similar to the one before us. We
    concluded that some of the insurers had appellate standing but only
    with respect to the limited group of issues that affected them. 
    Id. at 217-18
    .
    Here, the insurers are entitled to standing even under
    the more restrictive standard applied to bankruptcy proceedings.
    The retention of special insurance counsel is an important
    preliminary matter that will profoundly affect the determination of
    the validity of a proposed plan ab initio. It is an issue based on
    procedural due process concerns that implicate the integrity of the
    bankruptcy court proceeding as a whole. The retention of Gilbert
    as special insurance counsel will affect the resolution of issues that
    15
    may directly affect the rights of insurers and fairness to the
    asbestos claimants.
    Combustion Engineering and Dykes, on the other
    hand, were appeals from final orders confirming plans of
    reorganization. In Travelers, the objections were directed at an
    order reinstating certain claims. In the present case, the appeal is
    from an order which will affect the fairness of the entire
    bankruptcy proceeding, including the determination of issues such
    as those for which we granted insurer standing to challenge a final
    order in Combustion Engineering.
    Further, it is extremely important to resolve this
    preliminary matter now; otherwise, it may never be addressed.
    In re: Marvel Entertainment Group, 
    140 F.3d 463
     (3d
    Cir. 1998), presented a challenge to our jurisdiction in an appeal
    from an order refusing the trustee’s request to retain a certain law
    firm. We treated the bankruptcy judge’s order as final, pointing out
    that if we did not take jurisdiction at that point, no “meaningful
    review” of the denial of the appointment could ever take place. 
    Id. at 470
    .
    We observed that once a plan has proceeded to
    confirmation, orders involving retention of professionals are
    unlikely to get the attention they deserve. Once a bankruptcy
    reorganization has been completed, it would be unlikely that the
    proceedings would commence again from the beginning to correct
    preliminary issues. Id.; see also In re: Amatex Corp., 
    755 F.2d 1034
    , 1040 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that “waiting until a final plan
    is approved may well cause several years of hearings and
    negotiations to be wasted”); In re: GI Holdings, 
    385 F.3d 313
     (3d
    Cir. 2004) (reviewing an order appointing a trustee prior to plan
    confirmation). Addressing the challenges to Gilbert’s retention at
    this stage comports with our discussion of the unlikelihood of
    review late in a bankruptcy in Marvel as well as the concern for
    fairness and due process throughout complex bankruptcy
    proceedings such as this one.
    In addition, counsel for the insurers has a
    responsibility, if not a duty, to alert the Court to ethical conflicts.
    Rules governing professional conduct are often viewed as even
    16
    more necessary and applicable in bankruptcy cases than in other
    contexts. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy (15 th ed.) ¶ 8.01[1] (“Thus
    the importance of adherence to the ethical rules, as well as
    disclosure, initial and continuing, cannot be overemphasized.”).
    There are, of course, concerns about the tactical use
    of disqualification motions to harass opposing counsel. See
    Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 
    472 U.S. 424
    , 436 (1985)
    (disqualification of counsel in a civil, not a bankruptcy
    appointment). Similarly, courts must be cautious about infringing
    on the right of the debtor to retain counsel of its choice.
    Nevertheless, the obligation to ensure that professional ethics are
    followed has led courts to rule that counsel has standing to raise
    and challenge unethical procedures on the part of opposing
    lawyers. See Kevlik v. Goldstein, 
    724 F.2d 844
    , 848 (1 st Cir. 1984)
    (citing cases from the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Fifth
    Circuits authorizing attorneys to report ethical concerns to the
    court).
    We raised, but did not decide, whether a “motion to
    disqualify must be brought by a former client” in In re: Corn
    Derivatives Antitrust Litigation, 
    748 F.2d 157
    , 161 (3d Cir. 1984).
    However, we noted, “one of the inherent powers of any federal
    court is the admission and discipline of attorneys practicing before
    it.” 
    Id. at 160
    .
    The District Court in Schiffli Embroidery Workers’
    Pension Fund v. Ryan, Beck & Co., 
    1994 WL 62124
     (D.N.J. 1994),
    cited then Rule 8.1 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional
    Conduct, which required lawyers to report violations of the Rules
    of Professional Conduct. Based on that duty, the court found that
    a lawyer had standing to present a motion to disqualify its opposing
    counsel.
    Rule 8.3 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional
    Conduct is the current version of the rule addressed in Schiffli; it
    provides that a lawyer who knows that another lawyer has
    committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that
    raises a “substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty,
    trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform
    the appropriate professional authority.” See also O’Connor v.
    Jones, 
    946 F.2d 1395
    , 1399 (8 th Cir. 1991) (“In cases where
    17
    counsel is in violation of professional ethics, the court may act on
    motion of an aggrieved party or may act sua sponte to disqualify.”);
    International Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer, 
    527 F.2d 1288
    , 1295 (2d
    Cir. 1975) (considering the issue of attorney conflict despite failure
    of parties to raise the point).
    We need not decide whether the insurers’ counsel
    had a duty to disclose Gilbert’s conduct in this case. It is enough
    that the insurers’ counsel had the right to raise the issue under the
    Rules of Professional Conduct and require adjudication by the
    court. Concluding otherwise would suggest that we do not support
    the long-standing role of lawyers practicing before federal courts
    in monitoring and reporting ethical violations.
    We note also, as a practical matter, that in
    circumstances such as those present here, it is highly unlikely that
    any of the parties other than the insurers or their attorneys would
    challenge the application for retention of Gilbert. Congoleum,
    Gilbert, Perry Weitz and Joseph Rice worked together to negotiate
    the terms of the pre-packaged plan and all were deeply committed
    in having it approved. Moreover, we are aware that the standard
    set out in Travelers is a jurisprudential and not a strict statutory
    requirement for standing. We are persuaded that, in the
    circumstances here, the insurers and their attorneys have standing
    to present this appeal.
    V.
    Having concluded that standing has been established,
    we turn to the Rules of Professional Conduct and the standards set
    by the Bankruptcy Code.
    A.
    The District Court’s local rules provide that the rules
    of American Bar Association, as revised by the New Jersey
    Supreme Court, apply to attorneys practicing before the court
    “subject to such modifications as may be required or permitted by
    federal statute, regulation, court rule or decision of law.” Local
    Rule 103.1 (D.N.J.). In the absence of a “definitive state court
    decision interpreting the rules as promulgated by the [New Jersey]
    Supreme Court, the federal court will proceed to reach its own
    conclusions as to the appropriate application of the rules of
    18
    professional conduct. United States v. Balter, 
    91 F.3d 427
    , 435 (3d
    Cir. 1996) (quoting New Jersey District Court Local Rules).
    In International Business Machines Corp. v. Levin,
    
    579 F.2d 271
    , 279 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978), we noted that the “conduct
    of practitioners before the federal courts must be governed by the
    rules of those courts rather than those of the state courts.”
    However, in United States v. Miller, 
    624 F.2d 1198
     (3d Cir. 1980),
    we approved the district court’s reliance on an opinion of the
    Supreme Court of New Jersey in applying the local rules on
    professional conduct. We observed that incorporation of state law
    in this field serves to avoid “detriment to the public’s confidence
    in the integrity of the bar that might result from courts in the same
    state enforcing different ethical norms.” 
    Id. at 1200
    .
    State precedents as to professional responsibility
    should be consulted when they are compatible with federal law and
    policy and do not “balkanize federal law.” Grievance Comm. for
    Southern District of New York v. Simels, 
    48 F.3d 640
    , 645 (2d Cir.
    1995); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 
    6 F.3d 336
    , 341
    (5 th Cir. 1993). Bankruptcy professionals are required to examine
    their relationship not only based on the two-party litigation model,
    but also one guided by “a stricter, fiduciary standard.” 1 Collier on
    Bankruptcy (15 th ed.) ¶ 8.01[1].
    Rule 1.7 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional
    Conduct, like Rule 1.7 of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional
    Conduct, provides that, a lawyer shall not represent a client if there
    is a “concurrent conflict of interest,” a situation where either:
    (1) the representation of one client will be directly
    adverse to another client; or
    (2) there is a significant risk that the representation
    of one or more clients will be materially limited by
    the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a
    former client, or a third person or by a personal
    interest of the lawyer.
    NJ RPC 1.7(a).12    Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent
    12
    Rule 1.7 of the New Jersey Rules of Professional
    Conduct was revised in November 2003 and the new rule became
    19
    conflict of interest, a lawyer may undertake the representation if:
    (1) each affected client gives informed consent,
    confirmed in writing, after full disclosure and
    consultation ... [w]hen the lawyer represents multiple
    clients in a single matter, the consultation shall
    include an explanation of the common representation
    and the advantages and risks involved;
    (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer
    will be able to provide competent and diligent
    representation to each affected client;
    (3) the representation is not prohibited by law; and
    (4) the representation does not involve the assertion
    of a claim by one client against another client
    represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or
    other proceeding before a tribunal.
    NJ RPC 1.7(b).
    Comments to the ABA version of this rule explain
    the policies underlying a rule against concurrent conflicts of
    interest. Absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in
    one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other
    matter, because a conflict that materially limits a lawyer’s
    representation of her client, even absent direct adversity may hinder
    a lawyer’s ability to “recommend or advocate all possible
    positions” for her clients. Annotated Model Rules of Professional
    Conduct 109 (5 th ed.).
    As the New Jersey rule specifies, the lawyer’s own
    interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on, or
    otherwise materially limit, the representation of a client. A lawyer
    effective on January 1, 2004. The previous version of Rule 1.7 did
    not address situations where a lawyer’s responsibilities to former
    clients impaired the current representation and it did not use the
    “significant risk language”; instead it mentioned situations where
    the representation of a client “may be materially limited” by a
    lawyer’s other responsibilities. These changes do not affect our
    disposition of the case because Gilbert would have been acting
    under a concurrent conflict under either version of the rule.
    20
    cannot allow a related business interest to affect his representation,
    for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the
    lawyer has an identified financial interest. See 
    id.
    In addition to the standards established by
    professional ethics, attorneys retained in bankruptcy proceedings
    are also required to meet the restrictions imposed by section 327 of
    the Bankruptcy Code.13 Subsection (a) restricts retention of
    lawyers and other professionals to those who do not hold or
    represent an interest adverse to the estate and are disinterested.
    Subsection (e) permits employment of an attorney “for a specified
    special purpose,” so long as the attorney does not hold or represent
    “any interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate with respect to
    the matter” on which he is to be employed. The “special purpose”
    13
    Section 327(a) states:
    “ Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with the
    court's approval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountants,
    appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not
    hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are
    disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying
    out the trustee's duties under this title.”
    
    11 U.S.C.A. § 327
    (a). Section 327(e) addresses professionals
    employed for a “specified special purpose” and provides that
    “The trustee, with the court's approval, may employ,
    for a specified special purpose, other than to represent the trustee
    in conducting the case, an attorney that has represented the debtor,
    if in the best interest of the estate, and if such attorney does not
    represent or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate
    with respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be
    employed.”
    
    11 U.S.C.A. § 327
    (e).
    Section 327 applies to a debtor in possession as well
    as a trustee. United States Trustee v. Price Waterhouse, 
    19 F.3d 138
     (3d Cir. 1994).
    21
    must be unrelated to the reorganization and must be explicitly
    described in the application. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (15 th ed.) ¶
    327.04[9][d].
    To put the matter in focus we will review Gilbert’s
    activities in chronological order. In September 2002, when it had
    existing co-counsel agreements with Weitz in several asbestos
    matters, Gilbert represented Congoleum in settlement negotiations
    with Weitz to resolve the claims of two of its own clients,14 Cook
    and Arsenault, whose mesothelioma claims were then in trial.
    Congoleum settled the cases for cash, plus a secured claim against
    funds that Congoleum hoped to recover from its excess insurers.15
    In November 2002, Gilbert became co-counsel with Weitz in two
    other asbestos bankruptcy cases.
    In February 2003, Congoleum retained Gilbert for the
    purpose of negotiating the pre-packaged chapter 11 reorganization.
    The retainer called for negotiations with “key asbestos bodily
    injury claimants’ counsel” as well as arriving at the “terms of a
    ‘pre-packaged’ plan of reorganization . . . reviewing and
    commenting on the plan of reorganization . . . [and] assisting or
    consulting with Congoleum and its bankruptcy counsel on a
    strategy for confirmation of the pre-packaged plan.”
    For most of 2003, Gilbert, Weitz and Rice worked
    on the terms of an agreement to settle Congoleum’s current
    asbestos related injury claims. The settlement agreement they
    ultimately drafted provided for screening of each participating
    claimant by Kenesis, a process that was in effect during the pre-
    petition period. At the same time, Gilbert was assisting the Dughi
    firm in the coverage litigation in the New Jersey state court.
    14
    It appears that Gilbert acted as co-counsel with
    Weitz for these two individuals in their claims against another
    bankrupt asbestos company.
    15
    We note a striking disparity between the combined
    settlement of $16 million, which included fully secured
    assignments of insurance proceeds Messrs. Cook and Arseneault
    received, and the partially unsecured $100,000 settlement that
    others with mesothelioma claims would receive under the
    settlement agreement’s disease matrix.
    22
    Weitz represented many individuals who presented
    claims against Congoleum and who were screened by Kenesis and
    who were also clients of Gilbert as co-counsel.          Before the
    insurers’ appeal reached the District Court, Gilbert produced in the
    New Jersey coverage action a list of claimants that it represented
    as co-counsel with Weitz. This list contains the names of
    approximately 15,000 individuals; the insurers estimated 10,000 of
    those individuals have claims against Congoleum. Neither Gilbert
    nor Congoleum have denied that there is an overlap of claimants.16
    In at least three other asbestos claimant cases, Gilbert
    and Weitz had agreed to charge the individuals they jointly
    represented a 10% contingency fee “on any and all insurance
    proceeds recovered . . . [by the claimant] in connection with their
    claims against [the asbestos defendant] and its insurers.” The
    insurers here assert that that same fee arrangement is present in
    cases against Congoleum. Gilbert has not denied that assertion
    despite demands that it disclose the details of its fee sharing
    arrangements with Weitz. Thus Gilbert represented Congoleum
    and actively participated in the claimants’ settlement negotiations
    while simultaneously representing some of those claimants, albeit
    assertedly only in insurance matters.
    In negotiating the settlement agreement and plan
    terms with Weitz and Rice pre-petition, Gilbert, as counsel for
    Congoleum, had a duty to limit the company’s responsibility on
    such key features as the disease matrix, exposure to asbestos from
    Congoleum products, if any, and the extent of actual injury.
    Although the settlement agreement required the claimants to
    release Congoleum, Gilbert admitted in the coverage action in state
    16
    In a deposition in the New Jersey coverage action,
    Scott Gilbert, a partner in Gilbert, was asked if any of the claimants
    he represented as co-counsel with Weitz in the Robert A. Keasbey
    case were also suing Congoleum. Scott Gilbert replied that he was
    unsure how many claimants overlapped and had never attempted
    to determine if there was an overlap. In subsequent deposition
    testimony he would only “assume” that Gilbert represented clients
    in other bankruptcies that had claims against Congoleum, including
    Messrs. Cooke and Arsenault.
    23
    court that the release was a limited one and applied only if
    proceeds were recovered from the insurance companies. If that
    attempt failed, then Congoleum would be liable to the individual
    claimants for the amount of the settlements, thus pitting
    Congoleum against the individual claimants Gilbert represents as
    co-counsel with Weitz.
    Congoleum’s interests called for a reduction in the
    number of claims approved that would likely be included in a
    settlement package presented to the insurers. The insurers cited
    major deficiencies in the validity of some claims approved by
    Kenesis. To the extent that the claims were not valid, it was
    Gilbert’s responsibility in representing Congoleum to see that they
    were rejected, even though it would be adverse to Gilbert’s
    interests if those claims were pursued individually or were
    excluded from a “package” offered to the insurers in settlement.
    This was not a potential, but an actual conflict.
    To legitimize the alleged conflicts, Gilbert relies on
    waivers both from Congoleum and clients the firm represented as
    co-counsel with Weitz. However, Gilbert did not contact the
    claimants; instead it relied upon Weitz to secure those waivers.
    As discussed above, in several earlier asbestos
    bankruptcy proceedings, Weitz executed engagement letters for
    Gilbert’s work as co-counsel. In those agreements, Weitz waived
    “all present and future conflicts of interest on behalf of” the
    individual clients the firms jointly represented and agreed to advise
    the clients of the information contained in the engagement letters
    including Gilbert’s disclosure of its representation of tort
    defendants. Gilbert has not disclosed an engagement letter with
    Weitz for claimants in the Congoleum case, although it has not
    denied that one exists.
    The record does not establish that Weitz had the
    authority to issue waivers on behalf of the thousands of individual
    claimants it represented. In addition, the record does not include
    the information, if any, that Weitz furnished to the individuals nor
    does it indicate whether they were given the opportunity to object
    24
    to Gilbert’s representation.17
    Although concurrent conflicts may be waived by
    clients under the New Jersey and ABA Rules of Professional
    Conduct, the effect of a waiver, particularly a prospective waiver,
    depends upon whether the clients have given truly informed
    consent. Given the complexities of the bankruptcy proceeding and
    the “many hats” worn by Gilbert throughout the pre- and post-
    petition process, we cannot conclude that the purported waivers
    Gilbert received from Weitz “on behalf of” the individual clients
    constituted informed, prospective consent. See Baldasarre v.
    Butler, 
    625 A.2d 458
     (N.J. 1993) (concluding that informed
    consent was not sufficient in a complex commercial real estate
    transaction); In re Matter of Edward J. Dolan, 
    384 A.2d 1076
    , 1082
    (N.J. 1978) (“[T]his Court will not tolerate consents which are less
    than knowing, intelligent and voluntary.”); In re Lanza, 
    322 A.2d 445
     (N.J. 1974) (concluding that attorney should have first
    explained . . . all the facts and indicated in specific detail all of the
    areas of potential conflict that foreseeably might arise.”).
    We conclude that Gilbert did not receive effective
    waivers from the claimants it represented and, therefore, acted in
    violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
    B.
    In addition to failing to review the waiver problem,
    the bankruptcy judge relied on an unrealistic view that the
    insurance interests of the claimants and Congoleum were so closely
    aligned and so narrowly defined that there was no actual conflict
    of interest. This error was the result, to a great extent, of the
    17
    In a subsequent proceeding, the insurers
    challenged Rice & Weitz’s failure to disclose any type of co-
    counsel, consultant or fee sharing relationships as required by
    Bankruptcy Rule 20019. The bankruptcy judge directed Weitz,
    Rice and others to comply and commented that many of the
    creditors “have never seen a copy of the disclosure statement and,
    for all the court knows, have absolutely no idea how their claim
    will be treated under the plan.” Baron & Budd, P.C. v. Unsecured
    Asbestos Claimant’s Committee [Congoleum], 
    321 B.R. 147
    , 
    2005 WL 435207
     (D. N.J. 2005).
    25
    court’s refusal to consider evidence about Gilbert’s activities in
    negotiating and preparing the plan before its filing. Those pre-
    petition activities were clearly separate from seeking a recovery
    from insurance companies after the claims were liquidated or from
    attempting to negotiate settlements with the insurers.18
    The application presented to the bankruptcy court
    recited that Gilbert would be “primarily responsible for strategic
    advice on insurance issues, including but not limited to insurance-
    related settlement negotiations and the representation of the
    Debtors with respect to insurance issues arising in the context of
    the chapter 11 cases.” However, the application also stated that
    Gilbert’s representation had encompassed the negotiations of the
    plan and pre-petition settlement of asbestos claims.           The
    application indicated that services to be provided post-petition
    included “advising and assisting the debtors with respect to
    insurance-related issues in connection with the formulation,
    negotiation, and confirmation of a plan of reorganization.”
    Although the bankruptcy court relied on the narrow
    role Gilbert was to have in the reorganization process, the judge did
    not inquire about the broad scope of Gilbert’s activities in
    negotiating the plan and the settlement agreement. Nor did the
    court question Gilbert’s role post-petition, as described in
    Congoleum’s application, in “advising and assisting [Congoleum]
    with respect to insurance-related issues in connection with the
    formulation, negotiation and confirmation of a plan of
    reorganization.”
    18
    On May 13, 2005, the state judge in the New
    Jersey coverage action heard oral argument on a motion to
    disqualify Gilbert as counsel for Congoleum in that action. The
    court concluded it would “reluctantly deny the insurance
    companies’ motion to disqualify GHR as Congoleum’s attorney.”
    The judge stated that he might have reached a different result if he
    had received the motion to disqualify earlier in the proceedings.
    The court also noted, in support of its decision not to grant the
    motion to disqualify, that the Bankruptcy and District Courts in this
    proceeding had previously denied similar motions as to Gilbert’s
    alleged conflicts of interest.
    26
    Gilbert, in fact, continues to participate actively in
    formulating and revising the plan. There have been changes and
    amendments, at least four of them, to the text of the original plan
    thus far and Gilbert has been involved in that process. A fifth
    version of the plan is set for consideration some months hence.
    In the usual situation, when counsel is retained to
    recover insurance proceeds, the underlying claim has been reduced
    to a judgment or settled for a specific amount. The retention of
    special counsel to act solely as appellate lawyer in such
    circumstances is an example of the intent of section 327(e). But
    here the claims have not been liquidated – the plan has not yet been
    approved and only that ruling will confirm the specific allocation
    of damages. Until that occurs, action against the insurers is
    premature. Gilbert has attempted to draw a sharp demarcation
    between its insurance advice and other tasks it undertook. Its
    efforts, however, might be likened to attempts at using a scalpel to
    carve a bowl of soup.
    Gilbert’s retention is far too expansive an assignment
    to be appropriate for an appointment under § 327(e). The
    application more properly falls under the ambit of § 327(a) which
    allows employment of professionals to assist generally in the
    administration of the estate. That subsection, however, prohibits
    appointments of individuals or entities who hold or represent an
    interest adverse to the estate and are not “disinterested.”
    In Marvel Entertainment Group, 
    140 F.3d 463
     (3d
    Cir. 1998), we held that disqualification could be imposed where
    an actual conflict of interest was present or, within the discretion
    of the court, where a potential conflict of interest existed. The
    presence of the appearance of impropriety standing alone is not a
    sufficient ground for disqualification, 
    id. at 477
    , but there is more
    than that here. See also In re: BHNP, 
    949 F.2d 1300
    , 1313 (3d Cir.
    1991) (“[I]n some circumstances, the potential for conflict and the
    appearance of conflict may, without more, justify remov[al] . . .[of
    a trustee].”); In re: Martin, 
    817 F.2d 175
    , 180-81 (1 st Cir. 1987)
    (concluding that section 327 addresses the appearance of
    impropriety, “irrespective of the integrity of person or firm under
    consideration.”); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (15 th ed.) § 327.04[5][a]
    (noting that the appearance of impropriety may, when combined
    with a potential conflict, be sufficient for disqualification).
    27
    Our discussion of the Rules of Professional Conduct
    demonstrates that Gilbert also cannot meet the Bankruptcy Code’s
    requirement of disinterestness contained in section 327(a). Its
    status as co-counsel with Weitz and its ownership interest in
    Kenesis represent factors which prevent Gilbert from being
    completely loyal to Congoleum’s interests. We note also in this
    respect that waivers under § 327(a) are ordinarily not effective.
    See In re: Granite Partners LP, 
    219 B.R. 22
    , 34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
    1998); Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 328.05[3] (15 th ed.).
    We conclude that Gilbert’s employment in this case
    was contrary to section 327 of the Bankruptcy Code.
    We do not approve of a bankruptcy court applying
    less than careful scrutiny to pre-petition procedures in pre-
    packaged plans. The parties here seek the court’s imprimatur of a
    reorganization that will free the debtor of all current and future
    asbestos liability. The legitimacy of such a transaction is
    dependent on the stature of the court.19
    In a pre-packaged setting, most of the work on a plan
    of reorganization that would occur in a “traditional bankruptcy”
    happens before the debtor files its petition. For a court to approve
    19
    In Baron & Budd, P.C. v. Unsecured Asbestos
    Claimant’s Committee [Congoleum], 
    321 B.R. 147
     n.17, 
    2005 WL 435207
     (D. N.J. 2005), a proceeding in the Congoleum case
    subsequent to this one, both courts agreed that pre-petition
    relationships were relevant. “The totality of the facts before the
    bankruptcy court suggest the opportunity for abuse of fee sharing
    relationships, involving attorneys in connection with the pre-
    petition process, to the end of conferring preferential security
    interests on appellant’s clients.”
    See also S. Elizabeth Gibson, Fed. Judicial Ctr.,
    Judicial Management of Mass Tort Bankruptcy Cases 122 (2005).
    (“A judge presented with a prepackaged mass tort plan needs to be
    fully informed about the circumstances surrounding the prepetition
    negotiations in order to determine whether the process has been
    tainted by conflicts of interest or self-interested actions by the
    participants.”).
    28
    a pre-packaged plan whose preparation was tainted with
    overreaching, for example, would be a perversion of the
    bankruptcy process.
    Pre-packaged plans offer a means of expediting the
    bankruptcy process by doing most of the work in advance of filing.
    That efficiency, however, must not be obtained at the price of
    diminishing the integrity of the process. In this case, it was not a
    proper exercise of the bankruptcy court’s discretion to fail to
    consider and appraise the conduct of the parties and counsel pre-
    petition.
    We observe also that the bankruptcy court has an
    obligation to prevent unnecessary expenditures in the
    administration of an estate. See In re: Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs.,
    Inc., 
    19 F.3d 833
     (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the bankruptcy court
    has authority to examine counsel fees sua sponte). Even if it be
    assumed that Gilbert’s representation of Congoleum post-petition
    was exclusively related to its forthcoming disputes with the
    insurers, it is not clear on this record why it was necessary to
    appoint an additional firm to handle insurance issues. The Dughi
    firm had represented Congoleum for more than ten years in
    insurance matters and had been actively engaged in the state court
    coverage action since 2001. The record fails to reveal what special
    competence in the insurance field Gilbert would provide in
    addition to that of the Dughi firm.
    The flood of asbestos litigation has been a serious
    problem for the courts of this country because the large number of
    claims are not easily adaptable to traditional common law
    procedures. See Achem Products v. Windsor, 
    521 U.S. 591
     (1997);
    Combustion Engineering, 
    391 F.3d at 200
    . Congress has provided
    for the use of a trust and channeling injunction as a possible
    solution, but it appears that the proposals for implementation of an
    administrative system somewhat similar to that used in black lung
    claims are more promising.
    As this case demonstrates, leaving the procedures for
    allocation of resources predominantly in the hands of private,
    conflicting interests has led to problems of fair and equal
    resolution. The need for counsel with undivided loyalties is more
    pressing in cases of this nature than in more familiar conventional
    litigation. Correspondingly, the level of court supervision must be
    29
    of a high order.
    Many of the issues are similar to those that arise in
    class actions for personal injuries. In re: Community Bank of
    Northern Virginia, 
    418 F.3d 277
     (3d Cir. 2005), we commented
    that “in class actions, particularly settlement-only suits, the district
    court has a duty ‘to protect the members of the class . . . from
    lawyers for the class who may, in derogation of their professional
    and fiduciary obligations, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead
    of that of the class.’” 
    Id. at 318
     (quoting Reynolds v. Beneficial
    Nat’l Bank, 
    288 F.3d 277
    , 279 (7 th Cir. 2002)). We need make no
    finding that this has occurred in the case before us, but we caution
    that here, as in situations of settlement-only class litigation,
    “careful and comprehensive scrutiny is required.”
    We recognize that ordinarily a remand to the District
    and Bankruptcy courts would be in order for further findings and
    appropriate action. However, here the record contains sufficient
    evidence that we may expedite the procedures. Therefore, we will
    reverse the order approving the retention of the Gilbert firm and
    remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with
    this Opinion.
    30
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-3609

Citation Numbers: 426 F.3d 675

Filed Date: 10/13/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023

Authorities (31)

In Re: Combustion Engineering, Inc. First State Insurance ... , 391 F.3d 190 ( 2004 )

James J. Kevlik v. David B. Goldstein, Town of Derry , 724 F.2d 844 ( 1984 )

Grievance Committee for the Southern District of New York v.... , 48 F.3d 640 ( 1995 )

in-re-community-bank-of-northern-virginia-and-guaranty-national-bank-of , 418 F.3d 277 ( 2005 )

fed-sec-l-rep-p-95400-international-electronics-corporation-and , 527 F.2d 1288 ( 1975 )

In Re Larry T. & Cynthia J. Martin D/B/A a & W Drive-In ... , 817 F.2d 175 ( 1987 )

In Re: United Artists Theatre Company, Debtors v. Donald F. ... , 315 F.3d 217 ( 2003 )

in-re-g-i-holdings-inc-fka-gaf-corporation-debtor-the-official , 385 F.3d 313 ( 2004 )

United States Trustee v. Price Waterhouse Sharon Steel ... , 19 F.3d 138 ( 1994 )

In Re Ernest Dykes Charlene Dykes, Debtors. General Motors ... , 10 F.3d 184 ( 1993 )

brian-s-miller-michael-rose-michelle-rose-hw-on-behalf-of-themselves , 362 F.3d 209 ( 2004 )

In Re: Pillowtex, Inc. Patricia A. Staiano, the United ... , 304 F.3d 246 ( 2002 )

in-re-amatex-corporation-formerly-known-as-american-asbestos-textile , 755 F.2d 1034 ( 1985 )

international-business-machines-corporation-v-howard-s-levin-and-levin , 579 F.2d 271 ( 1978 )

United States v. Miller, William G. , 624 F.2d 1198 ( 1980 )

In Re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litigation (Mdl 414). ... , 748 F.2d 157 ( 1984 )

In Re Busy Beaver Building Centers, Inc. Kirkpatrick & ... , 19 F.3d 833 ( 1994 )

Christopher Furnari v. Warden, Allenwood Federal ... , 218 F.3d 250 ( 2000 )

bankr-l-rep-p-76575-in-re-indian-palms-associates-ltd-bc-90-25765 , 61 F.3d 197 ( 1995 )

travelers-insurance-company-v-hk-porter-company-inc-the-official , 45 F.3d 737 ( 1995 )

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