SGS US Testing Co v. Takata Corporation , 547 F. App'x 147 ( 2013 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 12-3284
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SGS U.S. TESTING COMPANY, INC.,
Appellant
v.
TAKATA CORPORATION; TK HOLDINGS, INC.; JOHN DOE COMPANIES
(1–50)
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District Court of New Jersey
District Court No. 2-09-cv-06007
District Judge: The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 12, 2013
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 26, 2013)
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OPINION
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
The appellant, SGS U.S. Testing Company, tests seatbelts and other
products for its clients. Over a seventeen-year period, SGS tested nearly six
hundred seatbelts for the appellees, Takata Corporation and its affiliates. Amid
allegations that the tests were inadequate and the seatbelts unsafe, SGS and Takata
were named as defendants in multiple class actions. None of the actions were
successful. Before and after each action, SGS requested indemnification from
Takata, and Takata denied all requests. Those denials led to this lawsuit.
SGS sued Takata for contractual indemnification, breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and common-law indemnification. The District Court
dismissed the first and second claims for failure to state a claim and granted
Takata‟s motion for summary judgment on the third claim. SGS appeals all three
decisions. For the reasons that follow, we will reverse in part and affirm in part.1
SGS‟s first argument is that it has a valid claim for contractual
indemnification. We review de novo a District Court‟s dismissal under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), applying the same standard as the District Court.
See Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). “Under Rule
12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded
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The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and
we have final-order jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The parties and the
District Court assumed that New Jersey substantive law applies, and we see no
reason to assume otherwise. See Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., 63 F.3d 166,
180 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (concluding that “choice of law issues may be
waived”).
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allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, a court finds that [the] plaintiff‟s claims lack facial plausibility.” Id.
(quoting Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011)).
In exchange for SGS‟s testing services, Takata agreed to indemnify SGS.
Indeed, the parties executed several contracts with various indemnification
provisions over the years. New Jersey‟s indemnification law distinguishes
between vicarious-liability and independent-fault cases. Mantilla v. NC Mall
Assocs., 770 A.2d 1144, 1149 (N.J. 2001). In Mantilla, the Court “adopt[ed] the
„after-the-fact‟ approach” to determine whether a party has defended against
allegations of its independent fault. Id. at 1149, 1151 (citing Cent. Motor Parts
Corp. v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 596 A.2d 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991)). This approach “permits an indemnitee to recover counsel fees if the
indemnitee is adjudicated to be free from active wrongdoing regarding the
plaintiff‟s injury, and has tendered the defense to the indemnitor at the start of the
litigation.” Id. at 1151 (citing Cent. Motor Parts Corp., 596 A.2d at 769). This
does not mean that an indemnitee is automatically entitled to an award for the
costs of defense. Rather, as Kieffer v. Best Buy, 14 A.3d 737 (N.J. 2011),
demonstrates, when the indemnitee has been adjudged free of any wrongdoing, the
ability to recover depends upon the language of the contract. Id. at 743-44 & n.6
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(concluding that adjudication that owner, contractor and subcontractor were not
negligent entitled indemnitee owner to indemnification based on expansive
language indemnifying it from “any and all” claims, but that indemnitee contractor
was not entitled to indemnification for costs of defense since contract with
subcontractor required judicial finding of negligence by subcontractor). If
application of the after-the-fact approach establishes that an indemnitee “has been
found to be at least partially at fault,” then the indemnitee “may not recover the
costs of its defense from an indemnitor” unless there is explicit language in the
indemnity contract. Mantilla, 770 A.2d at 1145.
Employing the “after-the-fact” approach here, it is evident that the
complaint alleged that SGS, as indemnitee, was adjudicated free of wrongdoing
and that it tendered the defense to Takata, the indemnitor, at the outset of the
litigation. See JA. 442 (¶¶14-24). SGS, therefore, may be entitled to recover its
defense costs depending upon the language of the various indemnity contracts.
See Mantilla, 770 A.2d at 1151, Kieffer, 14 A.3d at 743-44. Accordingly, we
conclude that the allegations in SGS‟s complaint were sufficient to state a claim
for indemnification under New Jersey law and that the District Court erred by
dismissing the claim.
We note, however, that in New Jersey “[an] indemnitee may recover only
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those fees and expenses attributable to the making of defenses which are not
primarily directed toward rebutting charges of active negligence.” Central Motor
Parts Corp., 596 A.2d at 762 (quoting Piedmont Equip. Co. v. Eberhard Mfg. Co.,
665 P.2d 256, 258-259 (Nev. 1983)). See also Piedmont, 665 P.2d at 260 (holding
that an indemnitee who was “exonerated of liability at trial” was, nonetheless, only
entitled to recover expenses not directed at rebutting charges of active negligence.)
In this case, SGS incurred substantial expenses defending its testing methodology.
On remand, the District Court will need to consider whether, in light of the
language of the indemnification provisions, these expenses should be excluded
from any recovery.
SGS‟s second argument is that it also has a valid claim for breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing. This duty “is implied in every contract in New
Jersey.” Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1126 (N.J. 2001).
Conduct that is contrary to “community standards of decency, fairness or
reasonableness” violates the duty. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 205 cmt. a (1981)); see also id. at 1130 (“Bad motive or intention is essential.”).
The District Court dismissed this claim because it concluded that SGS did not have
a valid “claim for contractual indemnification.” JA. 16. As explained, that
conclusion was wrong and the claim should not have been dismissed.
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SGS‟s third and final argument is that the District Court improperly granted
summary judgment on its common-law indemnification claim. For many of the
reasons stated in the District Court‟s opinion, see JA. 41–46, we conclude that
summary judgment was proper.
In sum, we will affirm the District Court‟s order granting summary
judgment on SGS‟s common-law indemnification claim. But we will reverse its
order dismissing SGS‟s claims for contractual indemnification and breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and we will remand for further proceedings.
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