United States v. Carl Knight , 550 F. App'x 76 ( 2014 )

ALD-116 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-3910
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CARL ANTHONY KNIGHT,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 1-98-cr-00003-002)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
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Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4
and I.O.P. 10.6
January 9, 2014
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 23, 2014)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Carl Anthony Knight was convicted in 1999 for conspiracy to distribute crack
cocaine and was sentenced to life imprisonment. See United States v. Knight, No. 99-
3667, 50 F. App’x 565 (3d Cir. 2002). In 2013, he filed a motion to correct a purported
clerical error in his judgment order pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36, which provides that
“the court may at any time correct a clerical error in a judgment . . . or correct an error in
the record arising from oversight or omission.” Knight argued that his judgment
correctly reflected that he was convicted for violating 21 U.S.C. § 846, but should also
have indicated that he had been convicted of aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. Knight did not contend that this omission had any effect on his conviction or
sentence; rather, he argued merely that the judgment order should be “factually accurate
upon its face.” See United States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423, 425 (3d Cir. 1987)
(clerical error “must not be one of judgment or even of misidentification, but merely of
recitation, of the sort that a clerk or amanuensis might commit, mechanical in nature”)
(quotation marks omitted).
The District Court determined—and we agree—that although Knight’s co-
defendants may have been charged with aiding and abetting, the sole count for which
Knight was convicted was a violation of § 846. Thus, there was no error to correct in
Knight’s judgment, and the District Court properly denied his Rule 36 motion.1 Because
Knight’s appeal of that denial presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.
See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011)
(per curiam).
1
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We have not established in a precedential
opinion the standard in this Circuit for reviewing the denial of a Rule 36 motion, but we
need not do so today because we would affirm under any available standard.
2