Diallo v. Attorney General of the United States of America , 553 F. App'x 141 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 13-2750
    ___________
    ABDOULAYE DIALLO,
    AKA Boubacr Sese,
    AKA Abdulai Tanu Jalloh,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent
    ____________________________________
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    (Agency No. A093-441-557)
    Immigration Judge: Honorable Mirlande Tadal
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    January 28, 2014
    Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: January 29, 2014)
    ___________
    OPINION
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    Abdoulaye Diallo, a/k/a Boubacr Sese a/k/a Abdulai Tanu Jalloh, a native and
    citizen of Guinea, initially entered the United States in September 1999. He subsequently
    applied for asylum, using the alias Abdulai Tanu Jalloh and claiming to be from Sierra
    Leone. His application was denied, and he was ordered removed in an order the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upheld in 2004. At some point, he returned to the United
    States. Diallo married a United States citizen in April 2011 and sought to adjust his
    status on the basis of that marriage (he was unable to do so because his wife was
    unavailable for the necessary interview because she had been incarcerated). In December
    2011, about a month after his wife was incarcerated, he sought, and was granted,
    permission to travel to Guinea to see his terminally ill mother. After a short stop in
    Belgium, Diallo remained in Guinea until September 2012.
    Diallo was not readmitted to the United States on his return because he had
    previously been removed. The Government charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C.
    § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) 1 and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). 2 He conceded the charges and
    sought asylum, withholding, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
    1
    “Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure
    (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into
    the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.”
    2
    “Any immigrant at the time of application for admission . . . who is not in possession of
    a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or
    other valid entry document required by this Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other
    suitable travel document, . . . is inadmissible.”
    2
    (“CAT”) based on what he alleged to have experienced in Guinea while he was there to
    visit his gravely ill mother.
    Specifically, in his affidavit and at his hearing, Diallo primarily described events
    that happened on August 27, 2012, August 28, 2012, and September 8, 2012. He
    claimed that he belongs to the largest opposition party in Guinea, the Union of
    Democratic Forces in Guinea (“UFDG”), and has served on the security team for its
    leader, Cellou Dallen Diallo, in the United States and in Guinea. On the security team on
    August 27, 2012, he and others were tear-gassed by police outside of Cellou Dallen
    Diallo’s compound and en route to a protest rally. At checkpoints, others were arrested
    and injured. At the rally itself, police fired tear gas and bullets. Cellou Dallen Diallo and
    another opposition leader (and the former prime minister of Guinea), Lansana Kouyate,
    had to return to Kouyate’s compound. There, they conferred with a government
    prosecutor and security officials about the situation; ultimately, the prosecutor guaranteed
    the leaders safe passage.
    However, Diallo, on his way home, was arrested at a security checkpoint, beaten
    (among other things, a guard broke one of Diallo’s toenails when he hit his foot with his
    gun), and detained after security forces saw a picture of Cello Dallen Diallo and Diallo’s
    security badge in his car. He was released and driven home on August 28, 2012, after
    brokering a deal with a gendarme for his release in exchange for $500 and an agreement
    that he would not participate in UFDG activities. On that day, he went into hiding for the
    rest of the day, with the exception of a visit to a clinic from about 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m.
    3
    Then, at an opposition rally that he attended as a UFDG security officer on September 8,
    2012, he saw the gendarme with whom he had made the agreement. Fearful, he did not
    return home. Later that night, gendarmes came to his family’s compound and searched
    for him there. He decided to leave Guinea, but before doing so, he learned from his
    father that a friend of his father had heard that security forces were planning to kill him at
    the final ceremonies in a football tournament later that month, if he attended, as he had
    wished to attend, with Cellou Dallen Diallo. Diallo’s mother died the next day, but he
    did not return home, leaving for the United States soon thereafter instead. He noted that
    the hostility toward the UFDG is also based on hostility toward the ethnic group to which
    he belongs.
    The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Diallo’s applications on the basis of an
    adverse credibility finding and Diallo’s failure to meet his respective burdens of proof.
    She also denied asylum as a matter of discretion. 3 The BIA rested its decision on the
    adverse credibility finding alone in regards to the asylum and withholding claims and did
    not reach the other bases for denial of relief. The BIA separately ruled on the CAT
    claim, holding that Diallo had not credibly established past torture and that there was no
    clear error in the IJ’s determination that he had not established that he would face torture
    on his return.
    3
    She nonetheless held that Diallo had corroborated the claims in his application.
    4
    Diallo, proceeding pro se, presents a petition for review. He argues that the BIA
    erred in upholding the IJ’s decision denying his applications for asylum, withholding, and
    CAT relief. Informal Brief at 1. His main arguments are that the adverse credibility
    finding is not supported, in part because the agency misinterpreted the REAL ID Act
    when it relied on his “past statements and one stamp in his passport,” Memorandum
    accompany Informal Brief at 3 & Informal Brief at 4, and that he presented sufficient
    evidence to show persecution, Memorandum accompanying Informal Brief at 3. He
    generally asks that the BIA’s decision be reversed, Memorandum accompanying
    Informal Brief at 6, and at one point, specifically asks that the asylum and withholding
    rulings be reversed. Informal Brief at 5. The Government counters that the adverse
    credibility finding should stand given Diallo’s prior fraud, a discrepancy between
    Diallo’s testimony and the evidentiary record, and Diallo’s failure to adequately and
    independently corroborate his claim. The Government also states that Diallo has waived
    his CAT claim.
    We have jurisdiction over Diallo’s petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We
    consider questions of law de novo. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 
    280 F.3d 297
    , 302 n.2 (3d
    Cir. 2002). We review factual findings, such as an adverse credibility determination, for
    substantial evidence. See Butt v. Gonzales, 
    429 F.3d 430
    , 433 (3d Cir. 2005). We
    evaluate whether a credibility determination was “appropriately based on inconsistent
    statements, contradictory evidences, and inherently improbable testimony . . . in view of
    the background evidence of country conditions.” Chen v. Ashcroft, 
    376 F.3d 215
    , 223
    5
    (3d Cir. 2004). We afford an adverse credibility finding substantial deference, so long as
    the finding is supported by sufficient, cogent reasons. See 
    Butt, 429 F.3d at 434
    . After
    reviewing the matter, we cannot say that the record compels a conclusion different from
    the one reached by the agency in regards to the credibility determination.
    In affirming the IJ’s decision, the BIA relied on an inconsistency that, as the BIA
    described it, goes to the heart of Diallo’s claim. 4 Diallo testified that after he was
    released early in the morning on August 28, 2012, and returned home, he stayed into
    hiding for the rest of the day, leaving only for a short visit to a clinic in the early
    afternoon. R. 169. But, during the hearing, Diallo also testified that he took his passport
    to the French Embassy and applied for a visa. His passport includes an entry “Visa
    demandé le 28/08/12 à Conakry.” R. 360. The French-qualified interpreter at the hearing
    translated the phrase as meaning “a request.” R. 172. Counsel for the Government noted
    to Diallo that the stamp in his passport “seems to indicate that you requested a visa to
    France on that particular day.” R. 173. Diallo responded, “But they refused to give me a
    visa.” R. 174. He seemed to imply that the refusal was on August 28, 2012, but he did
    4
    In a pre-REAL-ID Act case, the discrepancies identified by the agency had to go to the
    heart of the claim to support the adverse credibility determination. See Gao v. Ashcroft,
    
    299 F.3d 266
    , 272 ( 3d Cir. 2002). Now, under the REAL ID Act, an adverse credibility
    determination can be based on inconsistencies that do not go to the heart of the
    applicant’s claim, but inconsistencies must be considered as part of “the totality of the
    circumstances, and all relevant factors.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). However, under
    the circumstances, because the fact on which there is an inconsistency in this case is so
    central, it could serve as a sufficient basis to put in question the rest of Diallo’s
    testimony. We do not need to consider the parties’ competing arguments about the
    significance of Diallo’s past fraud in the calculus.
    6
    not learn of the denial until after the rally and other events. R. 174. When asked when he
    applied for the visa, he said that he did not “remember exactly the date,” and then
    explained that he “gave the passport to someone because on that embassy, you can pay
    someone to help you to get the visa.” R. 174. He said that he had given the passport and
    photographs over previously and received it back later from a man who said, “I am sorry,
    I was not able to help you.” R. 174. To explain why he wanted to leave the country
    before the events of August 27, 2012, and while his mother was terminally ill, Diallo
    further testified that he had planned to go to France because he was going “to buy some
    stuff and to come back to Guinea to sell them.” R. 174.
    As the BIA noted, the stamp in Diallo’s passport indicates that he requested a visa
    on August 28, 2012. The translation of “demandé” is in the record, and Diallo did not
    deny that “demandé” means requested. A request for a visa at the French Embassy on
    August 28, 2012, conflicts with his testimony at the basis of his claim for persecution. It
    is inconsistent with his claim that he stayed in hiding on that day after being released
    from detention (with the exception of a trip to a clinic for treatment). Furthermore, the
    BIA had a basis for rejecting Diallo’s alternative explanation, which involved references
    to “someone” and an unspecified date, as unpersuasive. For these reasons, we conclude
    that the adverse credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence.
    Lastly, although the issue of waiver of the CAT claim is close, we cannot
    conclude, as the Government asserts, that Diallo did not challenge it at all. He clearly
    mentioned it in his informal brief. And he challenges the credibility determination that
    7
    figured in an alternative basis for the denial of CAT relief. Upon review, however, we
    conclude that the BIA properly denied Diallo’s CAT claim.
    For these reasons, we will deny Diallo’s petition for review.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-2750

Citation Numbers: 553 F. App'x 141

Judges: Fuentes, Greenberg, Per Curiam, Van Antwerpen

Filed Date: 1/29/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2023