Edwin Estien, Jr. v. Mary Showalter ( 2018 )

Case: 17-3331 Document: 003112833578 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/23/2018
BLD-095 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-3331
___________
EDWIN ESTIEN, JR.,
Appellant
v.
MARY LOU SHOWALTER, Correctional Healthcare Administrator;
TRACY PARKES, Corizon Clinical Coordinator;
LIEUTENANT RAY DUNKLES;
CAPTAIN J. HARRIS; R.N. PAULA PRICE;
DR. LUIS O. ARANEDA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civil No. 1-13-cv-02474)
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 18, 2018
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 23, 2018)
_________
OPINION *
_________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Edwin Estien, Jr., proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals from the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the three remaining defendants in
an action Estien brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons that follow, we
will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary
for our discussion. During the time relevant to this litigation, Estien was incarcerated at
the State Correctional Institution in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania. 1 In April 2012, Estien
injured his left wrist and thumb after a fight with another inmate. He was subsequently
placed into the Restrictive Housing Unit, which houses inmates in disciplinary or
administrative custody. He claims that he did not receive any medical assistance for his
injuries for three days before he was taken to the emergency room at a nearby hospital.
He asserts that several institutional staff members violated his constitutional rights in the
following months.
Specifically, he claims that defendant Lieutenant Ray Dunkle caused a three-day
delay before he initially received medical treatment, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Estien also maintains that former Corrections Health Care Administrator
Mary Lou Showalter and former Clinical Coordinator and current Health Services
1
Estien is presently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Smithfield in
Huntingdon, Pennsylvania.
2
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Administrator Traci Parkes intentionally delayed scheduling or requesting medical
appointments for him on a number of occasions. Finally, he asserts that Showalter
violated his First Amendment rights by delaying or failing to request medical
appointments for him in retaliation for his complaints to her.
In September 2013, Estien filed a complaint against these defendants and three
others. The District Court dismissed Estien’s claims against three defendants early in the
litigation but allowed his claims against Dunkle, Showalter, and Parkes to continue.
They moved for summary judgment on Estien’s remaining claims, while Estien filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment. The District Court granted defendants’ motions for
summary judgment on September 28, 2017, denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for
summary judgment. Estien timely appealed.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise
plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment; thus, we apply the
same standard as the district court. Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265
(3d Cir. 2014). We will “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is
sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, “all justifiable inferences are to be
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drawn in . . . favor” of the non-moving party. Id. at 255. However, a mere “scintilla of
evidence” in support of the non-moving party does not create a genuine issue of material
fact. Id. at 252. Additionally, “the non-movant may not rest on speculation and
conjecture in opposing a motion for summary judgment.” Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins.
Co., 814 F.3d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 2016). We may summarily affirm a district court’s
decision “on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial
question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
III.
The District Court properly granted summary judgment for defendants, as Estien
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against Dunkle or Showalter and failed to
show that Parkes was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires prisoners to exhaust
available administrative remedies before bringing a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct
by prison officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[P]roper exhaustion of administrative
remedies is necessary” to fulfill the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). An inmate must substantially comply with a prison grievance
system’s procedural rules to avoid procedural default of a claim. See Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 228-32 (3d Cir. 2004). The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’
grievance policy involves a three-step process that an inmate must fully complete in order
to properly exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA. See Booth v. Churner,
206 F.3d 289, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
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Estien submitted numerous grievances between June and July 2012 relating to the
care that he was receiving for his injuries. Estien admits that although he initiated
numerous grievances, he did not complete the three-step appeal process for any of them.
He argues that he attempted to complete the full process for one grievance relevant to this
appeal, but that his request for an extension of time to file his appeal was denied. He also
claims that he requested free photocopies of his appeal paperwork from the prison law
library to pursue his appeal but was denied them as his prison account did not meet the
threshold for receiving free copies. He does not explain why that finding was inaccurate
or demonstrate how it prevented him from pursuing that appeal. Nor does he explain
why he failed to pursue any of the other appeals. Estien has not shown that he was
“thwarted [in] his efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies” such that the grievance
process was not “available” to him. See Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir.
2002). Thus, Dunkle and Showalter are entitled to summary judgment. 2
The District Court also properly granted summary judgment to defendant Parkes,
as Estien failed to show that she was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
2
Defendant Parkes did not raise the issue of exhaustion in her summary judgment
motion or subsequent briefs. We note that Parkes did raise this issue in her answer to
Estien’s complaint and that Estien was on notice of the exhaustion issue as the other
defendants raised it and it applies equally to all defendants in this case. Additionally,
Parkes’ attorney asked Estien at his deposition about whether any of his grievances had
addressed Parkes’ actions, and Estien admitted that most of them had not; he could not
identify the one in which he believed he had included Parkes. Nonetheless, defendants
have the “burden of proving the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust remedies.”
Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 2002). As Parkes did not pursue this defense
on summary judgment, we address the merits of Estien’s claim against her.
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The Supreme Court has held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “In order to state
a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. at 106. Establishing a
claim requires proving both an objective component—“a serious medical need”—and a
subjective component—“acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate
indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d
Cir. 2003). A plaintiff may show deliberate indifference by demonstrating that “there
was objective evidence that [the] plaintiff had serious need for medical care . . . and
prison officials ignored that evidence” or where “necessary medical treatment is delayed
for non-medical reasons.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Estien’s only evidence in support of his deliberate indifference claim against
Parkes is his personal belief that Parkes failed to schedule him to receive medical care
between April 17-20, either delayed scheduling or failed to schedule a follow-up
appointment on April 23 for hand surgery after his emergency room visit on April 20, and
generally failed to timely schedule other external medical appointments.
As the District Court concluded, Estien’s speculations are insufficient to allow his
claim against Parkes to survive summary judgment. The record demonstrates that Parkes
is not a medical professional; she did not provide medical services. She was responsible
for the administrative duty of scheduling medical appointments for inmates, based on the
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availability of external healthcare providers and the availability of prison personnel to
transport the inmate to an external appointment. She scheduled appointments only at the
direction of prison medical staff; she could not initiate appointments herself. Parkes did
not have access to inmate medical records or their medical conditions in her
administrative capacity.
Estien’s medical records repeatedly contradict his assertion that any doctor
recommended at the emergency room on April 20 that he be scheduled for a follow-up
appointment on April 23, which is the only way Parkes would have been informed to
schedule an appointment for him. His remaining allegations are equally unfounded.
There is no evidence that Parkes knew what Estien’s condition was, as she did not have
access to his medical records. Estien’s vague conjecture that Parkes somehow both knew
about his condition and neglected to schedule medical care for him between April 17-20
fails to establish her knowledge or that any medical professional informed Parkes about
his condition and instructed her to take any action. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,
236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison
doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical
prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter
requirement of deliberate indifference.”). Estien’s general allegations about Parkes’
failure to schedule later appointments at some point in the following months fare no
better, as they are based entirely on his belief about what Parkes knew and do not
specifically describe any instances when she failed to schedule him for medical
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intervention as directed to by medical providers. Thus, Parkes was entitled to summary
judgment.
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